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I. INTRODUCTION
During the United States Supreme Court's October Term, 2000,' the
Court issued opinions in 87 cases, of which approximately forty percent in-
volved criminal procedure, federal habeas, immigration and other criminal
justice related matters. Without question the most intriguing decision, how-
ever, was Bush v. Gore,2 which ended the dispute over election returns in the
state of Florida and decided the 2000 presidential election. What relevance
does an equal protection case involving voting rights in a presidential elec-
tion have for criminal procedure? Perhaps a great deal.
1. The Court's 2000 Term extended from October 2,2000 to September 30, 2001.
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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A. Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights
The essential equal protection principle underlying Bush v. Gore is eas-
ily grasped: Where a fundamental right is at stake, official discretion must be
controlled to prevent unequal treatment in the enjoyment of that right.?
Stated broadly, Bush v. Gore thus teaches that the failure to create standards
to control official discretion alone can violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment when abridgment of a fundamental right is in-
volved. Thus, to establish an equal protection violation, in this context, it is
not necessary to prove "the existence of purposeful discrimination."'
While the Court has been subject to harsh criticism5 for intervening in
presidential politics, and for the manner in which it intervened, that criticism
has not been directed at the equal protection principle itself. Indeed, as Pro-
fessor Cass Sunstein has observed, the underlying principle "behind the
equal protection ruling has considerable appeal" and broadly understood
"should bring a range of questionable practices under fresh constitutional
scrutiny."6 While Professor Sunstein's remarks were made in the context of
discussing the equal treatment of voters, why should the equal protection
principle suddenly lose its appeal when applied in the criminal justice con-
text to require equal treatment of criminal defendants, especially those ac-
cused of capital offenses?7
Indeed, the argument for requiring controls on discretion to ensure equal
treatment would seem even more compelling in the latter context than in the
former. As the Court in Bush v. Gore acknowledged, an "individual citizen
has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for President of the
United States."8 The Court found that where the state has created such an en-
titlement, however, the right to vote is "fundamental."9 The Court noted that
3. Id. at 104-05.
4. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (citing Whitos v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545, 550 (1967)). In McCleskey the Court held that defendant's reliance upon empirical stud-
ies, showing a statistically significant risk that race influenced jury decisions imposing the
death penalty in the state of Georgia, was insufficient to establish an equal protection viola-
tion because statistical studies could not "prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with
discriminatory purpose." Id. (emphasis in original). McKleskey, however, raised a traditional,
category-type equal protection claim based upon suspect class status. Such a claim requires
proof of intentional or purposeful discrimination against the suspect class. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In contrast, the claim raised in Bush v. Gore does not depend
upon this categorical approach, but argues simply that official discretion must be controlled to
prevent disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals, regardless of their status.
5. Symposium, Bush v. Gore, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 613 (2001).
6. Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. Cii. L. REv. 737, 773 (2001).
7. Indeed Professor Sunstein expressly recognizes this implication of Bush v. Gore. Id. at
772.
8. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104. Indeed, the states have total discretion in deciding how
the members of the electoral college representing their state will be selected. Article II pro-
vides for election of the President by "Electors" who are to be appointed "in such Manner as
the Legislature [of each state] may direct." U.S. CONST. art. II § 2.
9. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104. Fundamental rights are given heightened judicial pro-
[Vol. 38
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"one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight to be accorded
each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter."'"
Applying the equal protection principle safeguarding fundamental rights
to Florida's manual recount procedures, the Court ruled that "in the absence
of specific standards to ensure its equal application"" the broad "intent of
the voter"'" standard permitted "disparate treatment" between voters in dif-
ferent counties. This failure to have adequate standards for controlling offi-
cial discretion thus violated the Equal Protection guarantee because it al-
lowed the state to "value one person's vote over that of another.""
Certainly the Bush v. Gore equal protection principle ought to be no less
applicable when a state permits "disparate treatment" of death-eligible de-
fendants. This occurs when prosecutors in a state use differing standards to
elect those particular death-eligible defendants in their county they will seek
to execute. In contrast to the implied right at issue in Bush v. Gore, the "right
to life" is a fundamental right that is found in the Constitutional text, ex-
pressly protected by both the Fifth 5 and Fourteenth Amendments.'6 Indeed
as the Framers proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, it is to secure
such "inalienable" rights that governments are instituted.'7
tection in the form of strict judicial scrutiny. See Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).
10. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104.
11. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
12. The Florida Supreme Court had ordered that ballots not counted by machine should
be manually examined and counted as a legal vote if "the intent of the voter" could be ascer-
tained. No standards, however, had been promulgated for determining how such intent was to
be determined. The Court stated, "Florida's basic command .. is to consider the 'intent of
the voter.' ... This is unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and as a starting principle.
The problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application." Id.
at 105-06 (quoting Gore v. Harris, 773 So.2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000)).
13. For example, there appeared to be a difference in treatment among several counties
with respect to whether an indentation, or dimple, which did not penetrate through the paper
ballot sufficiently to cause light to shine through, was counted or not. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
at 105.
14. Id. at 104-05.
15. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
16. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
Co sT. amend. XIV. Because the right to life explicitly protected by these Amendments is
"fundamental" and therefore entitled to heightened judicial protection, would seem self-
evident. This has been recognized in Jolhson v. Zerbt, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) and Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), where Justice Marshall observed:
The concepts of cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due process be-
come so close as to merge when the substantive due process argument is stated in
the following manner: because capital punishment deprives an individual of a fun-
damental right (i.e., the right to life) ... the State needs a compelling interest to
justify it.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 359 n. 141 (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring).
17. THEDECLARATnONOFL\DEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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As is true of voting rights, the fundamental nature of the right to life lies
in the equal weight to be accorded each life and the equal dignity owed to
each defendant. The absence of specific state-wide standards to ensure that
prosecutorial decisions do not result in "disparate treatment" between simi-
larly situated death-eligible defendants in different counties, permits the state
to "value one person's [life] over that of another" and violates the Equal Pro-
tection guarantee.
It has been said, however, that because Bush v. Gore dealt with a unique
situation of immediate national importance, the decision is "sui generis;"
that it will not "have legs" to carry its equal protection principle beyond the
bounds of voting rights cases. 9 But to stamp the Court's decision with a la-
bel warning that the principle it announces is good "for this case only," is to
admit that the Court is simply a "naked power organ" which has perverted
the prime directive to decide cases according to principle rather than poli-
tics.2"
All students of the Constitution, including Judge Robert Bork, agree that
a "principled decision is one that rests on reasons ... that in their generality
and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved."'" As
Judge Bork explains:
The requirement that the Court be principled arises from the resolution of
the seeming anomaly of judicial supremacy in a democratic society. If thejudiciary really is supreme, able to rule when and as it sees fit, the society
is not democratic. The anomaly is dissipated however, by the model of
government embodied in the structure of the Constitution, a model upon
which popular consent to limited government by the Supreme Court also
rests. This model we may... call "Madisonian."... [I]t follows that the
Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can demonstrate in reasoned
opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitution.... If it
does not have such a theory but merely imposes its own value choices, or
worse if it pretends to have a theory but actually follows its own predilec-
tions, the Court violates the postulates of the Madisonian model that alone
22justifies its power.
Lower courts, therefore, cannot assume that Bush v. Gore's equal pro-
tection principle should not be taken seriously. These courts will have to ex-
plain why the equal protection principle established in that decision does not
also apply to the right to life, which unlike the implied right to vote for elec-
tors, is explicitly recognized in the text of our nation's founding documents.
Moreover this justification will have to satisfy the most rigorous standard of
18. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
19. Michael C. Doff, The 2000 Presidential Election: Archetype or Exception?, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2001).
20. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1971).
21. Id. at 2 (quoting H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in
PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAIMENTAL LAW 3, 27 (1961)).
22. Bork, supra note 20, at 2-3.
[Vol. 38
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judicial review-strict scrutiny.' Thus, prosecutors will have the burden of
proving that it is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest
that they be given absolute discretion, unrestrained by statewide standards,
to select from among those defendants eligible for death, those who will be
executed.'4 This would seem a most difficult burden to meet. To suggest that
there does not have to be "at least some assurance that the rudimentary re-
quirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied"' when
the fundamental right to life hangs in the balance, is to repudiate Bush v.
Gore as a legitimate exercise of judicial power.
What compelling interest could the government assert for not having
statewide standards, for example, that would reduce the likelihood of con-
victing and executing an innocent person? Cases that depend upon eyewit-
ness identification testimony provide a classic example where statewide
standards could be employed. Just as certain types of vote tabulating ma-
chines have a known error rate, we now know that cases depending upon
eyewitness identification also result in erroneous convictions. :6 In death-
eligible cases where the identification of the assailant is at issue and the
state's case will be based on eyewitness identification testimony, a statewide
standard could provide uniformity by restraining prosecutorial discretion to
seek death unless DNA or other evidence substantially corroborates the
eyewitness testimony.
Other examples where unequal treatment due to the lack of uniform
statewide standards might be shown include the impact of race on the capital
decision-making process ' and the likelihood of perjury contributing to the
23. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US.663 (1966) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S.533 (1964).
24. This is thus quite different from the Eighth Amendment claim raised in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The question raised under a Bush v. Gore analysis is whether a
state's "procedures... are consistent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate
treatment" with respect to a fundamental right. Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 98. 105 (2000).
Governmental practices which are inconsistent with equal treatment of a fundamental right
are "carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. at 561. Therefore,
the burden is on the state to show that the practice is necessary to promote a "compelling state
interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 638.
25. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109.
26. See EDwARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCI'LNCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISiH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996)
(finding that the majority of defendants exonerated by DNA evidence had been victims of
mistaken eye-witness identification). See also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet. Mis-
carriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 57 (Table 6) (1987).
27. See David Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); Michael B. Blankenship & Kristie R. Blevins. Inequalities in
Capital Punishment in Tennessee Based on Race: An Analytical Study of Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Cases, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 823, 858 (finding racial dis-
parity where the aggravating factor was a homicide found to be "heinous, atrocious, and
cruel"). Standards could require that a panel of experienced prosecutors screen cases accord-
ing to objective criteria without knowledge as to the race of either the defendant or the victim.
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conviction of the innocent. 8 Our purpose here is not to draw a detailed blue-
print, but rather to sketch the broad outlines of a strategy for eliminating
these and other causes of unequal treatment of death eligible defendants.
Under this strategy the courts would not have to be involved in determining
the content of such standards. That could be left appropriately to legislative
bodies. But if injunctive relief were sought in pending death penalty cases to
enforce Bush v. Gore's equal protection principle, and a stay was granted
pending the formulation and adoption of state-wide standards, the resulting
moratorium and renewed debate over capital punishment might well advance
our criminal justice system toward a more rational, just and civilized struc-
ture of punishment where the death penalty is severely restricted if not
eliminated altogether.
B. Judicial Alignments
Approximately one third of the 2000 Term decisions relating to criminal
justice were announced by unanimous opinions. The non-unanimous deci-
sions appeared to divide the court almost in half. The Chief Justice, joined
by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy typically squared off in support of
law enforcement against Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer who
were more inclined to support individual rights. Justice O'Connor, who
wrote the largest number of majority opinions in criminal cases, swung from
one camp to the other, often providing the crucial fifth vote for a decision. 9
There were notable exceptions to this pattern, however. Justice Scalia and
Souter appeared to switch sides on Fourth Amendment issues" and in
Rogers v. Tennessee,31 which dealt with retroactivity of judicial decision
making, there were defections from both camps." Justice Stevens found
himself most often in the minority, dissenting in ten cases.
C. Fourth Amendment
The Court attempted to resolve several thorny Fourth Amendment is-
sues concerning law enforcement's use of surveillance technology and the
For cases in rural localities and in highly publicized cases in urban areas this might require
that the Office of the State Attorney General organize the panel at the state level.
28. The risk of convicting an innocent person because of perjury could be reduced by
setting standards which would constrain the use of the death penalty in cases in which the tes-
timony of self-interested witnesses, such as jail house informants (who are offered substantial
sentence reductions in return for their testimony) contribute to the state's case against the ac-
cused.
29. Justice O'Connor authored seven majority opinions, Justices Stevens wrote five.
30. See Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001) and Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
31. 121 S. Ct. 1693 (2001).
32. In Rogers, the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Souter joined Justice O'Con-
nor, to form a majority opposed by Justice Stevens, Scalia, Thomas and Breyer.
[Vol. 38
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increasing reliance upon suspicionless searches and seizures under the "spe-
cial needs" exception to the normal warrant and probable cause require-
ments. In Kyllo v. United States,33 the Court held that the use of a thermal
imager to detect infrared radiation constituted a "search" when used to reveal
crude images of heat escaping from the exterior walls and roof of a home.
The five-to-four decision, authored by Justice Scalia, should give one pause,
however, in light of Justice Stevens' dissent, which sees the Court's ration-
ale as a departure from the test announced in Katz v. United States.' The
opinion's cryptic attempt to limit its rationale to technology that is "not in
general public use" is also a troubling indication of the narrowness of this
decision.
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond" and Ferguson v. City of Charleston'
the Court was confronted with the logical consequences of its own prior de-
cisions that had departed from the individualized suspicion standard embed-
ded in the text of the Fourth Amendment. The Court had created an excep-
tion to the basic probable cause requirement in cases where there was a
special need for flexibility necessitated by an important governmental inter-
est unrelated to law enforcement purposes.37 The police, however, quickly
took advantage of opportunities to extend these exceptions to their logical
conclusion. Recognizing that virtually any suspicionless search or seizure
could be immunized by the "special needs" doctrine, the Court attempted to
halt the hemorrhaging, first striking down the police use of a checkpoint for
the purpose of detecting drugs in Edmond, and then holding in Ferguson that
the suspicionless drug tests performed on pregnant women without their
consent at a state hospital were unconstitutional. In both cases the Court em-
ployed a "primary purpose" test to determine whether the government prac-
tice was law enforcement related and thus disqualified under the "special
needs" exception. This new purpose inquiry promises to add a new layer of
confusion to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and increase litigation in this
murky area.
The Court did achieve clarity regarding the ability of police to make a
full custodial arrest for a minor offense, although this was accomplished at
the citizen's expense. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,3" the Court held by a
five-to-four margin that "it is not a constitutional violation for a police offi-
cer to be a jerk."39 Thus, the Court upheld the full custodial arrest of a soccer
mom who was taken to jail and forced to post bail because she failed to wear
her seat belt, a non-jailable infraction punishable only by a $50.00 fine. This
33. 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
36. 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
37. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) and Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1988), discussed infra.
38. 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001).
39. Comment by Justice Kennedy during oral argument in Atwater. Tr. Oral Arg. 19.
9
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decision, which gives the policeman on the street unbridled discretion to take
a person into custody for any traffic offense, allows law enforcement to in-
flict a substantial loss of liberty upon a wide segment of the population,
without needing to give any justification. Moreover, it also permits a signifi-
cant intrusion upon privacy as full searches of both the traffic offender and
her vehicle may be made as an incident of a custodial arrest. The Court's
failure to recognize Atwater's implications in areas where racial profiling
occurs is highlighted by the fact that a majority of the Court saw the admit-
ted abuse in this case as a rare occurrence that was not deserving of Consti-
tutional protection.
D. Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief
In Artuz v. Bennet,' a unanimous Court gave an important procedural
victory to habeas petitioners, holding that a pending state post-conviction pe-
tition was "properly filed" for the purpose of tolling the one-year time limit
for filing federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus, even if the state petition
contained claims that were procedurally barred by state law. This contro-
versy arose because the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA)"' requires federal habeas corpus petitions to be filed within a
year of the close of state proceedings."2 However, a properly filed state post-
conviction petition will toll the statute until it is resolved in the state court.
The state argued that a post-conviction petition that contained unexhausted
or procedurally defaulted claims was not "properly filed." Justice Scalia,
who authored the Court's opinion, however, found that the question of
whether a petition contained meritious claims was separate from the question
whether the petition had been properly filed. Justice Scalia therefore held
that a petition was properly filed when it was delivered to a court having ap-
propriate jurisdiction and accepted as being in compliance with the applica-
ble rules governing the filing of such petitions.
Having given a literal interpretation to Section 2244(d)(2) of the
AEDPA in Artuz, the Court then did an about face in Duncan v. Walker,"3 re-
fusing to interpret the words "other collateral review" in the same section to
encompass a federal habeas petition. The statute states that in calculating the
one-year filing limitation on federal habeas corpus after the close of state
proceedings, "the time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending" shall not be
counted." In a split decision, Justice O'Connor held that the term "other col-
lateral review" only referred to state court proceedings. Thus defendant's
first federal habeas petition, dismissed without prejudice because of the ap-
40. 531 U.S. 4 (2000).
41. Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266) (1996)).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2001).
43. 121 S. Ct. 2120 (2001).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2001) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 38
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parent failure to exhaust state remedies, did not toll the statutory period. As a
result, the defendant's second habeas petition filed outside of the one-year
limitation period was dismissed as untimely filed.
Habeas petitioners lost again in Tyler v. Cain,"' where Justice O'Connor
provided the key fifth vote for denying relief. The issue in this case was
whether Tyler's second habeas petition properly relied upon a "new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Su-
preme Court" as required by the AEDPA." The defendant argued that it was
sufficient for a federal appellate court to declare that a new rule of constitu-
tional law was retroactive to cases on collateral review based principles es-
tablished by Supreme Court precedent. The Court held, however, that only
where the Supreme Court itself specifically holds that a new rule is retroac-
tive, or where the holdings of prior Supreme Court decisions "necessarily
dictate retroactivity," can it be said that the new rule was "made retroactive"
by the Supreme Court.'
In Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss," the Court also re-
stricted the right of defendants to obtain federal habeas relief with respect to
prior state convictions used to enhance their sentence in a current state case.
Again, the Court was split. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion and
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. Similarly, in
Daniels v. United States, " the Court, per Justice O'Connor, refused to allow
a federal defendant to collaterally attack a prior state conviction via federal
post-conviction relief.' In both Coss and Daniels it should be noted the
Court recognized there is an exception if the prior state convictions were ob-
tained without counsel.
In Seling v. Young,5' the Court, in another opinion by Justice O'Connor,
used labels to restrict the availability of the writ. The Court held that a sex
offender, committed in a civil proceeding as a sexually violent predator,
cannot obtain habeas relief by raising an "as applied" challenge to the condi-
tions of his confinement, alleging that they are punitive and therefore violate
double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees.
While federal habeas relief was thus restricted in Walker, Tyler, Coss,
Daniels, and Young, the right to use the writ was strengthened in three im-
migration cases. In INS v. St. Cyr,' the defendant pled guilty to a deportable
offense in 1996 at a time when the Attorney General had discretion to re-
view the proceedings and waive deportation. Thereafter, Congress enacted
45. 121 S. Ct. 2478 (2001).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)(A) (2001) (emphasis added).
47. Tyler v. Cain, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2484 (2001).
48. 121 S. Ct. 1567 (2001).
49. 121 S. Ct. 1578 (2001).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2001).
51. 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
52. 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001).
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legislation which removed the Attorney General's discretion." Defendant
maintained that this legislation could not be applied retroactively to him. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued that the Court was
without jurisdiction to hear his claim, because the Congressional legislation
had also stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to review deportation
proceedings. In a five-to-four decision by Justice Stevens, however, the
Court held that the legislation could not be interpreted to remove habeas ju-
risdiction and upheld St. Cyr's retroactivity claim. Justice Stevens observed
that in light of the prohibition against suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus
found in Article I, § 9 of the Constitution, the interpretation claimed by the
INS (precluding review of deportation proceedings by any court) would
"give rise to substantial constitutional questions."'
In Calcano-Martinez v. INS,5 where the permanent resident aliens were
deportable based upon their past criminal convictions, a federal appellate
court dismissed their petition for direct review for want of jurisdiction, based
upon the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (HRIRA)56 The Supreme Court agreed that the IIRIRA stripped the
Courts of Appeal of jurisdiction to hear petitioners' claims on direct review.
However, the Court held that such deportees could still seek relief from a
deportation order by filing a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
In the third case of this trilogy, Zadvydas v. Davis,7 the Court also up-
held habeas jurisdiction for deportees who sought to challenge their indefi-
nite confinement by the INS, which arose when no country was willing to
accept them. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg construed the relevant statute to limit the period of detention to
only what was "reasonably necessary" for the purpose of removal because
indefinite detention of an alien who had been lawfully permitted to enter
would raise "serious constitutional concerns." 8
E. Capital Punishment
The Court reversed two death penalty cases during the term because of
erroneous jury instructions. In Penry v. Johnson9 Justice O'Connor over-
turned the second death sentence imposed upon Johnny Paul Penry. The
Court had previously reversed defendant's first death sentence because his
jury had not been properly instructed regarding mitigating factors including
53. Illegal Immigration and Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. 110 Stat.
3009-546 (1996); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
54. INS v. St. Cyr. 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2279 (2001).
55. 121 S. Ct. 2268 (2001).
56. 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
57. 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001).
58. Id. at 2495.
59. 121 S. Ct. 1910 (2001).
[Vol, 38
12
California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss1/4
2001] U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL AND HABEAS CORPUS DECISIONS 99
organic brain damage and mental retardation.' On retrial, Penry was again
convicted and sentenced to death under virtually the same jury instructions.
The only change was a supplemental instruction that simply told the jury it
could consider mitigating evidence." The verdict form, however, was tied to
the original three "special issue" questions' that the Court had previously
held precluded any meaningful consideration of the mitigating evidence in
Penry's case. The Supreme Court, therefore, again reversed Penry's death
sentence for failure to give proper instructions to the jury concerning his
mental retardation.
In Shafer v. South Carolina,' the Court also vacated a death sentence
because the trial court refused to inform the jury, as required by Simmons v.
South Carolina,' that because of defendant's prior record, the default sen-
tence would automatically be life imprisonment without possibility of parole
if the jury did not vote for death.' The trial court refused to give such an in-
struction to the jury on the theory that the prosecutor never argued the de-
fendant should be given death because of his dangerousness.' The Supreme
Court found, however, that the failure to inform the jury of the mandatory
default sentence was a clear violation of Simmons.'
F. Ex Post Facto
In Rogers v. Tennessee," the Court again grappled with the application
of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The defendant had stabbed a
victim who died more than a year and a day after the act. The Tennessee Su-
preme Court affirmed his murder conviction, however, abolishing the com-
mon law "year and a day" rule as obsolete.' In affirming the Tennessee
court, Justice O'Connor found that ex post facto limitations incorporated into
due process give courts greater flexibility than legislatures."0 In dissent, Jus-
60. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
61. Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 759-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
62. The three questions were:
(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant... was committed deliberately...; (2)
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3)... whether
the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response
to the provocation....
Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1915 (2001) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh. 492 U.S. at 310
(quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 and Supp. 1989))).
63. 121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001).
64. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
65. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1266.
66. Id. at 1268.
67. Id. at 1271 (citing Simmons v. South Carolina. 512 U.S. 154 (1994)).
68. 121 S. Ct. 1693 (2001).
69. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tenn. 1999).
70. Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. at 1699-1700.
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tice Scalia argued that it was just as unfair to allow courts to change the law
ex post facto as it was for legislatures to do so.7
G. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Texas v. Cobb" restricts the scope of protection afforded by the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by narrowing the class of offenses to which the
right is available. Cobb was indicted for a residential burglary and counsel
was appointed. Thereafter, without notifying his appointed counsel, Cobb
was questioned by the police about two missing occupants of the home that
he had broken into, and he confessed to their murders." The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that because counsel had been appointed
for him on the burglary charge, that lawyer should have been notified by the
police prior to interrogating Cobb on the related murders that had occurred
during the course of the burglary. 4 In a groundbreaking opinion, authored by
the Chief Justice, the Court held that because the Sixth Amendment had not
attached to the uncharged murders, no right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment existed." Using the "Blockburger test' 6 as a standard, the Court
asserted that the right to counsel would apply to an uncharged offense only if
it were considered the "same offense" as the formally charged crime." Be-
cause murder and burglary each have different elements and were thus sepa-
rate crimes under that test, Cobb did not have a Sixth Amendment right to
have his lawyer, appointed on the burglary charge, present at his interroga-
tion on the murders. In reaching this conclusion the Court narrowly con-
strued Brewer v. Williams, 9 Maine v. Moulton" and McNeil v. Wisconsin;
81
weakened Michigan v. Jackson;' and departed from the bright line approach
adopted in Fifth Amendment cases by Edwards v. Arizona" and Arizona v.
Roberson.84
71. Id. at 1704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).
73. Id. at 1339.
74. Cobb v. State, 2000 WL 275644, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
75. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1340.
76. "Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is
whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
77. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1343.
78. Id. at 1344.
79. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
80. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
81. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
82. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
83. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
84. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
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In Glover v. United States," an ineffective assistance case, counsel's
failure to object to the government's arguably incorrect classification of de-
fendant's offenses resulted in the defendant receiving a sentence increased
by an additional six months. 6 Rejecting the government's argument that this
failure, if error, was de minimus, the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Jus-
tice Kennedy, held that any increase in jail time caused by counsel's defi-
cient performance, constituted prejudice under the test for ineffective assis-
tance established in Strickland v. Washington.'
H. Self-Incrimination
In Ohio v. Reiner"8 the Court held that a witness who denies guilt may
still properly invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. A babysitter had been called as a witness against the defen-
dant Reiner, who was charged with murder and child abuse in the death of
his infant. The babysitter had invoked her privilege and was granted immu-
nity before she testified against the defendant." The Court held unanimously
that the babysitter, who had denied any involvement in the abuse and death
of the child, properly invoked the privilege, finding that she had reasonable
cause to apprehend danger from answering questions where the defense
maintained that she was the cause of the abuse.'
. Detainers
In Alabama v. Bozeman,9' state authorities lodged a detainer against an
inmate incarcerated on a federal sentence. The inmate was transferred to the
lodging state for a single day for the purpose of arraignment on the state
charge and then returned to federal prison.92 The Court adhered to a literal
interpretation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers which provides that
where an inmate is transferred pursuant to a detainer, the charge to which the
detainer relates must be dismissed if an inmate is returned to the place of his
original imprisonment prior to the completion of the trial on that charge."'
85. 121 S. Ct. 696 (2001).
86. Id. at 699.
87. Id. at 701 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
88. 121 S. Ct. 1252, 1255 (2001).
89. Id. at 1253.
90. Id. at 1254-55.
91. 121 S. Ct. 2079 (2001).
92 Id. at 2083-84.
93. Id. at 2082-83.
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II. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Kyllo v. United States 4
In an unusual alignment of justices, the Court held, five-to-four, that law
enforcement use of thermal imaging technology to measure otherwise unde-
tectable heat emissions from the walls and roof of a home constituted a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Federal agents suspected that Danny Lee Kyllo was growing marijuana
inside his home in Florence, Oregon." An Agema Thermovision 210 thermal
imager operated by a Sergeant in the Oregon National Guard96 was employed
to scan the triplex in which Kyllo lived." The thermal imager detects infra-
red radiation not otherwise visible to the naked eye, and transforms this in-
formation into heat images that show relative differences in temperature.98
The scan of the triplex at 3:20 a.m. revealed that the roof and one wall of
Kyllo's residence were significantly warmer than the rest of his home or the
adjacent homes of his neighbors.9 Believing this heat pattern was consistent
with the use of high intensity lamps used by indoor marijuana growing op-
erations, the agents sought a search warrant. Based in part upon the thermal
imaging information, a federal magistrate authorized the search of Kyllo's
home, which revealed over one hundred marijuana plants."
Although the agents ultimately obtained a warrant to physically enter
Kyllo's home, they did not possess a warrant at the time they conducted the
high-tech scan of the exterior of Kyllo's home. Because the Fourth Amend-
ment normally requires a warrant to safeguard the home from unreasonable
searches, the issue in Kyllo was whether the use of the thermal imager con-
stituted a "search."
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have no doubt under-
stood the word "search" to include any examination, inspection or observa-
tion made for the purpose of discovering information.' Following the
Court's decision in Katz v. United States," however, a "search" occurs for
Fourth Amendment purposes only when the government invades an objec-
tively reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus it was thought that the out-
come of this case would hinge largely on how the Supreme Court justices
chose to characterize the heat emissions radiating from Kyllo's home. Most
94. 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
95. Id. at 2041-
96. United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d. 526, 528 (9" Cir. 1994).
97. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See WEBSTER'S AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (6" ed.
1989).
102. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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courts addressing the issue had treated the escaping radiation as abandoned
"waste heat" exposed to the public, and ruled that a homeowner can have no
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to this information any more
than she could with respect to smoke escaping from a chimney.'"' On the
other hand, where the heat emissions were viewed as "signatures" of activi-
ties occurring inside the home, the homeowner's expectation of privacy was
deemed reasonable and the use of the thermal imager was ruled a "search. '""w
In Kyllo itself, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, complaining that it
lacked a factual basis from which to assess the "intrusiveness" of the tech-
nology employed, had remanded the case back to the District Court for an
evidentiary hearing to determine "the quality and the degree of detail of in-
formation" that the thermal imager could reveal." The Court of Appeals
raised the concern that the device might be capable of detecting "sexual ac-
tivity in the bedroom."" The District Court, however, found that the thermal
imager revealed only a crude visual image of the heat patterns emanating
from the outside walls of Kyllo's house and did not show any human forms
or activities within the home."° In a bizarre turn of events, divided panels of
the Ninth Circuit initially reversed Kyllo's conviction, but then affirmed it.
The first panel, in an opinion by Judge Noonan, ruled two-to-one that the use
of the thermal imager constituted a search.'' But after a change in composi-
tion, that panel withdrew the initial opinion and then ruled two-to-one, with
Judge Noonan dissenting, that the thermal scan was not a search."t ' The re-
configured panel held that Kyllo had no subjective expectation of privacy in
heat that he allowed to escape from his home. The panel held further that
Kyllo had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the "hot spots"
revealed by the thermal imager because they "did not expose any intimate
details of Kyllo's life.""'
In a rarely seen alignment, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Souter,
Thomas, Ginsberg and Breyer, rejected both prongs of the Court of Appeals
analysis. Justice Scalia began by observing that the Katz "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" test for determining when law enforcement conduct con-
stitutes a "search" has been criticized as "circular ... subjective and unpre-
dictable.""' The truth of this observation is plainly illustrated by the unusual
twists and turns that this case took in the lower courts.
103. See United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 1325 (11 Cir. 1995); United States v. Ishmael,
48 F.3d 850 (5- Cir. 1995); and United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8" Cir. 1994).
104. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10" Cir. 1995) (holding that war-
rantless use of thermal imager constituted a search), vacated and decided on other grounds by
83 F.3d 1247 (10" Cir. 1996) (en banc).
105. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530 (9 Cir. 1994).
106. l1t
107. Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041 (2001).
108. United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (1998).
109. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d. 1041 (1999).
110. Id at 1047.
Ill. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
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Setting these difficulties aside, however, Justice Scalia found that pri-
vacy expectations in the interior of the home have roots deep in the common
law and have always been acknowledged as reasonable. Thus, historically,
"the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.""'
Finding that this "ready criterion ... assures preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted,""' 3 Justice Scalia rendered irrelevant the debate about degrees of in-
trusiveness by deeming all details about the interior of the home intimate de-
tails. Writing for a majority, he therefore held that,
obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,". . . constitutes a
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in gen-
eral public use.
1
Thus, while the thermal imager disclosed only crude images of hot spots
on the roof and walls of Kyllo's home, it nevertheless revealed information
about "the relative heat of various rooms in[side] the home.""' To withdraw
Fourth Amendment protection for information concerning the interior of the
home, Justice Scalia said would "erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment... [and] leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing tech-
nology-including imaging technology that could discern all human activity
in the home."" 6
Justice Scalia's apparently newfound concern for the Fourth Amend-
ment should not be seen, however, as a signal that he has defected to the lib-
eral wing of the Court. Neither should one too readily assume that the battle
to place limits upon the power of technology "to shrink the realm of guaran-
teed privacy" has been won."7 Such an interpretation is belied by the nar-
rowness of the rule adopted in Kyllo and the gateway left open for the very
erosion of rights Justice Scalia so ardently claims to protect.
112. Id. at 2046 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
113. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
114. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). The curious use
of Silverman-a case decided prior to Katz-as precedent in the sentence announcing Kyllo s
essential holding is consistent with Justice Scalia's antipathy for Katz and the broader scope
of Fourth Amendment protection that the Katz decision gave to areas beyond the protected
zones expressly mentioned in the Amendment's text-i.e., "persons. houses, papers and ef-
fects." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
115. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043 n.2.
116. Id. at 2043-44.
117. Justice Scalia would have us believe, however, that Kyllo resolves this issue, noting,
"The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." Id. at 2043.
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It should not be forgotten that just recently Justice Scalia, concurring in
Minnesota v. Carter,"' belittled the Katz test as "fuzzy," "self-indulgent" and
"notoriously unhelpful.""9 In Kyllo, Justice Scalia did not abandon the posi-
tion he took in Carter, that the Fourth Amendment should be applied only as
literally written and historically understood." Indeed, as implied by Justice
Stevens' dissent, the "new" rule adopted in Kyllo can actually be seen as a
departure from Kat m  Narrowly read, Kyllo only grants protection from
sensory-enhancing technology for information obtained from the interior of
the home because text and tradition establish that this was the "minimal...
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amend-
ment was adopted."'" The office, the telephone booth, the car and other ar-
eas not traditionally covered by the literal text of the Amendment or having
"roots deep in the common law" are thus left unprotected by Kyllo's rule.'"
More importantly, as the dissent points out, Justice Scalia's apparent
limitation of Kyllo to technology not in "general public use" actually makes
the rule uncertain and "somewhat perverse" because "its protection appar-
ently dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is 'in general public
use."1 24 Justice Scalia's footnote response to the dissent"u claims that the
Court's prior precedent in California v. Ciraolo requires this qualification.'26
However, Ciraolo involved a naked eye observation of defendant's backyard
from a fixed wing aircraft lawfully flying in navigatable airspace at 1000
feet. Technology (i.e. the use of an airplane) was thus employed in Ciraolo
to enhance the officer's vantage point-not his senses. The issue there was
whether the homeowner had a reasonable expectation of privacy from obser-
vations made from that aerial vantage point. Thus Ciraolo is clearly distin-
guishable from Kyllo, which involved the technological enhancement of hu-
man senses rather than vantage point.'"
Certainly the use of technology to enhance human sensory capabilities
presents different and more serious issues than the use of technology to sim-
118. 525 U.S. 83 (1998). See also Laurence A. Benner, et al., Criminal Justice in the Su-
preme Court: A Review of United States Supreme Court Decisions at the Close of the Millen-
nium:1998-1999, 36 CAL. W. L. Ray. 437, 442-50 (2000) (discussing Minnesota v. Carter).
119. Carter, 525 U.S. at 91, 97 (Scalia, I., concurring).
120. Id. at 96. (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting that the Court's decision in Minne-
sota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990) (holding that an overnight guest had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in her host's home) represented the "absolute limit of what text and tradition
permit").
121. Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2051 (2001) (Stevens. J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2043.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2043).
125. Id. at 2046 n.6.
126. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
127. For further discussion of this distinction, see generally Laurence A. Benner. Dimin-
ishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22 J. MARSHALL L. RE-v. 825 (1989).
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ply provide a platform from which to make naked eye observations. Justice
Scalia's failure to distinguish between these two separate issues is made all
the more troubling by his failure to define "general" public use. Indeed this
vague standard presents a mirror image of the issue that the Court left unre-
solved with respect to vantage point in Florida v. Riley.'
In Riley, decided after Ciraolo, police used a helicopter to view the inte-
rior of a greenhouse secluded in the defendant's backyard. The Court frag-
mented on the issue of when a naked eye observation made from a lawful
public vantage point constituted a search. A plurality, comprised of Justices
White, Scalia, Kennedy and the Chief Justice, believed that a homeowner
had no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding police observations made
from a helicopter that lawfully hovered over a back yard at 400 feet. Five
justices in that case, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that an
otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage of the home
could be lost simply because police viewed defendant's greenhouse from a
position that could have been lawfully used by the public. Justice O'Connor,
who wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, actually agreed
with the four dissenters that the mere fact a member of the public could law-
fully travel at 400 feet over backyards was not enough to destroy one's oth-
erwise reasonable expectation of privacy. Rather, the question to be an-
swered, in the view of five justices, was whether the public used this
airspace with such regularity that a defendant could not have reasonably ex-
pected privacy with respect to observations made from that vantage point.'29
A similar issue appeared last term in Bond v. United States' where the
Court held that squeezing a bus passenger's carry-on luggage was a search.
Significantly, the Court rejected the government's reliance upon the plurality
opinion in Riley, concluding that while a passenger may have exposed her
bag to manipulation by other passengers, "[s]he does not expect that other
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an
exploratory manner... 3 Even more significant, however, is the fact that Jus-
tice Scalia dissented in Bond, agreeing with Justice Breyer that the type of
manipulation engaged in by the officer there was not a search because it was
"entirely foreseeable" and "substantially similar" to the manipulation en-
gaged in by the general public. 32
128. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
129. Id. at 454. Because Justice O'Connor believed the defendant had the burden of
proof on this issue and had failed to meet it, she agreed with the plurality that the defendant
had not shown a Fourth Amendment violation. However, she did not agree with the plurality's
reasoning. See Benner, supra note 127, at 861-73.
130. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
131. Id. at 338-39 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Bond see Laurence A. Benner.
et a]., Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Review of United States Supreme Court
Criminal and Habeas Corpus Decisions (October 4,1999-October 1, 2000) 37 CAL. W. L.
Rav. 239, 248-50 (2001).
132. Bond, 529 U.S. at 340.
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Justice Scalia's cryptic reliance upon Ciraolo (that a homeowner has no
reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation because overhead
flights by fixed wing aircraft are "routine"'), coupled with the omission of
any discussion of either Riley or Bond in his response to Justice Stevens'
dissent in Kyllo is ominous. In Ciraolo there was no evidence that aircraft
flew over the defendant's backyard "as a matter of course"'' or that mem-
bers of the public observed his or anyone's back yard from aircraft at 1000
feet with "sufficient regularity"'35 that an expectation of privacy from such
fleeting glimpses was unreasonable.'36 Thus, Ciraolo can be read to stand for
the proposition that if public use of a particular vantage point is merely fore-
seeable, then an expectation of privacy from that vantage point is not rea-
sonable. But that is not the standard adopted by the defacto majority in Riley
or the majority in Bond. And surely that should not be the standard for ad-
dressing the entirely different issue, presented in Kyllo, of using technology
to enhance the human senses.
If a citizen's privacy in her conversations or other activities conducted
entirely indoors is lost whenever it is reasonably foreseeable that members
of the public could use a new form of technology to invade that privacy, then
it will simply be a matter of time before what is available at your local Radio
Shack will determine the scope of protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment against government snooping. Precisely because such an even-
tuality would be intolerable, the use of technology to enhance the senses
should be subjected to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause
requirements anytime its use reveals information about the interior of a
home that could not have otherwise have been obtained by the naked senses
without invading a reasonable expectation of privacy. Kyllo should not stand
in the way of a future ruling to that effect despite Justice Scalia's cryptic ref-
erence to Ciraolo in a footnote.
37
A further question remains as to what impact Kyllo will have on the use
of technology outside the home. New passive imaging technology that can
see through clothing to reveal weapons or other hidden items has already
been developed for law enforcement use.' In a manner similar to the ther-
mal imager, this technology detects the radiation of electro-magnetic energy.
133. The full passage reads: "In an age where private and commercial flight in the public
airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000
feet." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
134. Bond, 529 U.S. at 339.
135. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,454 (1989).
136. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J. dissenting) (taking issue with the majority
opinion on the ground that it would require a homeowner to protect against such a "fleet-
ing ... glimpse" in order to maintain Fourth Amendment protection).
137. Kyllo, 121 S. CL at 2046 n.6.
138. Michael Allen, Are These X-Rays Too Revealing? WALL ST. . Mar. 2, 2000. at B I.
See also Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2044 n.3. (describing other forms of new surveillance technol-
ogy).
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If the Court were to rule that we do not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the radiation our bodies naturally emit, then the Fourth Amendment
would not apply to the use of such devices. But the "person" is expressly
protected by the literal text of the Fourth Amendment and certainly tradition
and history support the argument that privacy of the person was just as im-
portant to the framers of the Amendment as the interior of the home. While
such technology may show only crude images and reveal no "intimate de-
tails," reliance upon that argument to reduce one's expectation of privacy
about information emanating from the body would seem foreclosed by
Kyllo. Thus, after Kyllo, not only the thermal imager, but also other similar
devices that measure radiation may now be subject to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements.
B. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista'
Although the Fourth Amendment was intended by the Framers to pro-
tect against arbitrary, unreasonable seizures, in this case the Supreme Court,
by the margin of a single vote, appears to have abdicated its role as the
guardian of that Constitutional protection. The Court let stand what all ad-
mit was arbitrary and unreasonable-the warrantless, custodial arrest,""
booking, and jailing of a young mother of two small children, for a traffic
infraction for which her state legislature had determined she could not be in-
carcerated, even for an hour.
Gail Atwater, a sixteen year resident of Lago Vista, Texas (population
2,486) is a full-time mother who, prior to this incident, had received only a
single traffic citation, ten years earlier, for failing to signal a lane change."'
She was coming home from soccer practice with her two children when they
realized that a toy, which had been affixed to the window of their pickup
truck, had fallen off.4 2 Ms. Atwater back-tracked to look for the toy and the
children, aged three and five, took off their seat belts so they could look out
the window.' There was no traffic and Ms. Atwater was driving slowly
about 15 miles per hour on a residential street near her home when she was
pulled over by a Lago Vista police officer.'"
139. 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001).
140. The term "arrest" is synonymous with seizure. California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621,
627 (1991). Thus, an officer effects an arrest when he make a traffic stop, detains the driver
and issues a citation. A "custodial arrest" occurs when the arrestee is taken into custody.
transported to a police station, booked and required to post bond or otherwise obtain release
by court order. See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Cf Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
141. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 U.S. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
142. Petitioner's Brief at 2-4. Record at 380.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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From the outset the officer was verbally abusive to Ms. Atwater.'' Jab-
bing his finger in her face and screaming, he castigated her for failing to
have her children buckled up.'" The children became frightened and started
crying. When Ms. Atwater asked him to lower his voice he yelled at her
"You're going to jail."'47 When Ms. Atwater asked if she could drop her chil-
dren at a neighbor's house just down the street, he refused and said he would
take them into custody as well.'" Only through the intervention of neighbors
who had gathered at the scene were the children released to a friend of the
family.
4 9
Ms. Atwater was handcuffed with her hands behind her back, placed in
a squad car and transported (without a seatbelt) to the police station. There,
she was stripped of her shoes, her possessions and her eyeglasses. After her
mug shot was taken, she was placed in a holding cell for about an hour and
then was taken before a judge who released her on $310 bond.'" When she
returned to retrieve her car she found it had been towed. 1
Ms. Atwater was charged with failing to wear a seat belt, failing to have
her children properly belted, and failing to have her driver's license and
proof of insurance on her person." She pled no contest to her own seat belt
violation and paid a $50 fine, the maximum possible punishment. All other
charges were dismissed." Under Texas law, the failure to wear a seat belt is
a non-jailable offense. However, law enforcement is given unbridled discre-
tion to give either a citation or to make a full custodial arrest for such an in-
fraction."
There was no evidence that Ms. Atwater presented a flight risk or was a
threat to either the officer or the pubic. Nor was there any evidence that she
had provoked her arrest by being belligerent or in any way challenging the
officer's authority. Indeed Ms. Atwater had apologized for letting the chil-
dren take off their seat belts.'55 The record does not reveal that the officer
ever gave or was required to give any reason for making a custodial arrest
instead of issuing a citation. It does appear, however, that this officer was on
a crusade to zealously enforce the seat belt statute. Just three months earlier
145. Id. The allegations contained in the complaint filed by Atwater against the officer
were assumed by the Court to be true for the purposes of this decision. Atwater. 121 S. Ct. at
1541.
146. Id. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1541.
148. Id. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1542.
151. Id. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1542.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1541.
155. Id. at 1566 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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he had stopped Ms. Atwater because he mistakenly suspected that one of her
children was not wearing a seat belt. '56
Believing that her custodial arrest without a warrant was arbitrary and
unreasonable, she filed suit against the officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sit-
ting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, over three dissents,
affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment for the officer.'57
Justice Souter, writing for the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy
and Thomas affirmed the Fifth Circuit. Justice O'Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg
and Breyer dissented.'58
Justice Souter's opinion first struggled with the historical record regard-
ing warrantless arrests for misdemeanors. Justice Souter began by acknowl-
edging that Atwater's historical argument was "by no means insubstan-
tial."' 59 Atwater maintained that the common law only permitted warrantless
arrests for misdemeanors if they involved a breach of the peace committed in
the officer's presence. Eminent authorities such as Lord Halsbury, Sir Wil-
liam Blackstone, James Fitzjames Stephen and Glanville Williams supported
her position."' However, citing among others a treatise published posthu-
mously in 1736 more than half a century after the author's death, Justice
Souter found that there was not unanimous agreement on this point. 61
Justice Souter then called attention to the "nightwalker statutes" (which
permitted arrest of strangers walking abroad at night) and pointed out other
statutes passed by the British Parliament close to the time of the American
Revolution that permitted warrantless arrests for certain misdemeanors not
technically constituting a breach of the peace. It is not at all clear why en-
actments of a British regime from which Americans revolted, a regime
whose repression of rights gave impetus to the Fourth Amendment, should
serve to restrict the interpretation of that Amendment today. Nevertheless,
Justice Souter found that the historical record at the time the Fourth
Amendment was ratified, failed to provide "a clear answer" to the question
of when warrantless misdemeanor arrests were prohibited by the common
law. 6
If absolute clarity and unanimity in the historical record is a prerequi-
site, then virtually all of our constitutional rights may be in danger. History
teaches us that these protections have almost always been forged as a result
of controversy and conflict. The fact they were enshrined in constitutional
text and a separate bill of rights is testament to the fact the Framers thought
these rights were vulnerable to abuse from the power of unconstrained dis-
cretion. Justice Souter's tedious excursion into history, moreover, misses the
156. Id.
157. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380 (1999).
158. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1536.
159. Id. at 1543.
160. Id. at 1544-45.
161. Id. at 1546.
162. Id. at 1552-53.
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forest by focusing upon only a few of the trees. What is clear from the his-
torical record is that there was no universal, unlimited power to arrest at
common law for offenses that were less than felonies. Rather than seeing the
existence of a limited number of statutory exceptions as proof of this general
rule, Justice Souter uses them to defeat a particular version of the rule, which
is propped up to serve as a straw man.
Justice Souter found that there was also no uniform rule banning war-
rantless misdemeanor arrests other than for breaches of the peace in early
American cases, citing as an example decisions that upheld statutes authoriz-
ing warrantless arrests for "Sabbath-breaking."" He also extensively dem-
onstrates, supported by an appendix containing statutory references, that cur-
rent state laws authorize warrantless arrests for many minor offenses not
involving breaches of the peace."
Finding no support for either an English common law or an existing
American law rule limiting warrantless misdemeanor arrests to breaches of
the peace, Justice Souter then refused to "mint" a new constitutional rule to
limit an officer's discretion in cases involving minor offenses. Atwater had
argued that absent circumstances where public safety required detention, a
custodial arrest was unreasonable if the offense for which the arrest was be-
ing made did not carry any jail time. This seemingly straightforward bright
line rule, based on legislatively authorized punishment, was rejected, how-
ever, on the ground that "an officer on the street might not be able to tell"
because state penal laws frequently have "complex penalty schemes."" But
surely an officer could check with a superior? Justice Souter claimed, how-
ever, that such a rule would "place the police in an almost impossible
spot."'" The amount of drugs involved, for example, might not turn out to be
enough to have warranted a jail sentence. Yet again, this example is baffling
because all the rule proposed by Atwater requires is probable cause to be-
lieve that a jailable offense has been committed.
This over-solicitous concern regarding the administrability of the rule
from the officer's perspective highlights the Court's true concern. It fears
that a constitutional rule controlling the discretion to make a custodial arrest
163. Id at 1548.
164. Id at 1552, 1558-60. The Appendix appears to ignore, however, the distinction be-
tween infractions and misdemeanors. For example, the Appendix gives the impression that
California permits warrantless arrests for any type of "public offense" so long as it is commit-
ted in the officer's presence. Id. at 1558. However, California law in fact provides that except
for certain specified offenses (e.g., driving while impaired) an officer may not take an arrestee
into custody for an infraction (defined as an offense not punishable by jail. CAL- PENAL CODE
§ 19.6) unless the arrestee "refuses to sign a written promise to appear, has no satisfactory
identification, or refuses to provide a thumbprint or fingerprint." CAL P04AL CODE § 853.5.
Elsewhere in the opinion the Court does recognize that California is one of the "[mlany juris-
dictions [that] have chosen to impose more restrictive safeguards through statutes limiting
warranfless arrests for minor offenses," Atwater v. City of Lago Vista. 121 S. Ct. at 1540. but
cites only to a section of the California Vehicle Code dealing with the offense of speeding. Id.
165. 1d at 1554.
166. Id at 1555.
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would result in "increased litigation" that would result in evidence being ex-
cluded and provide a basis for making police officers personally liable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for making wrongful arrests. 67 But surely the cost of lost
evidence discovered in connection with an arrest for a non-jailable infraction
cannot be significant.6 ' Neither can it be said that our system of administer-
ing criminal justice will be greatly damaged if an officer is indeed deterred,
despite the benefit of qualified immunity69 from making a custodial arrest
for an offense because he has doubts about whether it is punishable by a jail
sentence. One is compelled to conclude, therefore, that it is ultimately only
the Court's desire to shield police officers from lawsuits, seeking to hold
them personally accountable for patently unreasonable conduct, that trumps
the right of citizens not to be subjected to such unreasonable exercises of
discretion.
In fairness, it should be noted that during oral argument, Justice Souter
appeared to sincerely believe that the type of "horrible case" Atwater pre-
sented was "very rare" and therefore should not be the basis for "constitu-
tionalizing a general rule."' 70 In response to Justice O'Connor's dissent, he
replied that her claim that minor traffic stops would become a gateway for
harassment of minorities, was "speculative" and noted that "absent from the
parade of horribles is any indication that the 'potential for abuse' has ever
ripened into a reality."'' Justice Souter and the majority are therefore con-
tent to rely upon the "good sense (and failing that, the political accountabil-
ity) of most local lawmakers and law enforcement officials" to prevent an
"epidemic of unnecessary minor traffic arrests" from occurring.'
This idealistic trust in democracy as a cure-all, however, is unfaithful to
the Framer's understanding of the role of the Constitution. The Fourth
Amendment was intended to prevent abuses from occurring by constraining
unlimited discretion precisely because arbitrary power is destructive of lib-
erty. Justice Souter's idealism also sadly betrays a mindset far removed from
the reality of racial stereotyping and the plight of the powerless in America.
By placing the burden upon the citizenry to prove there is an "epidemic" of
abuse before it will act to control unbridled discretion, the Court both over-
values the corrective influences, which are assumed in theory to exist, and
dramatically undervalues the costs to human liberty and privacy at stake.
167. Id.
168. This is so even without considering the many exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
169. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (holding that if a police offi-
cer makes a good faith reasonable mistake about the lawfulness of a search or seizure, she
cannot be held personally liable).
170. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18.
171. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. at 1557.
172. Id.
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Contrary to the Court's assessment that Atwater's arrest was merely
"inconvenient and embarrassing""' there is much more at stake than the hu-
miliation of being handcuffed and the stigma of being arrested. A custodial
arrest is a severe intrusion, which can involve a substantial loss of physical
liberty' and regardless of duration constitute a serious disruption to the life
of the person arrested. This disruption can also have attendant social costs
extending to the arrestee's employer and dependents. Indeed, in Atwater's
case the traumatic scars inflicted upon her innocent children were well
documented."5
A custodial arrest also results in a substantial invasion of one's privacy.
The arresting officer is now authorized to conduct a full search of the ar-
restee's person'76 and any immediately adjacent property as an incident of
that arrest.'" The arrestee's car can also be searched" and subjected to im-
poundment where a full inventory of the contents may be made."' The ar-
restee is also subjected to the degrading process of being "booked" and the
not unfrightening experience of being locked in a holding cell with strangers
until bail is posted or a magistrate orders release. The Court's cavalier dis-
missal of the consequences of a full custodial arrest displays an appalling in-
difference to the values of individual dignity, liberty and privacy protected
by the reasonableness requirement embodied in the text of the Fourth
Amendment.
The risk that a police officer's unconstrained discretion will be abused
must also be evaluated by the degree to which opportunities for abuse exist.
It is estimated that nationwide, there are 19.3 million traffic stops annually,
representing about ten percent of licensed drivers."w Exposing such a consid-
erable portion of the population to the unfettered discretion to impose such
severe intrusions upon liberty and privacy should alone tip the balance in fa-
vor of providing constitutional protection. But there is an additional reason
why uncontrolled discretion should not be sanctioned. This is because, as re-
cent studies have now established, the risk of exposure to such discretion
does not fall evenly. National statistics compiled by the United States De-
partment of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, reveal that "in 1999, Blacks
had higher chances than Whites of being stopped at least once and higher
chances than Whites of being stopped more than once."'.. Blacks and
173. Id at 1558.
174. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (holding that 48-hour
detention before being taken before a magistrate was not unreasonable).
175. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 1566 (O'Connor, I., dissenting).
176. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1973).
177. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
178. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
179. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1987).
180. Patrick A. Langan, et al., Contacts Between Police and the Public, Findings from
the 1999 National Survey, Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics, February, 2001, at I.
181. Id. at 13.
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Hispanics were also significantly more likely to experience the threat of
force or use of force as a result of contact with police.'82
Similar disparities were reported in a recent study conducted by an ur-
ban police department whose leadership has actively addressed public con-
cern about racial profiling.'83 That study, which was based upon special inci-
dent reports filled out by police officers for every vehicle stop, found that
Black and Hispanic drivers were over-represented in vehicle stops in com-
parison to their portion of the driving age population."j This was especially
true with respect to equipment violations. Overall, Blacks and Hispanics had
about a twenty-five percent chance of being stopped as opposed to Whites
who had only a fifteen percent chance of being stopped.'8" Black and His-
panic drivers were also substantially more likely to have their cars searched
than Whites.'86 Almost 10,000 cars and 5,000 drivers were searched in con-
nection with vehicle stops.'7 Contrary to prevailing racial stereotypes about
drug use, the success rate of the discretionary searches in finding contraband,
while extremely low overall, was highest for White drivers.' 8
Finally and most importantly, the study showed that Blacks and Hispan-
ics had substantially higher chances than Whites of being arrested (two to
three times higher) as a result of a vehicle stop. In a petition for rehearing,
Atwater presented the Court with new evidence suggesting that over 250,000
people are arrested annually for minor traffic offenses.'89 Reiterating the con-
cerns expressed by the dissenters, Atwater's petition reminded the Court that
because its decision in Whren v. United States'"9 has foreclosed any inquiry
into the subjective motivations of the police officer for making the stop, law
enforcement officers who harbor racial stereotypes about drug use by mi-
norities may now effect a full custodial arrest as a pretext in order to do a
full blown search of both driver and car. 9' Ironically, where such searches do
not reveal any contraband (which will be the case for the vast, overwhelming
182. Id. at 2.
183. Vehicle Stop Study, Year End Report: 2000, San Diego Police Department, May 8,
2001. The San Diego Police Department is nationally recognized as a leader in community
policing that seeks to involve the community and employ proactive approaches to solving the
problem of crime. Under the leadership of Police Chief David Bejarano the Department has
also made a concerted effort to combat racial profiling.
184. Id. at 3.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. The success rate in finding contraband as a result of discretionary (non-inventory)
searches was 17.4% for Whites, 15.9% for Blacks, 12.7% for Asian/Pacific Islander and
12.6% for Hispanics. ld. Tbl. 18.
189. Petition for Rehearing, at 4.
190. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
191. Petition for Rehearing, at 6. Shortly after the Atwater decision was handed down,
however, the Court in a per curiam opinion reaffirmed Whren in the context of a custodial ar-
rest made after an allegedly pretextual traffic stop. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S. C1. 1876
(2001).
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majority of those Black and Hispanic drivers searched":) the officer can
change his mind and issue only a citation. Thus the members of the Court
will never learn about such abuses and the myth about a "dearth of horri-
bles" will continue.
In Knowles v. Iowa'93 the Court unanimously held that in the absence of
probable cause to search for evidence of crime or reasonable fear for the of-
ficer's safety, a search of a vehicle incident to the issuance of a traffic cita-
tion was unreasonable, because there was no justification for it.'" Ironically,
Knowles will now have the perverse effect of giving curious officers the in-
centive to make custodial arrests for minor infractions in order to take ad-
vantage of the officer's broader power to search incident to arrest.'" One
cannot fault the natural desire of law enforcement to use every opportunity
to fight the war on drugs. One can question, however, why the Court remains
blind to the fact that the war on drugs is disproportionately leveled against
Black and Hispanic citizens. 96
Finally there is even a more fundamental reason for limiting police dis-
cretion to make custodial arrests for fine-only offenses. Our criminal justice
system is premised upon the principle that only the elected representatives of
the people may determine what may be punished as a crime. When an offi-
cer, without being required to give any justification whatsoever, is given the
unrestrained discretion to make a custodial arrest for a non-jailable traffic
offense, he is in effect being granted the arbitrary power to punish the of-
fender with incarceration. This is precisely what the officer's purpose was in
Atwater, as seen by his exclamation "You're going to jail" at the outset of
the encounter with Ms. Atwater. Although the law did not allow it, he de-
cided to punish her with incarceration because in his opinion she was being a
negligent mother. Atwater thus gives new meaning to the term "police state."
One can only hope that state legislators, mindful of the abuses made possible
by this extraordinary decision, will curb the arbitrary power to engage in
such extra-legislative punishment by enacting state laws which place con-
trols on law enforcement discretion to make custodial arrests. 1"
192. Over 87% of the Black and Hispanic drivers searched by the San Diego Police Dc-
partment during 2000 were innocent of carrying any contraband. Vehicle Stop Study, supra
note 183, table 18.
193. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
194. Id. at 114.
195. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
196. See Laurence A. Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, SLrth An-
nual Symposium: Politics of the Drug War, J. OF GENDER, RAcE & Jus-ncE (forthcoming.
2002).
197. See, e.g., CAL. PENALCODE § 853.5 (West 2001)
In all cases, except [those involving impaired driving offenses], in which a person
is arrested for an infraction, a peace officer shall only require the arrestee to pre-
sent his driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of his identity for cxamina-
tion and to sign a written promise to appear. If the arrestee does not have a driver's
license or other satisfactory evidence of identity in his or her possession, the offi-
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C. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 9'
In the first of two "special needs" doctrine cases decided during the
term, the Court held that roadblocks "designed primarily to serve the general
interest in crime control" violate the Fourth Amendment.'" In Edmond, the
Indianapolis police conceded that the primary purpose of their "narcotics"
checkpoint program was to discover illegal drugs."° Although police as-
serted that a secondary purpose was to detect impaired drivers who were in-
toxicated and check driver's licenses and registration, this did not save the
roadblocks."'
A supervisor authorized the roadblocks, and site selection was based
upon crime statistics for the area and traffic flow.2" The roadblocks were
manned by approximately thirty officers and conducted under written guide-
lines that required a predetermined number of vehicles be stopped in a par-
ticular sequence."' Officers had no discretion to stop cars out of sequence."
A narcotics detector dog circled around each car stopped at the checkpoint.2"
cer may require the arrestee to place a right thumbprint... or fingerprint... on
the promise to appear. This thumbprint or fingerprint shall not be used to create a
database. Only if the arrestee refuses to sign a written promise, has no satisfactory
identification, or refuses to provide a thumbprint or fingerprint may the arrestee be
taken into custody.
Id.
198. 531 U.S. 32 (2001).
199. Id. at 42. The other decision is Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Under the "special needs" doctrine, the Court has used a balancing test to determine when the
normal Fourth Amendment safeguards embodied in the warrant and probable cause require-
ment may be relaxed. If the government's special need for flexibility outweighs the citizen's
privacy and liberty interests, then the police practice is deemed to be "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment. The origins of the "special needs" doctrine are found in Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the spe-
cial need to protect an officer's safety when investigating suspected violent criminal activity
(armed robbery) was held to outweigh the minimal intrusion occasioned by a brief seizure and
pat down search for weapons. Id. at 30. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(upholding searches of school children by school officials on reasonable suspicion); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1988) (upholding warrantless and
suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989) (upholding drug testing of federal workers); Vernonia School District v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding drug testing of junior high school athletes). But see Chandler
v. Miller, 520 U.S, 305 (1997) (refusing to uphold warrantless and suspicionless drug testing
of candidates for political office).
200. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35-36.
201. Id. at 43-44.
202. Id. at 35.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 35. Random stops of motorists for safety inspection and driver's license
checks were held unlawful in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
205. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35. Although the legality of the checkpoint did not turn on the
point, the Court observed that a dog sniff did not constitute a search because there was no en-
try into the car and the only information obtained concerned the presence or absence of illegal
narcotics. Id. at 40. See also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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It was stipulated that the duration of each stop did not exceed five minutes.'
A search did not take place unless there was consent or the requisite indi-
vidualized suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment.'
The roadblocks were operated in daylight and motorists were given
warnings that they would encounter the narcotics checkpoint as they ap-
proached. During a two-month period, the roadblocks, resulting in 104 ar-
rests, 55 of which were for drug-related crimes, stopped 1,161 vehicles. -'
Edmond brought a class action in federal court seeking to enjoin the road-
blocks."' The district court denied Edmond's motion for preliminary injunc-
tion, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed."
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, affirmed the Seventh Circuit.2" The
Chief Justice, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. ' "
Justice O'Connor began by observing that in previous checkpoint cases
the Court had found a "special need" for dispensing with the normal re-
quirement of individualized suspicion."' In United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte,2l" a fixed immigration checkpoint, located within 100 miles of the
U.S.-Mexico border, was designed to stop the tide of illegal immigrants
flowing into the country." 6 This checkpoint was upheld, said Justice
O'Connor, because of the special need to police the Nation's border and the
"formidable... difficulty of effectively containing illegal immigration at the
border itself."2 7 In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz.2" the Court also
upheld sobriety checkpoints because of the "the immediate hazard posed by
the presence of drunk drivers on the highways, and the... gravity of the
drunk driving problem." ' 9 In both of these cases, said Justice O'Connor,
there was a special need to detect wrongdoers "beyond the normal need for
law enforcement"' that justified relaxing traditional Fourth Amendment re-
quirements.
The primary purpose of a "narcotics checkpoint," however, was in the
majority's view "indistinguishable from the general interest in crime con-
206. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
207. Id
208. Id. at 35-36.
209. Id at 34-35.
210. Id. at 36.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 48.
214. Id at 33, 37.
215. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
216. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38 (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551-54).
217. 531 U.S. at 37 (citing Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. at 561-64).
218. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
219. 531 U.S. at39 (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 451).
220. 531 U.S. at 37-38.
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trol." '21 Acknowledging that in both Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz the roadblocks
had the same "ultimate purpose" of arresting law violators as the Edmond
roadblock, Justice O'Connor nevertheless declared:
If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be
little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for al-
most any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line
at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime con-
trol, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions
from becoming a routine part of American life.
222
Justice O'Connor recognized that the social harm created by illegal
drugs was "of the first magnitude," but noted that "the gravity of the threat
alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law en-
forcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.
' '223
Neither did the secondary purpose of the roadblock, (i.e. removing im-
paired and unlicensed drivers from the highways) save the roadblocks. It is
the primary purpose of the roadblock by which its lawfulness is judged.2
Otherwise, Justice O'Connor observed, police would be able to use road-
blocks for "virtually any purpose so long as they also included a license or
sobriety check. '225 The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
strongly dissented from this ruling. In their view, because the secondary pur-
pose provided a valid reason for the roadblock, it was therefore lawful
whatever the other objectives were that police may have had in mind.26 Re-
lying on Whren v. United States,2 7 the Chief Justice argued that the subjec-
tive intentions of the police are irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis."8
The majority distinguished Whren noting that there, the seizure was in
fact in compliance with the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of in-
dividualized justification. 9 In Whren, the officer allegedly used a traffic
stop as a pretext to look for drugs. However, the officer did have probable
cause to stop the vehicle in question because of an observed traffic viola-
tion.2 ' By contrast, in roadblock situations, Justice O'Connor pointed out,
there is no individualized suspicion that independently justifies the stop of a
particular car. 31 She also likened the Edmond purpose inquiry to the subjec-
tive inquiry made in inventory searches. In those cases, Whren is also inap-
221. Id. at 44.
222. Id. at 42.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 48.
225. Id. at 46.
226. Id. at 51-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
227. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
228. 531 U.S. at 52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 45.
230. Id.
231. ld. at 46.
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plicable because "an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rum-
maging in order to discover incriminating evidence."' z
If inventory searches are to become the paradigm for how the Edmond
purpose inquiry is to be conducted, however, the Edmond primary purpose
test may itself turn out to be a ruse. Inventory searches are exempt from the
normal requirements of a warrant and probable cause because they are un-
dertaken for "administrative care taking functions." 3 In Colorado v. Ber-
tine,' the Court noted that an inventory search might be invalidated if there
was a showing that the search was conducted for the "sole purpose" of inves-
tigating suspected criminal activity rather than an administrative purpose. '
Far from being a model for a "primary" purpose inquiry, Bertine has led
lower courts to validate inventory searches whenever twin purposes exist.
For example in United States v. Judge, 6 the defendant's car was seized fol-
lowing his drug arrest and DEA agents without probable cause searched a
bag in the trunk of his car. 7 The court upheld the search as an inventory
search, but candidly admitted:
It would be disingenuous of us to pretend that when the agents opened
Judge's bag, they weren't hoping to find some more evidence to use
against him. But they could have also reasonably had an administrative
motive, which is all that is required under Bertine. While there are un-
doubtedly mixed motives in the vast majority of inventory searches, the
constitution does not require and our human limitations do not allow us to
peer into a police officer's "heart of hearts." ' S
Arguably, such twin purpose inventory searches are now invalid after
Edmond without a showing that the administrative purpose was the "pri-
mary" purpose. Even if that is correct, however, the difficulty of making
such a determination remains. Indeed it will be even more difficult to peer
into the "heart of hearts" of policy-making police personnel who establish
(and are apparently required by Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz to establish) the
special purpose roadblocks. 9 Will police chiefs or high level deputies now
232. Id. at 45 (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 14 (1990)). See also Colorado v. Ber-
tine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (noting the relevance of bad faith).
233. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371.
234. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
235. Id at 372 (emphasis added).
236. 864 F.2d 1144 (5 Cir. 1989).
237. Id. at 1145.
238. Id at 1147 n.5.
239. One of the central premises underlying both Marrinez-Fuerre and Sitz was the fact
that the discretion of the officer in the field was controlled to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory intrusions. Unless supervisory personnel control the placement of roadblocks
that premise is undermined. See State v. Hicks, No. E1999-00957-SC-RI I-CD, 2001 WL
1035172, at *15 (Tenn. Sept. 11, 2001). This understanding was echoed in Edmond by the
Court's declaration that the purpose inquiry was to be conducted "only at the programmatic
level." City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2001).
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be routinely called to the stand to testify at suppression hearings regarding
the "primary" purpose of roadblocks?
Justice O'Connor recognized the difficulty this new primary purpose in-
quiry would create for courts, and acknowledged that the same police prac-
tice might be either permitted or invalidated solely upon a determination that
it was "driven by an impermissible purpose." 2" Nevertheless, she noted that
courts routinely undertake such inquiries in other areas of constitutional ju-
risprudence in order to uncover abusive governmental conduct."'
It is clear that the majority has struck a compromise in Edmond between
the need to give law enforcement flexibility and the need, at the same time,
to keep overzealous law enforcement in check. Insight into the nature of that
compromise is perhaps best seen in the remarks of the Chief Judge of the
Seventh Circuit, who wrote the opinion in the court below."" In an attempt to
deflect criticism that a purpose inquiry was too difficult and too uncertain to
provide a suitable constitutional yardstick for evaluating such roadblocks,
Chief Judge Posner stated:
But law like politics is the art of the possible and often requires imperfect
compromises. Inquiry into purpose is one method of identifying and ban-
ning the most flagrantly abusive governmental conduct without handcuff-
ing government altogether. The alternative would be to rule that either all
roadblocks are illegal or none are. ... 24'
The "primary purpose" test thus functions like a kind of judicial toggle
switch that can be manipulated by the courts to either uphold or invalidate a
particular roadblock. But in this resulting compromise, the principle that or-
dinary searches for evidence of crime must be based upon individualized
suspicion would seem to have been given short shrift. It appears to be con-
ceded from the start that the "primary purpose" test will not provide a
workable rule for enforcing this principle, but rather will be capable of
weeding out only the "most fragrantly abusive" roadblocks.
It also seems clear that Edmond will generate a great deal of litigation.
Far from creating a bright line rule where it can be established that all road-
blocks for a certain purpose will be valid, courts will now have to examine
each roadblock to determine its "primary" purpose. That purpose, further-
more, will have to be justified under a special needs analysis. As Justice
O'Connor explained: "The constitutionality of such checkpoint programs
still depends on a balancing of the competing interests at stake and the effec-
tiveness of the program."2" Thus, the burden still remains upon the govern-
ment to establish three things: first, that there is a substantial special need to
dispense with individualized suspicion in order to accomplish the state inter-
240. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
241. Id.
242. Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659 (7" Cir. 1999).
243. Id. at 665.
244. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
[Vol. 38
34
California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss1/4
2001] U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL AND HABEAS CoRPUS DECISIONS 121
est served by the checkpoint;"" second, that this primary interest is in fact
promoted by the roadblock;' and third, that the gravity of the state interest
served by the roadblock is important enough to outweigh the intrusion im-
posed upon citizens using the public highways."' Satisfying these three ele-
ments may be a relatively easy burden to meet near the border in immigra-
tion checkpoint cases, in areas where drunk driving is a significant problem,
and in emergency situations where a roadblock is setup to "thwart an immi-
nent terrorist attack" or apprehend a dangerous fleeing criminal.2s
There remains, however, the suggestion in dicta in Delaware v. Prouse,
repeated again as dicta in Edmond,"4 9 that a roadblock for the purpose of
checking drivers' licenses and registration is permissible, so long as there are
adequate controls on the officers' discretion to eliminate arbitrariness in se-
lecting which cars to stop.' However, it is difficult to understand how such
a checkpoint would survive the foregoing analysis, especially if a "substan-
tial" need to dispense with Fourth Amendment protections must be shown as
required by Chandler v. Miller.'" Indeed, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in
State v. Hicks' has provided a good example of how such an analysis
dooms driver's license checkpoints.'
In State v. Hicks members of the Highway Patrol and two city police
departments set up a roadblock for the asserted purpose of ensuring "high-
way safety" by "detecting and deterring unlicensed drivers."' Six officers
manned the checkpoint, including one K-9 officer with a drug-detecting
dogY At the roadblock, an officer examined defendant's license, while the
dog circled around the car and alerted to the presence of drugs. Marijuana
was discovered inside the passenger compartment of Hicks' car.'
Assuming arguendo that the primary purpose of the roadblock in Hicks
was to check for drivers' licenses, the Court held that the state failed to show
any special need to abandon normal Fourth Amendment requirements.' Be-
245. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997) (invalidating a program for drug
testing political candidates, holding that it must be shown that the need to dispense with ordi-
nary Fourth Amendment protections is "substantial").
246. This "effectiveness" requirement stems initially from Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S.
648, 659 (1979).
247. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
248. 531 U.S. at 44, 47.
249. Id. at 47.
250. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
251. 520 U.S. 305 (1997). Chandler requires that there be a "substantial" need to dis-
pense with individualized suspicion. Id. at 318.
252. State v. Hicks, No. E1999-00957-SC-RI 1-CD, 2001 WL 1035172 (Tenn. Sept. 11.
2001).
253. Although the Tennessee Court relied upon its own state constitution, the analysis is
similar.
254. Hicks, 2001 WL 1035172 at *7.
255. Id. at *1.
256. Id. at *7.
257. Id. at *8.
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cause a warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable absent narrowly
defined exceptions, the Court reasoned that it could not presume that the
state's asserted interest was sufficient without evidence. " Here the prosecu-
tion had failed to present any evidence that unlicensed drivers were unable to
drive safely, that they presented an imminent danger of death or serious bod-
ily harm, or that the threat from unlicensed drivers was of such a magnitude
that the danger to highway safety posed by this problem justified relaxing
the normal Fourth Amendment requirementsY9 Furthermore, because the
roadblock did not discover a single unlicensed driver during the period it op-
erated, the Hicks Court found that there was no proof that the roadblock was
effective in detecting unlicensed drivers."W The Court rejected the state's ar-
gument that this lack of effectiveness was due to the fact that the roadblock
deterred unlicensed drivers, because there had been no advanced publicity
concerning the roadblock given to the public."'
Having determined that the asserted primary purpose was insufficient to
justify the roadblock, the Hicks Court then briefly addressed the issue of
whether the checkpoint had been used as a pretext."2 The Court observed
that the preponderance of the evidence suggested this was the case, but side-
stepped the Edmond issue, apparently troubled by the warning in Edmond
that courts were to conduct the purpose inquiry only at the "programmatic
level" and not delve into the minds of the officers at the scene.263 The diffi-
culty the state court confronted here was that a Lieutenant who was at the
scene apparently set up the roadblock. The Tennessee Court therefore
avoided actually ruling on the Edmond issue and instead, in an interesting
twist, found that the use of the drug detector dog, being unrelated to a check
for drivers' licenses, showed that there had been an inadequate level of su-
pervisory authority over the officers at the scene."6 The conduct of the offi-
cers was therefore relevant to establish whether there had been a failure to
control their discretion in order to minimize the risk of arbitrary intrusions."
State v. Hicks thus demonstrates some of the difficulties of an Edmond in-
quiry and suggests an alternate approach that focuses on evaluating whether
the roadblock is unreasonable in terms of its asserted primary purpose.
It should be noted that in his dissent in Edmond, the Chief Justice,
joined only by Justice Thomas, argued that the majority should not have
258. Id. at*10.
259. Id. at *9.
260. Id. at *12.
261. Id.
262. Id. at *16.
263. "[Wle caution that the purpose inquiry in this context is to be conducted only at the
programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at
the scene." Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2001) (citing Whren v. United States.
517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
264. State v. Hicks, 2001 WL 1035172 at *17.
265. Id. at*16-18.
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evaluated the checkpoint under a "special needs" analysis. :' In the Chief
Justice's view, the previous checkpoint cases, Martinez-Fuerte and Stiz, had
not been decided on that basis because the special needs doctrine had arisen
only in cases involving searches. 7 Therefore, the Chief Justice would assess
the reasonableness of any checkpoint, regardless of purpose, on whether it
"effectively serve[s] a significant state interest with minimal intrusion on
motorists."2 Justice Scalia did not join this part of the Chief Justice's dis-
sent.269
Ironically, in a separate dissent, Justice Thomas declared that he was not
convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were correctly decided because the
Framers would not have considered "indiscriminate stops of individuals not
suspected of wrongdoing" to be "reasonable."" Nevertheless, because no
one advocated overruling these precedents, which he found to be controlling
for the reasons given by the Chief Justice, he joined the Chief Justice's dis-
senting opinion in full.7
D. Ferguson v. City of Charleston"
In this case, the Court, by a six-to-three margin, refused to sanction war-
rantless drug testing of pregnant mothers who sought prenatal care at a state
hospital. The "ultimate goal" of the drug-testing program was to protect the
health of both mother and baby by using the threat of criminal prosecution to
force cocaine-addicted mothers into a treatment program." Despite this be-
nign purpose, the Court found that the diagnostic drug tests were unreason-
able searches, absent consent or a warrant based upon probable cause, be-
cause the "immediate objective" and "direct and primary purpose" of the
testing program was "to generate evidence for law enforcement pur-
poses.... ."'
After the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a person who took
cocaine during the third trimester of their pregnancy could be charged with
criminal child neglect, 5 hospital staff at the Medical University of South
Carolina, 6 working together with police and prosecutors, formed a task
force to establish a policy for sharing results of drug tests conducted on
266. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
268. Il at 51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
269. 1& at 48.
270. Id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
271. ld.
272. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
273. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1291.
274. lI (emphasis in original).
275. See Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
276. Because the hospital in question is a public hospital operated by the state, the medi-
cal staff who conducted the testing are state actors subject to the Fourth Amendment. Fergu-
son, 121 S. Ct. at 1287.
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pregnant patients who received prenatal care at the hospital."' The policy,
known as M-7, created a protocol for who would be tested, established pro-
cedures for ensuring a proper chain of custody was maintained so the results
of the test could be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution, and laid out
the precise offenses with which a patient would be charged depending on the
stage of her pregnancy."'
The program was challenged by ten women who went to the public hos-
pital for medical care during their pregnancy, tested positive for cocaine and
then were arrested for cocaine related offenses.7 9 Four of the women had
been arrested without being given any chance to obtain treatment. " ' The re-
maining women were arrested after the program was modified to authorize
arrest only after the patient had been referred to treatment, but tested positive
a second time or otherwise failed to comply with the terms of the drug
treatment program." '
The state argued that because the ultimate purpose of the drug testing
program was to protect the health of both mother and child and prevent the
birth of babies addicted to cocaine, the special needs doctrine justified the
searches despite the absence of a warrant, individualized suspicion or con-
sent. 82 In previous cases, the Court had used the "special needs" doctrine to
diminish Fourth Amendment protection for various groups of citizens in an
attempt to give law enforcement greater power to win the war on drugs. The
Court approved suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees on a train
involved in a serious accident, 83 sanctioned testing of U.S. Customs Service
employees applying for promotions," ' and upheld drug testing of high school
athletes. 85 The Court declined, however, to extend the "special needs" excep-
tion to candidates running for political office. 86 In none of these cases, how-
ever, was the result of the drug test automatically shared with law enforce-
ment as a matter of routine.2
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, rejected the state's attempt to invoke the "spe-
277. Id. at 1284-85.
278. Id. If the pregnancy was 27 weeks or less the patient was charged with possession.
Id. But see State v. Lewis, 394 N.W.2d. 212 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that mere presence
of a controlled substance in a person's urine specimen did not constitute "possession" for the
purposes of a criminal statute proscribing unlawful possession of a controlled substance). If
the pregnancy was 28 weeks or more, the patient was also charged with child neglect. Fergu-
son, 121 S. Ct. at 1285.
279. Ferguson, at 1286.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1290.
283. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1988).
284. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
285. Vernonia School District, v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
286. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
287. Ferguson, 121 S.Ct. at 1288.
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cial needs" doctrine." Justice Kennedy concurred separately. :' Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and the Chief Justice dissented.'
Acknowledging that the asserted purpose of the drug testing policy was
beneficent rather than punitive, Justice Stevens nevertheless observed that
the Court would not simply accept the state's proffered purpose. Instead, the
Court would carry out a "close review" considering "all the available evi-
dence in order to determine the relevant primary purpose."" After undertak-
ing that review, Justice Stevens concluded that the purpose "actually served"
by the drug testing policy is ultimately indistinguishable from the general in-
terest in law enforcement because "the central and indispensable feature of
the policy from its inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the
patients into substance abuse treatment."' 2 Support for the conclusion that
the primary and immediate objective of the diagnostic testing was actually to
collect evidence for criminal prosecution was seen in the initial involvement
of law enforcement agencies in developing the policy and their continued
involvement in the daily operation of the program. -" The police were noti-
fied immediately of positive test results and hospital staff were trained in
procedures for handling positive test samples to assure a proper chain of cus-
tody that would satisfy evidentiary rules for admissibility of the test results
in a criminal trial.'
The majority thus found that there was a "critical difference" between
this case and the previous drug testing cases upheld under the "special
needs" doctrine because here the immediate and primary purpose for testing
was not "divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement."'
Indeed, the use of law enforcement and the threat of criminal prosecution
were at the "core" of the program and were "essential" to its success.'
The majority distinguished the situation where a doctor, in the course of
ordinary medical procedures, inadvertently came across information that law
or medical ethics might require be reported to the police, such as evidence of
child abuse.' The majority also distinguished New York v. Burger,' which
upheld a warrantless administrative search of an auto junkyard conducted by
policemen, because there "plain administrative purposes" negated the claim
that the statute authorizing the search had been enacted for the purpose of
enabling the police to gather evidence of crime.' Noting that in such admin-
288. 1l at 1284.
289. Id at 1293-96 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
290. Ia at 1296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
291. Id at 1290.
292. I
293. Id. at 1290-91.
294. Ia
295. Id at 1289.
296. Id at 1292 n.20.
297. Id at 1290.
298. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
299. Ferguson, 121 S.Ct. at 1292 n.21.
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istrative searches the discovery of evidence of crime would have been
"merely incidental," the majority contrasted the present case, observing that
here "the policy was specifically designed to gather evidence of violations of
penal laws."'
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, disagreed with that por-
tion of the majority opinion that held that the "special needs" test must hinge
entirely upon the immediate purpose of the drug test rather than the pro-
gram's ultimate goal. 0 ' In Justice Kennedy's view, if the ultimate goal of the
process was the improvement of the health of the mother and child, that
would satisfy the "special needs" exception, although the immediate result
of the procedure was to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution."
The majority had drawn the distinction between "ultimate" and "imme-
diate" purpose, however, because otherwise they feared the Fourth Amend-
ment would be reduced to a meaningless nullity by the "special needs" doc-
trine."' This is because it could be said that the enforcement of any criminal
law ultimately serves some broader social purpose.3 Thus, the majority
noted, virtually any suspicionless search could be "immunized" under the
"special needs" doctrine if the government was permitted to justify the
search in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate purpose.30
Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, dis-
sented. 36 Unlike Justice Kennedy, they concluded that the ultimate goal was
the treatment of the mother and child, and, unlike the majority, they would
permit the ultimate goal to validate the testing under the special needs doc-
trine, despite the involvement of the police in the process.3
Ferguson adds yet another layer of complexity to the primary purpose
test established in Indianapolis v. Edmond."8 If the immediate purpose of a
police practice is to secure evidence for general law enforcement purposes,
then ordinary Fourth Amendment safeguards apply."0 Only when the imme-
diate primary purpose is to serve a special need, unrelated to ordinary law
enforcement, will the "special needs" analysis be undertaken to determine
whether, after a balancing of the interests, relaxation of normal Fourth
Amendment requirements is justified."'
300. Id.
301. See id. at 1293 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
302. Justice Kennedy nevertheless agreed with the majority that the "special needs" ex-
ception was not applicable because of the pervasive involvement of the police in the entire
process and his apparent doubt that the health of mother and child was the ultimate goal. Id.
303. Id. at 1291-92.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 1302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308. 531 U.S. 32 (2001).
309. See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1292.
310. Id. at 1290 n.17.
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Yet, the line between what is an immediate, as opposed to an ultimate,
purpose may prove to be exceedingly fragile protection. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that evidence of illegal drug use arises from routine diagnostic medical
testing conducted without police involvement. Would the Fourth Amend-
ment bar the evidentiary use of such drug test results in a criminal trial? Ar-
guably, the immediate purpose of the initial testing was to protect the health
of the fetus by screening for all known threats. But it would not be neces-
sary, to serve that purpose, to maintain the test samples and test results under
a chain of custody appropriate for use as criminal evidence. What would be
the purpose of maintaining such physical evidence and turning the test re-
suits over to police, if not for the purpose of criminal prosecution? What if
medical personnel, suspecting drug use, asked the patient and the patient
confirmed her drug use? What would be the immediate primary purpose of
testing for drugs under that circumstance?
This suggests another issue left unresolved by Ferguson. May state
health care professionals turn the evidence over to police for criminal prose-
cution of the mother?. Could they reveal her admissions relating to drug
use? If not, why should disclosure of test results be treated differently? What
if a law required medical personnel to report drug use by patients who are
pregnant? In his dissent, Justice Scalia complains that the Court has left po-
lice "in the dark" about whether they can use incriminating evidence ob-
tained under such reporting statutes as "trusted sources," thus highlighting a
new avenue for defense attorneys to consider in attacking search warrants
that may be based upon information provided by medical informants." '
It may be argued, as a policy matter, that without the threat of criminal
prosecution, a prenatal drug treatment program may in many instances be
unsuccessful and, thus, fail to prevent harm to the unborn fetus. This view,
however, is subject to the counterargument that if the prenatal care facility
becomes known for working hand-in-glove with the police, addicted women
will steer clear of the facility, resulting in even greater potential harm to the
fetus, because the opportunity to receive prenatal care, as well as the chance
of successful treatment, will be lost.
Also undecided in Ferguson was the issue of consent.' When an expec-
tant mother goes for treatment of her pregnancy, the testing of bodily fluids
is a normal part of a doctor's examination. A variety of health problems may
be disclosed as a result of such testing, other than illicit drug use. Is the evi-
dence of drug use so acquired consensual? Furthermore, may the woman
consent to testing only for a limited purpose? In other words, may a patient
limit her consent by restricting the purposes for which the test results are
used? Is informed consent then required not only as to testing for drug use
but also as to the purposes for which the results of such tests may be used?
311. There was no physician-patient privilege under the law in South Carolina. Id. at
1298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 1298 n.3. For Justice Stevens' response to this charge, see id. at 1292 n.24.
313. Id. at 1288 n. 11.
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The Court in Ferguson did not address the issue of consent?' However,
Justice Stevens noted that while state hospital employees may be obligated
to furnish to police evidence inadvertently acquired, "when they undertake
to obtain such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of in-
criminating those patients, they have a special obligation to make sure that
the patients are fully informed about their constitutional rights, as standards
of knowing waiver require."
3
"5
The reference to Miranda did not go unnoticed by Justice Scalia, who
complained, in a solo portion of his dissent, that any requirement of in-
formed consent was "flatly contradicted by our jurisprudence.""' 6 As Justice
Scalia recognized, however, there was a "conceivable basis" for arguing that
any consent obtained was "coerced by the patient's need for medical treat-
ment."' 7 The issue of informed consent, remanded to the Court of Appeals
for resolution, may thus prove to be even more complicated than the purpose
inquiry mandated by Edmond and Ferguson.
E. Illinois v. McArthur 18
The Court held in this case that where police have probable cause to be-
lieve that there are illegal drugs in a home, the homeowner may be prevented
from entering the home for a reasonable time while a search warrant is ob-
tained.3 9
Defendant's wife went to the police and asked them to accompany her
to their trailer home to protect her while she removed her belongings. Two
officers accompanied the wife to the trailer home, remaining outside while
she entered. 2' When the wife exited, she told the officers that she observed
her husband slide some dope under the couch. 2' An officer knocked on the
door. When defendant answered, the policeman told him what his wife had
said and asked permission to search the premises. Defendant refused permis-
sion. 2' One officer, accompanied by the wife, left to obtain a search warrant
for the premises. The other officer remained on the front porch where defen-
dant was now also standing. The officer told defendant he could not re-enter
314. Id. Only Justice Scalia raised this issue. None of the other dissenters joined that part
of his opinion. Id. at 1296.
315. Id. at 1292 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) (emphasis in original).
316. Id. at 1297 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966)) (holding that a person assumes the risk that what he voluntarily discloses to a gov-
ernment informant will be turned over to the police)).
317. Id. at 1296. Indeed, at least with respect to a woman confined in labor, Miranda
would seem to be an appropriate analogy.
318. 121 S. Ct. 946 (2001).
319. Id. at 948.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 948-49.
322. Id. at 949.
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his home unaccompanied." While awaiting the warrant, defendant was al-
lowed to reenter the premises to obtain cigarettes and to make a telephone
call, but the officer stood inside the doorway observing defendant at all
times.' Two hours later the officer returned with a search warrant.' Less
than 2.5 grams of marijuana was found .1 6 Defendant was charged with a
misdemeanor for which the maximum sentence was thirty days in jail."
In his motion to suppress evidence defendant argued that the impound-
ment of his home was unlawful and that as a result the marijuana should be
suppressed.' The trial court suppressed the evidence, the appellate court af-
firmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court declined to review the decision.'
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the seizure lawful.'
Justice Stevens was the only dissenter.3 '
Justice Breyer writing for the majority held that the warrantless seizure
of the home was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because: (1) it
was based upon probable cause; (2) there were exigent circumstances be-
cause it was reasonable for the officers to assume that defendant would have
destroyed the drugs had he been allowed an unrestricted right to reenter the
premises; (3) the restriction was narrowly tailored to the exigency, as
McArthur was prevented only from reentering the home unaccompanied;
and (4) the restraint was temporary, lasting only two hours, which was a rea-
sonable time period for obtaining a search warrant.3
Defendant relied upon Welsh v. Wisconsin,"' which held that the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to minor
offenses because the state's interest in prosecution did not outweigh the seri-
ous intrusion occasioned by the search of a home."' The Court distinguished
Welsh, however, on the ground that in Welsh, the offense was a .'nonjailable
traffic offense.""'3 5 Here, the possession of marijuana, albeit a minor misde-
meanor, was a jailable offense. 36 Thus, as Justice Souter made explicit in a
concurring opinion, because the officer could have searched the home with-
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id at 952.
328. Id. at 949.
329. Id.
330. Id at 953.
331. Id at 954.
332. Id at 953.
333. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
334. See McArthur, 121 S. Ct. at 953 (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740, 742. 754
(1984)).
335. McArthur, 121 S. Ct. at 953 (quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742).
336. McArthur, 121 S. Ct. at 953.
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out a warrant under the exigent circumstances exception, it was a lesser in-
trusion to seize the home while a search warrant was being obtained."'
Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, argued that because Illinois classified
the offense as a minor misdemeanor, the homeowner's possessory interest in
his home should be given a higher priority than the law enforcement interest
in prosecuting this petty offense.338
III. HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
A. Tyler v. Cain"
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"
(AEDPA) places severe restrictions on filing successive federal habeas cor-
pus applications. Ordinarily if a state prisoner files a second petition raising
a claim that he has previously asserted in a habeas petition, the claim will be
denied.41 There is an exception, however, for a claim that relies upon "a new
rule of Constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court .... 4  The issue in this case is whether the words "made
retroactive" mean that the United States Supreme Court itself must make
such a holding in a given case, or whether that determination may be made
by lower courts from principles for determining retroactivity found in deci-
sions by the High Court.3 The Court concludes that only where it specifi-
cally holds that a new rule is retroactive, or where the holdings of several
cases "necessarily dictate" retroactivity, can it be said a new rule has been
'made retroactive" by the Supreme Court.
Melvin Tyler's decades old conviction in Louisiana for second-degree
murder arose out of a fight with his girlfriend in March 1975. During the
melee, their 20-day-old daughter was killed." The jury instruction on rea-
sonable doubt used in his trial was "substantively identical""34 to the instruc-
tion later held to violate Due Process in Cage v. Louisiana."6 Although Ty-
ler's case had been affirmed on direct appeal and five successive post-
conviction petitions had been turned down, he filed a sixth state post-
337. See id. at 953-54 (Souter, J., concurring).
338. Id. at 954 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
339. 121 S. Ct. 2478 (2001).
340. Pub. L. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in 28 U.S.C.§§ 2244-2266).
341. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2001).
342. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2001).
343. Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2480.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990). Under the rule established in Cage, a defendant is denied
Due Process if there is a reasonable likelihood that a jury instruction was interpreted by the
jury to permit a finding of guilt on a quantum of proof which was less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. See also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) and Victor v. Nebraska.
511 U.S. 1 (1994).
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conviction petition raising a claim under Cage. 7 Again, he was denied relief
by Louisiana.'
Tyler had also filed an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas corpus
prior to his sixth state post-conviction petition. 9 Therefore, he now had to
request leave to file a successor petition in the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.' The Court of Appeals granted the motion, allowing him to file in
District Court. The District Court then denied relief and the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, ruling that that Tyler could not show that any United States
Supreme Court decision rendered Cage retroactive to cases on collateral re-
view.
3 5 1
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas acknowledged that the word
"made" was ambiguous and could be interpreted as meaning "to cause to
happen."3 Nevertheless, looking at the plain meaning of the statute taken as
a whole, he concluded that Congress intended the word "made" to mean
"held.""sn Justice Thomas reaches this result by reasoning that the Supreme
Court does not "make" a rule retroactive "when it merely establishes princi-
ples of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower
courts."3  Only if the Supreme Court itself specifically declares the new rule
of law to be retroactive, or, if a series of Supreme Court holdings "necessar-
ily dictate" retroactivity, can it be said that the rule has been "made retroac-
tive" by the Supreme Court. 55 Since the Court never said in the Cage
opinion itself that the rule it announced in that case was retroactive, and did
not in another case say that errors like the error in Cage were retroactive, the
statutory exception was not available to Tyler and dismissal of his second
habeas petition was affirmed." 6
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dis-
sented. The dissent argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Teague v.
Lane' and Sullivan v. Louisiana" make it clear that the Court has made
347. Tyler, 121 S. Ct. 2480-81 (2001).
348. State ex rel. Tyler v. Cain, 684 So. 2d 950 (1996).
349. Tyler v. Butler, No. 88cv4929 (ED La.), af'd, Tyler v. Whitley, 920 F2d. 929 (50
Cir. 1990).
350. See AEDPA, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (1996).
351. Tyler v. Cain, 218 F.3d. 744 (5b Cir. 2000). The Courts of Appcal were divided on
this issue. The First and Eleventh Circuits had held that Cage had not been made retroactive
to cases on collateral review. Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F.3d 270 (1" Cir. 1998); In re
Hill, 113 F.3d 181 (11 Cir. 1997). However the Third Circuit had held that Cage was made
retroactive to cases on collateral review. West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53 (3" Cir. 2000).
352 Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2482.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 2484.
356. Id. at 2485.
357. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
358. 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
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the Cage rule retroactive to cases on collateral review?59 Although Teague
establishes that new constitutional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
will generally not be applied retroactively to cases on habeas review, there is
an exception for "watershed rules of criminal procedure" which go to the ac-
curacy of the process for determining guilt or innocence."W In order for this
exception to apply, the following two conditions must be met: (1) infringe-
ment of the new rule must "seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an
accurate conviction;"" and (2) the new rule must "alter our understanding of
the "bedrock procedural elements" essential to the fairness of the proceed-
ing.
362
A "Cage error," the dissent noted, involves a defect in the most funda-
mental of criminal jury instructions-the instruction on reasonable doubt."6
Indeed, Sullivan held that an instruction that violated Cage could not be
harmless error because it "'vitiates all the jury's findings,' and deprives a
criminal defendant of a 'basic protection ... without which a criminal trial
cannot reliably serve its function."'' 31 Such an error "renders the situation as
if 'there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment. '"365
Justice Breyer thus concluded that any instruction which makes all the
jury's findings untrustworthy must of necessity also seriously "diminish the
likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction"3" thus satisfying the first
Teague condition. Secondly, a "deprivation of a 'basic protection' needed
for a trial to 'serve its function '  is of necessity "a deprivation of a 'bed-
rock procedural element, '' 368 thus satisfying the second Teague condition.
Finally, there is no debate on the question of whether or not Cage enunciated
a new rule which altered pre-existing law.369 Therefore, reading Teague to-
gether with Sullivan, Justice Breyer maintained, it is clear as a matter of
simple logic that these Supreme Court precedents "made" Cage retroactive.
Justice Thomas dismissed this argument, however, stating that since it
was based upon a deduction from the holdings of Teague and Sullivan all
that it established was that the Supreme Court should make Cage retroac-
359. Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2487 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
360. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
361. Id. at 315.
362. Id. at 311 (emphasis in original).
363. See Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2486-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Cage v. Louisiana,
498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990)).
364. Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2487 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508
U.S. 275, 281 (1993)) (emphasis in original).
365. Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2487 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280).
366. Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2487 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 315 (1989)).
367. Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2487 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 28 1).
368. Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2487 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
369. See Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2488 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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tive.7 ° However, even if the deduction were correct, that would be insuffi-
cient because the Supreme Court itself has never squarely held that the new
rule laid down in Cage was retroactive to cases on collateral review.
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Thomas' opinion but wrote separately
to clarify that when the Court decriminalizes an offense by holding that "a
particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power
of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that
this Court has 'made' that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral re-
view."'
Justice O'Connor also acknowledged that it is not necessary for the Su-
preme Court to hold explicitly in a case that a new procedural rule is retroac-
tive."' However, she agreed with Justice Thomas that where a claim of retro-
activity was based upon a reading of several cases, the test was one of "strict
logical necessity.""37 In her view, the Court "can be said to have 'made' a
rule retroactive within the meaning of Section 2244(b)(2)(A) only where the
Court's holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is
retroactive."374 Justice O'Connor believed that under that standard, the
Court's holdings do not require the Cage rule to be held retroactive." '
B. Artuz v. Bennett'
In an important procedural victory for habeas petitioners, a unanimous
Court held that a pending state post-conviction petition tolled the one-year
time limit for filing habeas corpus petitions, even if the application for state
post-conviction relief contained claims that were procedurally barred.
The question presented in this case was whether an application for post-
conviction relief that presents claims, which are procedurally barred, is
"properly filed" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).'
Section 2244(d)(2) provides "that the time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward
any period of limitations under this subsection.""3S
Bennett was convicted of attempted murder and other crimes in Queens
County, New York in 1984. After unsuccessfully pursuing both a direct ap-
peal and post-conviction relief, Bennett filed a pro se post-conviction peti-
tion in 1995. The State trial court denied this motion orally, on the record,
370. hi at 2484.
371. id at 2486 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id
375. ld.
376. 531 U.S. 4 (2000).
377. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 ed. Supp. IV).
378. Id.
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but never sent the defendant a written order from which he could appeal, de-
spite several requests to do so."'
The defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 1998, which
the District Court dismissed as untimely because it was filed almost two
years after the passage of the AEDPA 8° The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, however, holding that because the defendant was un-
able to appeal the denial of his 1995 pro se state post-conviction petition, it
was still pending for purposes of Section 2244(d)(2) and thus tolled the time
period for filing the habeas petition."' The Second Circuit found that the pro
se state petition was "properly filed," even though the claims it contained
may have been subject to two procedural bars under New York state law.
The state contended that defendant's pro se claims were precluded by a bar
against raising an issue that had been previously determined on the merits on
direct appeal,38 and a bar against raising a claim that was available on direct
appeal but was not raised due to the defendant's unjustifiable failure. 83 The
United States Supreme Court held that even if the claims were barred, the
application was nevertheless still pending and affirmed the Second Circuit.
Justice Scalia, speaking for a unanimous Court, distinguished between
claims in an application and the application itself3 8 ' Thus the question of
whether an application is properly filed is "quite separate from the question
whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious and free of
procedural bar."3 5 What if some claims were procedurally barred and some
were not, would the State argue that the application is partially filed? Reject-
ing the state's contention, Justice Scalia ruled that an application is "properly
filed" for purposes of Section 2244(d)(2) when, "its delivery and acceptance
are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings."'8 6
Thus while an application erroneously accepted by a court without jurisdic-
tion or payment of the requisite filing fee would not be "properly" filed, the
acceptance of an otherwise properly filed petition does not become improper
simply because it contains claims which are procedurally barred or lack
merit.
This is a very important case because often the question arises as to
whether a post-conviction application properly tolls the one-year time period
for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus after the close of state court
proceedings. If a state court later determines that the claims in an application
379. Bennett, 531 U.S. at 5-6.
380. Id. at 6 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132 (S 735), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266) [hereinafter
AEDPA]). Since this was a pre-AEDPA conviction the relevant time period ran from the ef-
fective date of the act, April 24, 1996. See Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 98 (2d Cir 1998)
381. Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1999).
382. N.Y. CRIN1. PROC. LAW § 440.10(2)(a) (2001).
383. Id. at § 440.10(2)(c).
384. Bennett, 531 U.S. at 7.
385. Id. at 9.
386. Id. at 8.
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were procedurally barred by state law, Artuz makes clear that the defendant
cannot lose his right to federal habeas relief because he attempted to have the
state court first hear his federal claims.
C. Duncan v. Walker""
Having decided in Artuz v. BennetP" that a properly filed state post-
conviction petition tolls the limitation period for filing for federal habeas re-
lief, even if the claims in the state petition are procedurally defaulted," the
Court in this case turns to the question of whether a previously filed habeas
petition can also have this effect. The precise question in Walker was
whether the phrase "other collateral review" in Section 2244(d)(2) includes a
prior federal habeas corpus petition, or whether it only refers to other state
collateral attacks. 9°
Justice O'Connor, in an opinion joined by five members of the court,
held that "other collateral review" was limited to state proceedings and did
not include a federal habeas petition. Justices Stevens and Souter concurred.
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented.
In June, 1992, Walker plead guilty to robbery in a New York state court
and received a sentence of seven to fourteen years. Walker filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus on April 10, 1996, which was dismissed by the
District Court without prejudice, because it was not clear to the Court
whether or not Walker had exhausted his state remedies with respect to his
claims. 9' On May 20, 1997 Walker filed another petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the District Court, which was dismissed as time barred.' The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Walker's first
federal habeas petition was an application for "other collateral review"
which tolled the statute of limitations under Section 2244(d)(2).3" The Court
of Appeals reasoned that the word "state" modified only "post conviction,"
and not "other collateral relief' in Section 2244(d)(2). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari," to resolve the conflict between the Second and Tenth
Circuits395 and the Fifth, Ninth, and Third Circuit courts of appeal,' and re-
versed the Second Circuit.3
387. 121 S. Ct. 2120 (2001).
388. 531 U.S. 4 (2000).
389. See id. at 9.
390. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 2123. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that, "the time during
which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with re-
spect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 ed. Supp. V).
391. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 2123.
392. Id.
393. Walker v. Artuz, 208 F.3d 357, 359 (2 Cir. 2000).
394. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 991 (2000).
395. See Petrick v. Martin, 236 F.3d 624 (10' Cir. 2001).
396. See Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488 (5" Cir. 1999); Jirmnez v Rice. 222 F.3d
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Justice O'Connor argued for the majority that if Congress had intended
the phrase "other collateral relief' to include federal habeas corpus petitions,
it would have said so expressly.398 She based that argument on a comparison
of Section 2244 with other sections of the AEDPA, which do mention both
of the words "state" and "federal" expressly.3
Observing that it was a cardinal rule of statutory construction to give
meaning to every clause and word of a statute, Justice O'Connor also argued
that under the defendant's view of the statute, the word, "state" would have
no significant operative effect.' She noted that there could be other forms of
state collateral relief other than post-conviction. For example, in addition to
state post-conviction, some states allow for state habeas corpus relief or
other forms of collateral attack on state convictions. Many additional exam-
ples of other state collateral relief, which are not post-conviction actions,
abound. Justice O'Connor points to challenges to state court commitments to
mental hospitals after a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, and to
challenges to civil contempt orders or civil commitment orders."' Therefore,
the most reasonable interpretation in her view was to construe the phrase to
mean "other State collateral review."
Finally, O'Connor turned to the policy considerations that result from
the different interpretations of the statute. 3 Because restricting the term
"other collateral review" to state actions would better further the aims of the
AEDPA to "further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism," Jus-
tice O'Connor opts for the restrictive view.' That view "promotes the ex-
haustion of state remedies" and better serves the purposes of the AEDPA.'
Therefore, she holds that the defendant's first federal habeas corpus petition
did not toll the limitation period of Section 2244(d)(2).'
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in the result, noting
that the District Courts have the power to "toll the limitations period apart
from Section 2244(d)(2)."' Justice Souter pointed out that uniformly federal
courts have allowed a grace period of one year after the effective date of the
AEDPA for the filing of federal habeas corpus petitions for defendants
whose convictions became final prior to April 24, 1996.' He also stated that
"equitable considerations may make it appropriate for federal courts ... [to
1210 (9t Cir. 2000); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153 (3' Cir. 1999).
397. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 2124.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 2124-25 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(i), 2261(e), 2264(a)(3) (West 2001)).
400. Id. at 2125 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)).
401. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 2126.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 2127.
404. Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)).
405. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at2127.
406. Id. at 2129.
407. Id. at 2130.
408. Id.
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toll] AEDPA's statute of limitations for unexhausted federal habeas peti-
tions." Given those two safeguards, Stevens and Souter concurred.
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented."" Justice Breyer explains the
problem with the majority's interpretation is that if the defendant files a
timely habeas corpus petition with unexhausted claims, that petition may be
dismissed."' Then the defendant must go back to state court to exhaust those
claims. If he loses in the state court, the defendant would then want to return
to Federal Court to pursue those claims. However, if the previously filed ha-
beas corpus petition does not toll the one-year statute of limitations, his
subsequent petition might well be time barred." 2
To back up his fears, Breyer cites some alarming statistics: sixty-three
percent of all habeas petitions are dismissed, and of that number, fifty-seven
percent were dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.! 3 Moreover,
nearly half of the habeas petitions were pending in the District Court for six
months or longer, and ten percent were pending for more than two years.""
Thus, unless "other collateral review" is construed to include prior habeas
petitions, a substantial number of prisoners will be deprived of the ability of
carrying their case back to federal court after state court rejection of their
claims."'
Of course, the figures which Justice Breyer uses to back up his appre-
hension are based on statistics from 1992, which is prior to the 1996 enact-
ment of the AEDPA, and prior to the case of McFarland v. Scott.46 In that
case the Court held that a condemned prisoner could request the Federal Dis-
trict Court to appoint counsel for him to prepare a petition for federal habeas
corpus."7 Justice Breyer admits that ninety-three percent of the cases involv-
ing unexhausted claims were prepared pro se by the inmates themselves.4"' It
would be reasonable to postulate that since the advent of McFarland v. Scott,
the number of unrepresented condemned inmates on Federal Habeas has de-
creased because the condemned inmates can now request counsel to prepare
their habeas petitions. However, although the figures for cases dismissed be-
cause of unexhausted claims by death row inmates may have decreased since
409. Id.
410. Id. at 2131 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
411. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).
412. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 2131 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
413. Ie (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics, Federal Habeas Corpus Review: Challenging State Court Criminal Convictions 17
(1995) [hereinafter Federal Habeas Corpus Review]).
414. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 1231 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Federal Habeas Corpus
Review at 19).
415. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 1231 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
416. 512 U.S. 849 (1994).
417. Id. at 856-57.
418. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 2134 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Federal Habeas Corpus
Review at 14).
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1992, unexhausted claims may still appear in federal habeas petitions pre-
pared by both lawyers and non-lawyers for a variety of reasons."9
Moreover, Breyer disputes the majority's argument that if "other collat-
eral review" was interpreted to include federal habeas petitions, more of
them would be filed with unexhausted claims. 2' He points out that if a peti-
tioner files a mixed petition, the District Court has the power to dismiss all
unexhausted claims, 2' and District Courts have the power to require that on
refiling, the habeas petition contain only exhausted claims. 2
The decision in this case was much closer than is apparent from the
vote. If experience shows that Justices Stevens and Souter are not correct in
their view that federal judges will consider "equitable tolling" for prior ha-
beas corpus petitions with unexhausted claims, then they well might be per-
suaded by Justices Breyer's argument and agree to visit this issue again.
D. Seling v. Young 2.
In Seling v. Young, the Court held that an individual, claiming punitive
treatment after being involuntarily committed in a civil proceeding as a
sexually violent predator, cannot raise double jeopardy and ex post facto
claims in a habeas petition by making an "as applied" challenge to his par-
ticular conditions of confinement. 24
The state of Washington authorizes the civil commitment of sex offend-
ers as "sexually violent predators" upon a showing of mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes them "likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence if not confined. 4 2' 5 The commitment proceedings are com-
menced when a violent sex offender is about to be released from prison. The
individual is entitled to counsel and funds for expert witnesses, and the State
bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a
sexually violent predator. 6
The state filed a petition to commit Young as a sexually violent predator
one day prior to his scheduled release from prison.4 7 Young had been previ-
ously convicted of six rapes over a period of three decades. ' The District
419. Id.
420. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 2134 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 520 (1982)).
421. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 2134 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(2)
(1994 ed. Supp. V)).
422. Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 2134 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473,489 (2000)).
423. 121 S. Ct. 727 (2001).
424. Id. at 735.
425. Id. at 730 (citing Community Protection Act of 1990, WASti. REv. CODE §
71.09.010 et seq. (1992 and Supp. 2000)).
426. Young, 121 S. Ct. at 730.
427. Id. at 731.
428. Id.
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Court granted Young's petition for writ of habeas corpus on grounds that his
commitment violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the
United States Constitution." The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for recon-
sideration,' 3 however, following the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Kansas v. Hendricks,"3' which held that a similar commitment statute was
civil.
The District Court denied Young relief, holding that because the Wash-
ington Act is civil, Young's claims of double jeopardy and violation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause failed. '32 The Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the
linchpin of the claim was whether or not the act was punitive "as applied" to
Young. 3
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding
that an "as applied" analysis was not proper for an individual claimant, not-
ing that there remains a civil remedy for any problems associated with the
conditions of confinement and treatment regime at the place of commit-
ment." Justice O'Connor, who wrote the majority opinion, acknowledged
that some of Young's claims were serious. Young maintained that the condi-
tions of his confinement were more restrictive than those of "true" civil
commitment detainees; that residents were abused and denied access to ser-
vices; and that excessive restrictions and policies such as videotaping ther-
apy sessions, were not reasonably related to treatment." Indeed the facility
at which Young was held did not even have any certified sex offender treat-
ment specialists and even a court-appointed psychologist conceded that the
facility appeared to be "designed and managed to punish and confine indi-
viduals for life without any hope of release."'
Nevertheless Justice O'Connor agreed with the state that using an "as
applied" approach to determine whether the state's sex offender commitment
scheme was civil or punitive would be unworkable because confinement was
a continuing rather than a fixed event."7 Thus, Justice O'Connor held that
Young could not obtain release by proving that his particular conditions of
429. Id at 732.
430. Id
431. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). In Hendricks the Court held that the determination of whether
a law is civil or punitive in nature is initially an issue of "statutory construction." which must
be determined by looking at text and legislative history. Did the legislature intend the statute
to establish civil proceedings? If so, the Supreme Court reasoned, a court can only reject that
legislature's manifest intent where a party challenging the statute provides "the clearest proof
that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the State's in-
tention." Id. at 361 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
432. Young, 121 S. Ct. at 733.
433. Id.
434. 1d at 736.
435. Id at 733.
436. Id at 735.
437. Id.
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confinement were in fact punitive and thus violated the Double Jeopardy and
Ex Post Facto Clauses because:
Such an analysis would never conclusively resolve whether a particular
scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the
scheme's validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Clauses.... Unlike a fine, confinement is not a fixed event. As petitioner
notes, it extends over time under conditions that are subject to change. The
particular features of confinement may affect how a confinement scheme
is evaluated to determine whether it is civil rather than punitive, but it re-
mains no less true that the query must be answered definitively. The civil
nature of a confinement scheme cannot be altered based merely on vaga-
ries in the implementation of the authorizing statute. 38
However, Justice O'Connor did leave open the possibility that generally
applicable conditions of confinement could be relevant to a determination, in
the first instance, as to whether a commitment scheme was punitive. 39 Thus
the holding of Young would seem to be quite narrow. Where a commitment
scheme has been found to be civil, it "cannot be deemed punitive "as ap-
plied" to a single individual."' The majority's concession that an as applied
challenge might still be appropriate in certain circumstances prompted Jus-
tice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter, to file a concurring opinion to expressly
dissociate themselves from that suggestion, asserting that the determination
of civil or punitive statutes must be made by looking at the text of the legis-
lation on its face." Justice Thomas also filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment which expressed a similar view, observing that "a statute which is
civil on its face cannot be divested of its civil nature simply because of the
manner in which it is implemented."" 2
Only Justice Stevens dissented. In his view it was perfectly proper for a
court to look to the effect of a statute to determine whether its true nature is
civil or punitive." ' Stevens accused the majority of incorrectly assuming the
answer to the question it was asked to decide by starting from the assumed
premise that the commitment scheme was civil. Young's petition, Justice
Stevens pointed out, sought to introduce evidence of the conditions of his
confinement to show the punitive purpose and effect of the Washington
commitment scheme, noting that Young had now served a longer term of
confinement after completion of his sentence than he did on the sentence for
the crime he committed.'"
438. Id.
439. Id. at 737.
440. Id.
441. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997)).
442. Young, 121 S. Ct. at 727.
443. Id. at 743 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
444. Id. at 742, 745 n4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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This case is important not so much because of its result, which was en-
tirely predictable in light of Kansas v. Hendricks."5 What is significant is the
court's apparent willingness to allow a "civil" label, based upon a facial
reading of the text of a commitment statute, to take precedence over its ac-
tual effect.
E. Daniels v. United States'
Under a federal post conviction statute (28 U.S.C. § 2255), a federal de-
fendant can file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence on the
ground that it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States." At issue in this case is whether a defendant can use this fed-
eral post-conviction remedy to challenge a prior state conviction that was
used to enhance his federal sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA).'
The defendant, Daniels, was convicted of being a felon in possession of
a firearm in 1994.' Thereafter, the government sought to have Daniels de-
clared to be an armed career criminal under the ACCA, based upon four
prior state convictions-two for robbery in 1978 and 1981, and two for bur-
glary in 1977 and 1979.'" The Federal District Court found the defendant to
be an armed career criminal within the meaning of the ACCA"' and sen-
tenced him to 176 months in prison.4' Had the defendant not been subject to
this enhancement, his maximum sentence would have been only 120
months.4
Daniels unsuccessfully attacked his sentence on direct appeal,"' and
subsequently filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence. '55 Daniels argued that his state convictions were uncon-
stitutional because they were based on guilty pleas that were not knowing
and voluntary, and that one was also the product of ineffective assistance of
counsel.456 The District Court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals af-
firmed.4
445. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
446. 532 U.S. 374 (2001).
447. 28 U.S.C § 2255 (Supp. v. 1994). The Congress in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended § 2255, but those amendments are not relevant here.
448. 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(e) (1984).
449. 18 U.S.C § 922 (g)(1).
450. Daniels, 121 S. Ct. at 1580.
451. 18 U.S.C.S. § 924 (e) (1984).
452. Daniels, 121 S. Ct. at 1580.
453. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2).
454. 86 F.3d 1164 (9" Cir. 1996).
455. Daniels, 121 S. Ct. at 1580.
456. Id. at 1581.
457. Id.
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The reasoning of the lower courts was based upon the prior decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Custis v. United States.58 In that case,
the Supreme Court held, with the exception of convictions obtained without
the assistance of counsel, a defendant could not attack the validity of his fed-
eral sentence under the ACCA in his federal sentencing hearing by collater-
ally attacking prior state convictions that were used to enhance that sentence.
In Daniels the issue was whether, after sentencing was over, the defendant
could challenge those enhancing prior convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
which was designed to provide relief to federal prisoners "whose sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States."'
The lower courts found Custis dispositive of that issue as well.
The Supreme Court agreed that the policy considerations extant in Cus-
tis applied equally to the federal habeas context."W Justice O'Connor, writing
for a majority, which included the Chief Justice, Justices Kennedy, Thomas
and Justice Scalia, who concurred in a separate opinion, cited two reasons
for affirming the lower courts. The first was "ease of administration."'" Jus-
tice O'Connor pointed out that in order to challenge prior state sentences,
transcripts of those hearings and other state court records could be required,
which might no longer be available. 62 For example, Daniels had challenged
a 1978 conviction on the theory that he did not fully understand the elements
of the crimes with which he was charged when he entered his guilty plea."
However, the transcript of that proceeding was missing" and unavailable for
federal review of the guilty plea under Section 2255.
The other consideration concerned the finality of state court judg-
ments. 65 In some states, convictions affect the right to vote, hold public of-
fice, professional licensing, possession of firearms, etc."' If that conviction
were open to later collateral attack in a federal proceeding, all of these re-
strictions might have to be reevaluated, and there would be no finality to the
state conviction.
Justice O'Connor agreed with Daniels that defendants have the right to
challenge their convictions if they were unconstitutionally obtained, but the
question was in what proceedings and for how long. 7 The defendant may
challenge his conviction on direct appeal, post-conviction, and in a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.68 But, once the defendant is to be
458. 511 U.S. 485 (1994).
459. 28 U.S.C § 2255 (Supp. V. 1994).
460. Daniels, 121 S. Ct. at 1583-84.
461. Id. at 1581.
462. See id.
463. Id. at 1582.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 1581.
466. See id. at 1582.
467. See id. at 1582-83.
468. 28 U.S.C § 2254 (Supp. V. 1994).
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sentenced under the ACCA, and the prior conviction has not been set aside,
it is presumptively valid and can be used to enhance a federal sentence.'
Finally, Justice O'Connor argued that if a defendant has failed to chal-
lenge his state conviction in a timely fashion on direct appeal, post-
conviction, or federal habeas, he should not be able to get another "bite at
the apple" because that conviction is later used to enhance a federal sen-
tence. 7
Justice Scalia, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed with Justice
O'Connor that the defendant should not be allowed to collaterally attack his
prior state convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255."' However, he wrote sepa-
rately to indicate his disagreement with the suggestion by Justice O'Connor
and the plurality that in certain circumstances, where "no channel of review
was actually available to a defendant with respect to a prior conviction, due
to no fault of his own," the defendant might be able to file a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 challenging a federal sentence based on such a conviction." "
Justice Scalia does not believe that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is broad enough to
encompass review of a claim "that an enhanced federal sentence violates due
process" if the enhancement is based on prior convictions.""
Justice Souter, dissented together with Justices Ginsburg and Stevens,
arguing that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is broad enough to encompass
such a claim.47 Justice Souter points out, moreover, that Custis dealt with the
question of "where, not whether, the defendant could attack a prior convic-
tion for constitutional infirmity."'" Custis was in custody at the time of his
decision and could still have attacked his prior state convictions in state
court or through federal habeas review. 6 However, Daniels has no other fo-
rum in which to attack his prior state convictions. Justice Souter asked:
[w]hy should a prisoner like Daniels suddenly be barred from returning to
challenge.., a conviction, when the Government is free to reach back to
it to impose extended imprisonment under a sentence enhancement law
unheard of at the time of the original convictions? Daniels could not have
been expected in 1978 to anticipate the federal enhancement statute en-
acted in 1984 .... 4n
Justice Souter also notes the anomaly in the plurality's acceptance of the
fact that the defendant could attack these prior state convictions if any were
469. Daniels, 121 S. Ct. at 1583.
470. Id. at 1584.
471. Id. at 1585 (Scalia, I., concurring).
472. Id.
473. Id
474. Id. at 1586-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
475. Id. at 1586 (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 765 (1994) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted)).
476. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485,497 (1994).
477. Daniels, 121 S. Ct. at 1587-88.
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obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright." Although agreeing that the
exception for Gideon violations was valid, so were other violations of fed-
eral constitutional law such as Miranda violations, Brady violations, and/or
Strickland violations, etc., which are equally as important and should be
similarly subject to correction if a conviction obtained in violation of the
federal constitution has been used to enhance a federal sentence.479
Justice Breyer dissented separately to argue that Custis itself should be
overruled since it was the root of the problems noted by the dissent. 8" Prior
to Custis, the practice of the lower courts was to allow a challenge to a prior
state conviction at the time of the sentencing in federal court.48' Justice
Breyer predicted that unless Custis was reconsidered there would be "ever-
increasing complexity" in this area.4"
F. Lackawanna County D.A. v. Coss'8
This case deals with the question of whether federal habeas relief is
available to a state prisoner who challenges a current sentence on the ground
that it was enhanced due to an unconstitutional prior conviction for which
the defendant is no longer in custody. In Daniels v. United States,84 the
Court held that such relief was generally unavailable to a federal prisoner
through 28 U.S.C. § 2255.485 In Coss, the Court holds that relief is likewise
generally not available to a to state prisoner through a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254."6 Coss, however, arguably presented
circumstances constituting two exceptions to this general rule. The first ex-
ception concerns prior convictions with respect to which there was a failure
to appoint counsel. A majority of the Court agreed that under this circum-
stance the general rule against attacking prior convictions did not apply and
a defendant could seek habeas relief.487 A majority of the members of the
Court would also appear to recognize a second exception. That exception
would arise if it can be shown that the prisoner, through no fault of his own,
has been deprived of a forum in which to raise the claim he now seeks to
478. Id. at 1588 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
479. Daniels, 121 S. Ct. at 1588 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1964) (requir-
ing police to warn the defendant of the consequences of his confession and right to counsel or
to remain silent); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the prosecution to dis-
close exculpatory evidence in their possession to the defense); and Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) (requiring not only that the defendant have counsel, but that his counsel
be effective)).
480. Daniels, 121 S. Ct. at 1589.
481. Id. at 1588.
482. Id. at 1589.
483. 121 S. Ct. 1567 (2001).
484. 532 U.S. 374 (2001).
485. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V. 1994).
486. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. V. 1994).
487. Coss, 121 S. Ct. at 1574.
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vindicate."2 In that circumstance, Justice O'Connor, The Chief Justice, Jus-
tice Kennedy and presumably the four dissenters in this case would permit
habeas relief. Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality, avoided defining the
parameters of that exception, however, finding that it did not apply here be-
cause defendant's sentence had not actually been adversely affected by the
allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction.'
Coss was no stranger to the criminal justice system. By the time he was
sixteen he had been found delinquent at least five times." By the time he
was twenty-three, he had been convicted of assault, vandalism, criminal
mischief, disorderly conduct, and possession of narcotics."' In 1986, Coss
was convicted of several misdemeanors involving simple assault, criminal
mischief and vandalism." For these crimes he was sentenced to two con-
secutive terms of six months to one year." 3 Although Coss did not file a di-
rect appeal, he filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his counsel was
ineffective.4' The Lackawanna County Court appointed counsel, and the
State filed an answer to the petition. 93 Thereafter, no further action was
taken on this petition and it was still technically pending at the time the in-
stant proceedings were undertaken almost fourteen years later. '
In 1990 Coss was convicted of felony aggravated assault. ' At first, he
received a sentence of six to twelve years. However, he successfully chal-
lenged that sentence on appeal. On remand for re-sentencing, however, one
of the issues concerned whether Coss's prior 1986 misdemeanor convictions
should be considered as separate offenses, thereby increasing his "prior re-
cord score" and his possible sentence."' The trial court ruled that the 1986
misdemeanor convictions should count only as one offense, because they
arose out of the same incident. Under the Pennsylvania sentencing code a
single misdemeanor does not count toward the prior record score.'" There-
fore the 1986 convictions did not affect the range of sentences to which
Coss was eligible.' However, during the re-sentencing hearing, the trial
court also had to choose a sentence within the range of sentences available
to him. In choosing that range, the trial judge considered a number of fac-
tors, including
488. Id. at 1575.
489. Id. at 1576.
490. Ik at 1570.
491. Id.
492- Id.
493. Id. at 1571.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id at 1570-71.
497. Id. at 1571.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id.
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the seriousness and nature of the crime involved .... the well being and
protection of the people who live in your community, your criminal dispo-
sition, your prior criminal record, the possibility of your rehabilitation,
and the testimony that I've heard... it's indicative that from your actions
you will continue to break the law unless given a period of incarcera-
tion.so
The trial court then re-sentenced Coss to a term of six to twelve years."
In 1994, the defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging that his 1986
convictions were the result of his counsel's ineffectiveness, and that his 1990
re-sentencing was adversely and unconstitutionally impacted by their con-
sideration." 3 Based on the sentencing Judge's comments, the District Court
found that he had taken the 1986 convictions into account in his resentencing
for the 1990 conviction. Therefore, the District Court found that it had juris-
diction to hear the case under Section 2254, and concluded that Coss's coun-
sel had been deficient, but failed to find prejudice.' Therefore, the petition
was denied. 05 Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
agreed that the sentencing court considered Coss's 1986 convictions when it
determined Coss's sentence for the 1990 felony."° Reversing the District
Court, the Court of Appeals found that Coss's counsel was ineffective as to
one of the 1986 convictions and remanded the case back to the District Court
with instructions that either Coss be retried as to that offense or that he be re-
sentenced without consideration of the assault conviction."°
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the threshold issue was whether the
defendant could properly bring an action for habeas relief. Justice O'Connor
agreed that Coss was "in custody" as required by Section 2254,"' since he
was still in custody on the 1990 conviction." The more difficult question
was to what extent Coss' prior state convictions could be attacked collater-
ally. Justice O'Connor held that the policy reasons explained in Daniels v.
United States- 0 dictated that a state prisoner likewise could not ordinarily
attack a prior state conviction via a petition for federal habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254.11
Justice O'Connor observed that the policy reasons of finality of judg-
ment and ease of administration operate the same in the federal habeas con-
501. Id. (quoting Record Doc. No. 101)(emphasis added).
502. Coss, 121 S. Ct. at 1571.
503. Id. at 1571-72.
504. Id. at 1572.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) requires that a habeas petitioner establish that he is "in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a state court."
509. Coss, 121 S. Ct. at 1571.
510. 532 U.S. 374(2001).
511. Coss, 121 S. Ct. at 1574.
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text as in the federal post-conviction context. Once a state conviction has
been secured, and the defendant has failed to take advantage of his direct
and/or collateral appeal options, the state has a strong interest in preserving
the integrity of the conviction. Moreover, the same problems exist in trying
to discover old transcripts and records in order to revisit these prior convic-
tions."'
Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority, held, however, that where the
petitioner could demonstrate that his prior expired conviction was obtained
in the absence of counsel an exception would be made to allow relief under
Section 2254.'
Up to this point in her opinion, Justice O'Connor was joined by the
Chief Justice and by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. However, Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas refused to join that portion of her opinion address-
ing a second exception to the general rule barring habeas attack on prior state
convictions used to enhance a present sentence. This exception arose, Justice
O'Connor asserted, when it appeared that the defendant was not at fault in
failing to perfect a direct or collateral attack on his prior expired conviction
in the first instance.5t4 Justice O'Connor believed that where a defendant,
who was without fault, no longer had any forum in which to bring his claim,
he should be allowed to collaterally attack a prior conviction used to enhance
his present sentence. While only the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy
joined this part of her opinion, it is clear that with the additional votes of the
four dissenters a clear majority would adhere to this position."
Justice O'Connor avoided ruling on the issue, however, by finding the
error harmless. She acknowledged that it is "technically correct" to say that
the trial court did consider the tainted 1986 misdemeanor convictions in re-
sentencing Coss."6 However, she concluded that in light of Coss' extensive
criminal record, the 1986 misdemeanors were 'such a minor component of
[Coss'] record"' that the trial judge would have given the same sentence
even without their consideration 7 Therefore, Justice O'Connor reversed the
Court of Appeals decision below, finding that Coss did not qualify for relief
under Section 2254 "because the 1990 sentence he is challenging was not ac-
tually affected by the 1986 convictions."'2 This harmless error analysis,
however, was only adopted by a plurality, as Justice Scalia did not join this
portion of the opinion."9
512. Id at 1573-74.
513. Id. at 1570.
514. Id. at 1575.
515. See id. at 1575-77 (Souter, J. dissenting). See also id. at 1577 (Breyer, J.. dissent-
ing).
516. Id at 1576.
517. Id (citing Coss v. Lackawanna County District Attorney. 204 F.3d 453, 468 (3d
Cir. 2000) (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
518. Coss, 121 S. Ct. at 1576 (2001).
519. Id. at 1570.
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Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissented. 2 He
noted that here Coss had filed a timely state post conviction petition, but for
some unknown reason it had become lost in the state system for fourteen
years. 2 ' Indeed it is because of this fact that Justice O'Connor allowed for
the possibility of an exception to the prohibition against attacking prior state
convictions under Section 2254."52 Justice Souter pointedly disagreed with
Justice O'Connor's harmless error analysis, however, noting that the District
Court expressly found that the sentencing judge made reference to the 1986
convictions when it imposed a sentence at "the top of the standard range" for
Coss'1990 offense. 23 This finding was not challenged in the Court of Ap-
peals. Therefore, Justice Souter argued that by ruling in the first instance that
the consideration of the 1986 convictions had no adverse effect, the Supreme
Court was exceeding its authority as a court of review, and abrogating the
role of the lower courts.'24
Justice Breyer dissented separately to note that since the State had never
argued that the trial court's consideration of the 1986 convictions was harm-
less error, he would not overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals on that
basis. 2' However, he would have remanded the case back to the Court of
Appeals to determine whether federal habeas was (as the exception required)
the only forum available for review of the prior convictions.'26
G. INS v. St. Cyr 2'
In this five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court took a bold, proactive
stand to protect the rights of resident aliens subject to deportation by the
INS. The St. Cyr case addressed two issues: 1) whether habeas corpus re-
mains available as a remedy following enactment of two restrictive statutes
in 1996; and 2) whether statutes enacted after resident aliens plead guilty to
criminal charges may be retroactively applied to deportation proceedings
taking place at a later time.'28
St. Cyr is one of three cases in this Supreme Court term that supports the
continued viability of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, weakens the authority of
the INS, and staunchly maintains the primacy of the judiciary's role in safe-
guarding the Writ as a remedy against detention by the executive branch of
government. In this case, the INS argued that certain provisions of the
520. Id. at 1576 (Souter, J., dissenting).
521. Id. at 1576-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
522. Id.
523. Id. at 1577 (Souter, J., dissenting).
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001).
528. Id. at 2275.
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)' and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(llRIRA)' stripped the courts of jurisdiction under the habeas corpus stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.531 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, disagreed
with the INS, citing the strong presumption in favor of judicial review and
the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to
repeal habeas jurisdiction. 2 Justice Stevens also pointed to the clear re-
quirement in Article I of the Constitution that, "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasions, the public Safety may require it," observing that any statutory
construction precluding judicial review would raise "substantial constitu-
tional questions." ' Thus, he concluded, some form of judicial oversight in
deportation cases is "unquestionably" required by the Constitution. '
Despite the High Court's view that it must remain proactively involved
against incursions upon its authority by administrative agencies of the execu-
tive branch such as the INS, this decision does not alter the deference the
Court has shown to the decisions of state courts in criminal proceedings. 35
Justice Stevens is quick to distinguish St. Cyr from Felker v. Turpin," where
the Supreme Court refused to grant a death penalty inmate leave to file a
successor habeas corpus petition to challenge his state court conviction after
passage of the AEDPA. 7 In Stevens' view, historically, the Great Writ was
largely a remedy against executive detention."
In explaining why the language of the AEDPA and IIRIRA do not pro-
hibit habeas corpus jurisdiction, Justice Stevens observed that those statutes
employ specific words like, "judicial review," or "jurisdiction to review,"
but fail to include language relating to the Writ of Habeas Corpus or its ena-
529. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-
32, § 735, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
530. Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (amended 1997).
531. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2277-78.
532. ld. at 2278.
533. Id. at 2279 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. cl. 2).
534. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2279 (citing Heikkila v. Barber. 345 U S. 229 (1953)).
535. See, e.g., Nancy Albert-Goldberg & Marshall J. Hartman, Vhat Remains of Habeas
Corpus for Death Row Inmates?, 2 PUB. INr. L. REP. 11. 31 (1997). The authors note that the
AEDPA generally requires federal courts to defer to state court decisions. It is also a retreat
from case law that allowed federal circuit courts of appeal to rely on their own interpretation
of federal law instead of only Supreme Court precedent. As a result, some federal circuit court
judges believe that the AEDPA tramples on the judicial power embodied in Article Ill of the
Constitution.
536. 518 U.S. 651 (1996). See also Marshall Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus
and the New Federalism After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 30
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 337, 378 (1997).
537. Felkerv. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996).
538. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2280. We will leave it to future scholars to examine whether.
historically, executive and judicial functions were as clearly separate and distinct as they are
in the United States today.
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bling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241."'9 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in
Heikkila v. Barber" and two other early Supreme Court decisions, Justice
Stevens noted that the terms "judicial review" and "habeas corpus" have his-
torically distinct meanings in the context of immigration."' Therefore, a stat-
ute precluding judicial review of a deportation order does not preclude a
court from hearing a habeas corpus petition related to that order. Accord-
ingly, St. Cyr holds that habeas jurisdiction under Section 2241 was not re-
pealed by either the AEDPA or IIRIRA.ss
The second issue in this decision relates to the retroactive application of
the statutes in question."3 Enrico St. Cyr, a Haitian citizen, was admitted as a
lawful permanent U.S. resident in 1986.'" In March 1996, he pled guilty in
state court to selling a controlled substance.u5 The plea took place prior to
passage of the AEDPA in April 1996.46 Deportation proceedings against St.
Cyr were not commenced until April 1997, after passage of both AEDPA
and IIRIRA" The effect of those statutes was to repeal previously existing
laws that gave the Attorney General discretion to waive deportation for
aliens convicted of certain crimes.
48
Both the federal District Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed that the 1996 statutes should not apply to removal proceedings
brought against an alien who pled guilty to a deportable crime before their
enactment."9 The High Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals,
stating that it would be unfair to apply the statutes upon an individual who
entered into a plea agreement in reliance on the laws then in effect, without a
clear indication from Congress that it intended to make the statutes retroac-
tive."
In a prophetic passage in light of the subsequent terrorist attacks on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, Justice Stevens took issue with the INS's assumption that
immigrants were not an "unpopular group" '' and expressed the Court's con-
cern that '.[t]he Legislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away set-
tled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration. Its re-
sponsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use
539. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides in part that, "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by
the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their
respective jurisdictions."
540. 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
541. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2285.
542. Id. at 2287.
543. See id. at 2275.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. See id.
547. Id.
548. See id.
549. St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 2000).
550. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at2291-93.
551. Id. at 2288 n.39.
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retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or
individuals.""'5
Justice Scalia filed a lengthy dissent, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice
Thomas, and, in part, by Justice O'Connor. Justice Scalia argued that the
AEDPA and the IIRIRA, which latter statute revised the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (as amended in 1961), unambiguously repealed the
application of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the general habeas corpus provision, to de-
portation challenges brought by aliens convicted of certain crimes.'" The
dissent objected to the majority opinion's imposing a "magic words re-
quirement" upon Congress by insisting that clear language be included in the
statutes in order to repeal habeas jurisdiction.' Even if habeas relief of some
form were required by virtue of the Suspension Clause in Article I of the
Constitution, Justice Scalia argued that it would not embrace the "rarified
right asserted here: the right to judicial compulsion of the exercise of Execu-
tive discretion."'555
Justice Scalia further charged that the majority's decision routes all
challenges to removal orders by "criminal aliens" to the district courts rather
than to appellate courts, thereby avoiding time limits required in appellate
courts and according "criminal aliens" with greater access to judicial review
than other aliens subject to removal.556 Justice Stevens' opinion responded to
that charge by pointing out that St. Cyr raises only a question of an alien's
eligibility for discretionary relief, and that Congress could choose to provide
an avenue of relief though appellate courts if it wished.'"
Justice O'Connor, in a separate dissenting opinion, agreed with Justice
Scalia that the claimed right to executive discretion falls outside the scope of
habeas corpus review, and therefore did not find it necessary to address the
issue of what quantum of habeas review, if any, was required by the Suspen-
sion Clause.'"
H. Calcano-Martinez et al. v. INS"'
This is a companion case to INS v. St. Cyr. Unlike St. Cyr, who filed a
habeas corpus petition but did not appeal, the petitioners in this case filed
both a petition for review in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' and a ha-
beas corpus petition in the District Court. 6' Like St. Cyr, petitioners were
552. Id. at 2288 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products. 511 U.S. 244. 266 (1994)).
553. Id at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
554. Id
555. Id. at 2301 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
556. IdL
557. Id. at 2287 n.38.
558. Id at 2293 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
559. 121 S. Ct. 2268 (2001).
560. These petitions were filed pursuant to 8 U.S C. § 1252(a)(1) (199-1 ed , Supp. V).
561. The habeas corpus petitions were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
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lawful permanent residents of the United States, who conceded that they
were deportable based upon their past criminal convictions.
The petitions for review were consolidated in the Court of Appeals,
which subsequently dismissed them on the ground that the new Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) 62 ex-
pressly precluded courts of appeals from exercising jurisdiction to review
any final order of removal against any alien who has been convicted of cer-
tain offenses, including any aggravated felony." The Supreme Court in Cal-
cano-Martinez affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the
IIRIRA strips the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear the petitioners'
claims on petitions for direct review.
With respect to petitioners' habeas corpus petitions, however, the Court
of Appeals ruled that they could pursue those claims in a Section 2241 ac-
tion filed in district court." Consistent with St. Cyr, the Supreme Court in
Calcano-Martinez affirmed the ruling by the Second Circuit.
This case makes the Supreme Court's position with regard to AEDPA
and IIRIRA abundantly clear. In cases where resident aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies are ordered deported, appellate courts are without juris-
diction to entertain direct appeals, but deportees may petition for relief under
the habeas corpus statute in the district court.
. Zadvydas v. Davis6'
Like St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez, this case limits the extent of recent
legislative restrictions upon the writ of habeas corpus for resident aliens after
entry of a final removal order. In Zadvydas the issue was whether the United
States Attorney General was authorized to detain a removable alien indefi-
nitely beyond the removal period, or only for a period reasonably necessary
to secure the alien's removal." Writing for the majority in another 5 to 4
immigration decision, Justice Breyer held that the Immigration and National-
ity Act's (INA) post-removal detention provision 67 contains "an implicit rea-
sonableness limitation" that limits the discretion of the Attorney General. To
construe the INA provision otherwise, the Court stressed, would cause the
statute to run afoul of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 68
562. 110 Stat. 3009-546.
563. 232 F.3d 328 (1999).
564. Id.
565. 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001).
566. Id. at 2495.
567. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)(1994 ed., Supp. V) states that "an alien ordered removed.
may be detained beyond the removal period, and, if released, shall be subject to [certainl
terms of supervision .... The Court stressed the importance of the word "may" as an indica-
tion that Congress wished to limit the Attorney General's discretion. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at
2502.
568. Id. at 2498.
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This decision arose out of two cases that were consolidated due to a
conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Fifth
Circuit case involved Kestutis Zadvydas, born of Lithuanian parents in a
German displaced persons camp and brought to the United States at age
eight.5" The Ninth Circuit case involved Kim Ho Ma, whose parents fled
Cambodia, taking him to refugee camps in Thailand and the Philippines be-
fore bringing him to the United States at the age of seven." Both of these
individuals had been convicted of aggravated felonies and served their time
in prison before being released into INS custody. The INS ruled that they
should be deported due to their criminal records."
However, the INS was unable to deport both Zadvydas and Ma.' In the
case of Zadvydas, neither Germany nor Lithuania would accept him. As for
Ma, the INS could not send him back to Cambodia because that nation has
no repatriation treaty with the United States." Both men filed habeas peti-
tions after being held beyond expiration of the ninety-day removal period,
and in both cases, the United States District Courts granted their petitions on
the grounds that the government and the Constitution forbids post-removal-
period detention, unless there is a realistic chance that an alien will be re-
moved." The Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that eventual deportation
of Zadvydas was "not impossible." ' The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
affirmed the granting of Ma's petition, concluding that detention was not au-
thorized for more than a reasonable time beyond the ninety-day period. 6
Following a review of provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which limited judicial
review of deportation decisions, the Zadvydas Court concluded that 28
U.S.C. § 2241 habeas proceedings are available as a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention of resident
aliens.7 Although, on the surface, this conclusion appears to mesh with that
in St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez, there is one significant difference between
these decisions."n As Justice Breyer points out in Zadvydas, the IIRIRA
569. Id. at 2495-96. See Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. La. 1999) and
Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5'" Cir. 1999).
570. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2496. See Binh Phan v. Reno. 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149. 1156
(W.D. Wash. 1999) (this case was consolidated with approximately 100 similar cases); Kim
Ho May. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9" Cir. 2000).
571. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2496.
572. Id.
573. Id. at 2496-97.
574. Id.
575. Id. at 2496.
576. Id. at 2497.
577. Id. at 2498.
578. This difference may help to account for the fact that Justice O'Connor sided with
the majority in Zadvydas, but not in St. Cyr, and Justice Kennedy sided with the majonty in
St. Cyr, but not in Zadvydas.
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states that, "'no court shall have jurisdiction to review' decisions 'specified
to be in the discretion of the Attorney General."' 79 In St. Cyr and Calcano-
Martinez, petitioners were seeking to allow the Attorney General the author-
ity to grant a discretionary waiver of a deportation order, and therefore it was
necessary for the Supreme Court to reach the issue of whether the word "re-
view" was a bar to habeas corpus relief."' The remedy sought in Zadvydas,
on the other hand, was to remove the Attorney General's discretion to keep
the aliens in custody indefinitely.8 ' Justice Breyer reasoned that, since the
aliens in Zadvydas were not seeking review of the Attorney General's exer-
cise of discretion, the restrictive provision of the IIRIRA did not apply. 8'
The plain language restriction in the IIRIRA was not a potential bar to relief,
as it had been in St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez, as Zadvydas wanted to
eliminate the Attorney General's discretion rather than to authorize it.
This case shines a light on the nature of INS proceedings and the need
for executive branch compliance with constitutional mandates. Justice
Breyer observed that government detention violates the Due Process Clause
unless (1) it is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural
safeguards, citing United States v. Salerno,58 or (2) it is ordered in a civil
non-punitive proceeding where there is a special justification, such as
"harm-threatening mental illness," '84 citing Kansas v. Hendricks."' INS pro-
ceedings are civil and therefore assumed to be non-punitive. 6 Because the
basic purpose of detention in the removal law is to assure the alien's pres-
ence at the time of removal, there is thus no special justification for requiring
imprisonment rather than supervised release on specified conditions." ' If
preventive detention is sought because of dangerousness, then the procedural
protections required under Salerno and Hendricks ought to apply."8
Justice Breyer expressly noted that this case did not involve preventive
detention in connection with terrorism or other special circumstances where
an argument might be made for "heightened deference to the judgments of
the political branches with respect to matters of national security.' '89 He also
made a distinction between the constitutional rights afforded resident aliens
who have been given permission to enter and aliens who have not yet en-
tered the United States. Thus, Justice Breyer distinguished Shaughnessy v.
579. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994 ed.. Supp
V)).
580. Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2268, 2269 (2001); St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d
406, 410 (2d Cir. 2000).
581. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2497.
582. Id.
583. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
584. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2498-99.
585. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
586. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2499.
587. Id. at 2499, 2502.
588. Id. at 2499.
589. Id. at 2502.
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United States ex rel. Mezei," ° where an alien was indefinitely detained when
he tried to reenter the country at Ellis Island."' Mezei's presence at Ellis Is-
land was not considered a "landing" by the Court, and therefore, he was
treated as if he had not entered the country. 9 In contrast, Justice Breyer
pointed out, the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United
States, including aliens, regardless of whether their presence is "lawful,
unlawful, temporary or permanent."-"'
Noting that preventive detention of even dangerous persons had been
upheld only where there were "strong procedural protections," Justice Brey-
er concluded that a "serious constitutional problem" would arise if the
provisions of the ADEPA and the ITRIRA were construed to permit indefi-
nite and perhaps even permanent detention based upon executive discretion
without such protections.' Justice Breyer then concluded that there was
nothing in the history of these statutes clearly demonstrating a congressional
intent to authorize indefinite or permanent detention."' Therefore, the Court
held, once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention
is no longer authorized by statute.'
Justice O'Connor, who dissented in St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez,
joined Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg to form the majority in
Zadvydas. Justice Kennedy, who joined the majority in St. Cyr and Calcano-
Martinez, authored the dissent in Zadvydas, in which he was joined by the
Chief Justice and, in part, by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justices Scalia and
Thomas also filed a separate dissent.
All four dissenting justices joined in the view that the Attorney General
possessed clear statutory authority to detain aliens subject to deportation in-
definitely despite the refusal of any other country to accept them, and de-
cried the intrusion of the judicial branch upon the authority of "high officers
of the Executive" branch.' Justice Kennedy's dissent indicated an accep-
tance of an alien's right to seek habeas review after a removal order to de-
termine whether the detained alien poses a risk of dangerousness or flight.'
Justices Scalia and Thomas, on the other hand, refused to concede that there
are any situations in which the courts can order release.'
590. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
591. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2500 (citing Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 215-16 (1953)).
592. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2500.
593. Id. at 2500-01 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
594. Zadvydas, 121 S. CL at 2500.
595. Id. at 2502.
596. Id. at 2504.
597. Id. at 2507-09.
598. Id. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
599. Id. at 2506-07 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
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IV. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Texas v. Cobb'
This case resolves a longstanding question regarding the scope of pro-
tection afforded by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to shield an ac-
cused from police interrogation."' While appearing to be similar to the right
to counsel announced in Miranda v. Arizona,' the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is both broader and narrower than the counsel right under the
Fifth Amendment. In order to ensure that the Fifth Amendment right to be
free from compelled self-incrimination was honored in the police station,
Miranda ruled that before police can interrogate a suspect in custody they
must first advise the suspect that he has a right to consult an attorney and to
have the attorney present during any interrogation. Any custodial interroga-
tion conducted without a proper waiver of this right to counsel renders the
suspect's statements inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief. 3 Thus,
the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment arises only in relation to a
custodial interrogation by police.'
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, is not so limited in
scope. It applies to all critical stages of a prosecution including attempts to
deliberately elicit incriminating statements from an accused even if he is not
in custody.'S The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, however, only
when there is a criminal prosecution. Therefore, this right does not exist until
"adversary proceedings, triggered by the government's formal accusation of
a crime, begin." 6 Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment right attaches only to
specific offenses, which have been formally charged,' usually by the filing
of an indictment or a complaint."° Once the right to Sixth Amendment coun-
sel attaches, and is invoked, either by retaining, requesting or accepting the
appointment of counsel, it acts like a shield, which protects the accused from
further deliberate attempts by police or their agents to elicit incriminating
statements from him without counsel present.'
600. 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).
601. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
602. 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966).
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964).
606. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1345 (2001) (Breyer. J., dissenting).
607. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).
608. But see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (Finding that the right to counsel
was triggered by judicial arraignment, which used an arrest warrant as the charging instru-
ment).
609. See generally Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986); Massiah v. United States.
377 U.S. 201 (1969); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977): United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264 (1980); and Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
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In Cobb, the Court holds that this protective cloak provided by the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel can extend to uncharged offenses beyond those
formally prosecuted, but only if the uncharged offense would be considered
the "same offense" as a charged offense."" To determine whether an un-
charged offense is the "same offense" as a charged offense, the Court
adopted the elements test established in the double jeopardy context by
Blockburger v. United States.6"' The Court rejected the more generous factu-
ally based approach used in most lower courts, which extended the right to
counsel to other uncharged offenses if they were "closely related to" or "in-
extricably intertwined with" a charged offense. 2
The facts in Cobb show how the choice of tests can make a dramatic
difference in the scope of protection the Sixth Amendment provides regard-
ing interrogation on related but uncharged offenses. In December 1993, a
homeowner in Walker County, Texas reported that his house had been burglar-
ized and that his wife and infant daughter were missing. 6,3 Raymond Cobb, a
neighbor, was questioned, but denied involvement. In July 1994, Cobb was
questioned again and this time confessed to the Sheriff that he had committed
the burglary, but denied any knowledge of the missing wife and daughter. Cobb
was indicted for the burglary and Attorney Ridley was appointed as his coun-
sel.61
4
Thereafter, Sheriff's investigators requested counsel's permission to ques-
tion Cobb about the missing persons, which was granted on two different occa-
sions, but Cobb continued to deny involvement. However, while Cobb was free
on bond and living with his father in Odessa, Texas, he confessed to his father
that he had killed the wife during the burglary. Cobb's father informed the
Walker County Sheriff.
65
A warrant was faxed to Odessa authorities, who arrested Cobb, gave him
Miranda warnings, and secured a confession to the murders of both mother and
infant. Cobb stated that he had stabbed the mother in the stomach when she saw
him taking her stereo, and later buried the baby with its mother.6 He was con-
victed of capital murder and received the death penalty. "
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that his
confession was taken in the absence of counsel, and that his right to counsel
had attached when Ridley had been appointed for the burglary. The court rea-
soned that once the right to counsel attaches to a charged offense, it also at-
taches to any other offense that is "very closely related factually to the offense
610. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1343.
611. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
612. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1340-41.
613. Id. at 1339.
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 1340.
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charged."6 ' Finding the murder charges very closely related to the burglary
charge, the Texas Court held that the Odessa police should have notified Ridley
and sought Ridley's permission to question Cobb about the murders. Absent
that permission, the confession should have been suppressed."9 The Texas
Court relied upon Michigan v. Jackson."° In that case, the defendant had re-
quested the appointment of counsel at arraignment. The next morning, the po-
lice took a statement from the defendant in the absence of counsel, and without
any notification to counsel.62' The confession was suppressed as a violation of
Jackson's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority, which included Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, reversed the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals. A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, cast considerable doubt on the continuing validity of the
presumption in Michigan v. Jackson that a request for counsel at arraignment
constitutes an invocation of counsel for all purposes, including interrogation.6 '
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented. "
The Chief Justice premised his decision on a literal reading of McNeil v.
Wisconsin. 5 In McNeil, he argued, the Court held that that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached only to the specific offense charged. 6
In other words it was an "offense specific" right. In McNeil, the confession
at issue related to a crime far different in terms of time, place and subject
matter from the crime charged against McNeil at the time of the contested
interrogations. McNeil had been initially arrested and formally charged with
a robbery that occurred in West Allis, Wisconsin.6"7 The disputed question-
ing of McNeil by police related to a murder committed in the town of Cale-
donia, Wisconsin."6 The two crimes were totally without connection except
for the fact that McNeil was a suspect in each crime. The Court therefore
held that although McNeil's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached
and shielded him from police initiated interrogation with respect to the West
Allis robbery, he did not have a similar Sixth Amendment shield with re-
spect to the uncharged Caldonia murder.6"9 McNeil, however, did not address
the situation present in Cobb where the subsequent interrogation involves
closely related offenses arising out of the same course of conduct.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
621. Id. at 627.
622. Id. at 626.
623. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1344.
624. Id. at 1338.
625. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
626. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1341.
627. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 173.
628. Id. at 173-74.
629. Id. at 173.
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A previous decision that is more closely related factually to Cobb than
McNeil is Brewer v. Willians.6' Williams had been arrested in Davenport,
Iowa and arraigned on an arrest warrant charging him with abduction in Des
Moines, Iowa. A lawyer for Williams had been present at his arraignment in
Davenport. Williams also had a lawyer in Des Moines. Despite assurances
given to the lawyers that they would not interrogate Williams during the trip,
Williams was ultimately induced by police, while being transported back to
Des Moines, to lead them to a shallow grave where he had buried the body
of the ten-year-old girl he had abducted and murdered.6" Thereafter, Wil-
liams was convicted of murder.63" On appeal, however, the Supreme Court
held that Williams had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
during the interrogation on the ride from Davenport to Des Moines."
Cobb argued that Brewer implicitly held that the right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment attached to the murder charge because it was factually
related to the abduction charge." Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, rejected
this argument, declaring that "Constitutional rights are not defined by infer-
ences from opinions which did not address the question at issue. '"" He there-
fore distinguished Williams because in Williams, no one apparently raised
the issue that the defendant was charged only with abduction when the dis-
puted police interrogation occurred.636
The Chief Justice also distinguished Maine v. Moulton " on the same
ground. 8 In that case, Moulton and Colson were charged with three offenses
involving auto theft and the theft of auto parts. Both men retained counsel.
Colson, however, agreed to cooperate with police. He admitted that he and
Moulton had broken into a Ford dealership to steal the auto parts that were
the subject of the third theft charge.639 Colson also indicated that Moulton
630. 430 U.S. 387, 430 (1977).
631. Id at392-93.
632. ld at 394.
633. Id. at 405-06.
634. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1341 (2001).
635. Id.
636. The Chief Justice, then an Associate Justice, had joined in the dissent in Brewer.
Yet none of the Justices had suggested that because abduction was the only pending charge at
the time of the interrogation, that interrogation concerning the separate cnme of murder meant
that Williams was without a Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he confessed to the
murder by leading police to the grave site. That this argument was not made at that time is
noteworthy because the Court was apparently so concerned about public reaction to its deci-
sion in Brewer (which appeared to result in freeing an obviously guilty child murderer) that it
suggested in dicta that the discovery of the body might still be adnutted since a search was
already underway and searchers would have inevitably found the shallow grave without using
the tainted confession. Williams was retried using this theory and the Supreme Court subse-
quently upheld the conviction establishing what has come to be referred to as the inevitable
discovery doctrine. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
637. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
638. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1341.
639. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 163.
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had discussed the idea of killing one of the witnesses to be called by the
state. Colson agreed to help obtain and secretly record admissions from
Moulton regarding the pending charges and any plan to kill the state's wit-
ness. At a meeting between the two, which was initiated by Moulton, Colson
prodded his former partner in crime into making admissions regarding the
pending theft offenses. During this meeting, Moulton also incriminated him-
self with respect to the burglary of the Ford dealership from which the stolen
auto parts had been taken. In a superseding indictment, Moulton was
charged and convicted of both the originally charged theft offenses and the
closely related burglary of the Ford dealership."0
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Moulton's conviction for both
the theft offenses and the burglary, holding that the Sixth Amendment is vio-
lated "when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly cir-
cumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation
between the accused and a state agent."" Justice Brennan, author of the
Court's opinion, in a broad statement of principal, explained further:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation
of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a "medium" between him
and the State .... The determination whether particular action by state
agents violates the accused's r ht to the assistance of counsel must be
made in light of this obligation.
Moulton would therefore appear to recognize that the Sixth Amendment
attached to the burglary charge because it was closely related to and indeed
inextricably intertwined with counsel's representation of the defendant on
the originally charged theft offense involving the stolen auto parts.
In Cobb, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished Moulton on
the ground that the issue of separate offenses was not before the Court.6"
The Chief Justice argued, moreover, that the following language from Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion in Moulton, indicates that Justice Brennan agreed that
Sixth Amendment's protection did not apply to uncharged offenses:
On the other hand, to exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evi-
dence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at that
time, would unnecessarilyfrustrate the public's interest in the investiga-
tion of criminal activities.
But it is clear from this passage that other offenses were at issue. In-
deed, it is with respect to thesefiiture offenses that the above quoted lan-
guage refers. In Moulton, the state argued that because police were investi-
640. Jd. at 167.
641. Id. at 176.
642. Id.
643. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1342.
644. Id. at 1342 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985)).
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gating the possible threat to the safety of a witness, there should be an
exception created to the Massiah rule protecting defendants from interroga-
tion by secret informants. In responding to this argument, Justice Brennan
took pains to note, as had the Court in Massiah, that "it was entirely proper
to continue to investigate the suspected criminal activities of the defen-
dant.""5 However, Justice Brennan continued, again quoting Massiah,
"All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements...
[cannot] constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against
him at his trial.".. . To allow the admission of evidence obtained from the
accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever the police
assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance invites abuse
by law enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated investigation and
risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Mas-
siah."4
It is thus clear, as the use of the word "surveillance" suggests, that Jus-
tice Brennan was referring to the possibility of future charges arising out of
the alleged plan to kill a state's witness. This reference to admissions ob-
tained by secret interrogation to discover plans for afimire crime is a far cry
from interrogation to obtain incriminating admissions about a past offense.
In Moulton, Justice Brennan was explicitly attempting to reconcile the con-
flict between the law enforcement's need to be able to investigate future
criminal activities of those already charged, and the need to protect an ac-
cused who had invoked his right to counsel from being unfairly dealt with.
Deception with respect to future crimes was permissible."' Deception with
respect to interrogation concerning past offenses, which related to the current
representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, was not. Yet the major-
ity in Cobb ignore this important aspect of Moulton and take its language out
of context.
Having dismissed these prior precedents, and the "common sense" in-
terpretation of "virtually every lower court in the United States to consider
the issue,"' the Chief Justice was thus able to reject the Texas appellate
court's "closely related" test and coin his own rule. He announced that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel would extend to uncharged offenses only
if they constitute the "same offense.""' 9 Using the test established in Block-
burger v. United States,' a 1932 double jeopardy case, the Chief Justice
then defined "same offense" as follows:
645. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179 (quoting Massiaht. 377 U.S. at 207).
646. Id. at 179, 180.
647. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293. 308 (1966) (holding that post-indictment
statements made to a government informer were admissible because they related to "a quite
separate offense" of jury tampering).
648. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1350-51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
649. Id. at 1343.
650. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not."' 65
An examination of Blockburger will be helpful to appreciate how re-
strictive the decision in Cobb will prove to be. Blockburger was convicted of
three counts. The gist of each count was his sale and delivery of contraband
narcotics to the same person, on two consecutive days. The first count al-
leged that defendant sold narcotics upon which the tax stamp had not been
displayed on the first day. The second count alleged the sale of narcotics to
the same person on the second day. The third count alleged that the sale on
the second day was made without a prescription. The second transaction had
been arranged by the purchaser with the defendant at the time of the sale on
the first day. s2
Blockburger, convicted on all three counts, was sentenced to five years
in prison on each of the three counts, with each sentence to run consecti-
tively."' He argued that only one crime had occurred because it was one con-
tinuous transaction." ' The one act, one crime argument is in fact compelling
as to the second and third counts, because the same narcotics, the same date
and the same act of delivery were involved. But the Blockburger Court re-
jected the continuous transaction argument, holding that each of the three
counts required proof of a fact that was not a necessary element in the other
two counts.655 The first two counts required proof of a delivery of narcotics,
but on two separate days. Because the date of delivery for each count was a
necessary fact, both counts therefore required proof of a fact that the other
did not. Although the second and third counts related to the same delivery,
an essential element of the second count was the fact that the narcotics carne
from a package without a tax stamp. But that fact was not a necessary ele-
ment for the third count. The fact that the purchaser did not present the seller
with a proper prescription was a necessary fact to the third count, but this
fact was irrelevant to the first two counts. Therefore each of the three counts
properly alleged three different crimes.
Applying this test to the facts in Cobb, the Chief Justice observed that
the lawyer represented Cobb only on the burglary charge.6 6 Murder, the sub-
ject crime of the Odessa police questioning of Cobb, and burglary, the only
charged crime at the time of the Odessa interrogation, each have different
elements. Therefore, although the murder arose in the course of, and for the
651. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1343 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299. 304
(1932)) (emphasis added).
652. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 300-01.
653. Id. at 301
654. Id.
655. Id. at 302.
656. See Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1344.
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purpose of, completing the burglary, Cobb had no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel regarding his interrogation on the uncharged murders.'
Justice Kennedy, while joining the Chief Justice's opinion also wrote a
concurring opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.s These three jus-
tices would abolish the Sixth Amendment shield against police-initiated in-
terrogation, which Michigan v. Jackson' 9 held was automatically perfected
once counsel has been appointed at arraignment. In their view, if the police
comply with Miranda v. Arizona,' the confession should be admissible as
evidence without regard to the stage of proceeding, unless a defendant has
clearly and unambiguously asserted that he does not want to speak except
through the medium of counsel."'
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, dis-
sented.' Justice Breyer observed that it has been extraordinarily difficult for
lawyers and judges to apply the very technical Blockburger formula in dou-
ble jeopardy cases and predicted it will be even more difficult to use this test
to define Sixth Amendment rights.' Indeed, it is almost ludicrous to imag-
ine the police considering the Blockburger test before interrogating a suspect
at the police station.
Justice Breyer also defended Michigan v. Jackson against the attack
launched by Justice Kennedy, noting that "the police may not force a suspect
who has asked for legal counsel to make a critical legal choice without the
legal assistance that he has requested and that the Constitution guarantees. "
However, by allowing the police to initiate interrogation of a defendant
who has invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, on the basis that a
different charge in involved, Cobb has moved the Court a significant step
toward Justice Kennedy's position.
Cobb also drives a wedge between the Sixth and Fifth Amendments by
creating another distinction between the Sixth Amendment right and the
right to counsel under Miranda. In Arizona v. Roberson,' the Court refused
to follow the path taken in Cobb, holding, in the Fifth Amendment context,
that once an accused in custody had requested counsel, he could not be ap-
657. Id.
658. See id.
659. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
660. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
661. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1344-45 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring). It would seem, how-
ever, that such formalism could easily be defeated by a similar formality. At arraignment the
defendant could simply make the clear and unambiguous assertion that Justice Kennedy re-
quires by stating on the record that he or she wishes to communicate only through the medium
of counsel and does not wish to submit to any questioning in counsel's absence
662. Id. at 1345.
663. Id. at 1350 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
664. ld. at 1347 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
665. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
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proached by police to initiate custodial interrogation on any other offense,
whether related or not.'
In Roberson, police had arrested a burglary suspect. When he was ques-
tioned about the burglary at the station house, he requested a lawyer and
questioning was discontinued. 7 Three days later an officer not involved in
the arrest or initial questioning, came to the station house and interrogated
Roberson about a different, unrelated burglary. Roberson was fully advised
of his Miranda rights, but this time did not request a lawyer and waived his
right to silence."6 He answered questions and made incriminating admis-
sions. However, these admissions were suppressed by the state trial court at
Roberson's trial on the second burglary charge."9 The Supreme Court agreed
with the state court that once Roberson requested a lawyer with respect to
interrogation about the offense for which he was arrested, the failure to pro-
vide counsel barred the questioning of Roberson about any other offenses,
even if they were unrelated.67 The Court's reasoning was that once a suspect
invokes his right to counsel after being read the Miranda warnings, any "re-
sumption of questioning.., without the requested attorney being provided,
strongly suggests to the accused that he has no choice but to answer."67' The
Court distinguished Michigan v. Mosely7 noting that a request for counsel
by a suspect raises the presumption "that he considers himself unable to deal
with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance" and
this pressure does not dissipate simply because the police seek at a later time
to interrogate him about a different offense."n
A request for counsel at custodial interrogation, made in response to a
Miranda warning, even before a suspect is formally charged with an offense,
therefore triggers a bright-line rule barring any further police-initiated inter-
rogation of the suspect on any charge, whether it be the offense with respect
to which interrogation was initially sought or a totally unrelated offense that
police may wish to question him about in the future. In Cobb, by contrast,
the Court does not treat a request for counsel at arraignment as having the
same effect as a request for counsel made during a Miranda advisement.
666. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677-78.
667. Id. at 678.
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Id. at 678-79.
671. Id. at 678 n.2 (quoting the state trial court's explanation given for his ruling to sup-
press the statements).
672. 423 U.S. 96 (1975) Mosley holds that where a suspect only expresses a desire not to
be questioned, but does not request counsel, the police can, after a reasonable period of time,
approach the suspect again and seek to question him. So long as a proper Miranda waiver is
obtained and there is no evidence of repeated badgering, incriminating statements made dur-
ing this subsequent encounter will be admissible. Id. at 106-07. The invocation of one's right
to silence is thus given significantly less protection than the invocation of one's right to have
the assistance of counsel. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
673. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683.
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Thus, even though the suspect has now been formally charged and has the
forces of organized society arrayed against him, he is only protected from
renewed attempts by police to interrogate him, if the subject matter of the in-
terrogation relates to the "same offense" as the formally charged offense (as
defined by the Blockburger test). This is because a request for Sixth
Amendment counsel at arraignment, while viewed as a general all-purpose
request for legal assistance,"4 is treated as a request for counsel's assistance
at interrogations only with respect to offenses formally charged. Such for-
malism defies common sense. Certainly a defendant does not know and does
not calculate whether he is invoking his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment or the Fifth Amendment.'" Cobb also substitutes for the bright
line rule in Roberson a muddy test that, despite its obvious purpose to en-
courage police to interrogate formally charged defendants, will nevertheless
be a trap for the unwary officer who has not mastered complexities of a dou-
ble jeopardy test that has proven difficult for judges and lawyers. Most
importantly, however, Cobb undercuts the fundamental premise underlying
Michigan v. Jackson that a request for Sixth Amendment counsel constitutes
a request for counsel's assistance in all dealings with the state, because the
state is now an adversary that has determined to prosecute him.
Cobb and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion cast an ominous cloud
over the future of the right to counsel at interrogation. The Court's lack of
respect for the right to counsel was also seen during the term in its denial of
certiorari in Bridgers v. Texas." In that case the Miranda warning, which
was read from a printed card, failed to advise a suspect that he had the right
to have an attorney present with him during any interrogation.' The warn-
ing only suggested that an attorney could be consulted "prior to any ques-
tioning."67 8 In a "statement" (not a dissent) respecting the denial of certiorari,
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, wrote explicitly to re-
iterate that the denial of certiorari "expresses no view about the merits of pe-
titioner's claim" and noted that the warning omitted "an essential Miranda
element."679 Justice Breyer's statement concluded that if this problem
"proves to be a recurring one, I believe that it may well warrant this Court's
attention." '
674. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986).
675. Indeed it is ironic that the Roberson rule is grounded in a "'right" to counsel that is
not found in the text of any Amendment, but is granted judicially by the Miranda decision.
676. 121 S. Ct. 1995 (2001).
677. Id. at 1996.
678. Id. at 1995-96.
679. Id. at 1996.
680. Id
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B. Glover v. United States"
Upholding the right to effective counsel at trial and sentencing, a
unanimous Court held that any increase in jail time attributable to ineffec-
tiveness of counsel would constitute prejudice under Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 82 and Williams v. Taylor.3
In Glover, the defendant, who was Vice President and General Counsel
of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union, was
charged with taking kickbacks on investments made with the Union's
money. 6 ' He was convicted of money laundering, labor racketeering, and tax
evasion. Viewing these offenses as involving the same harm, the probation
pre-sentence report recommended that all convictions be grouped together
for the purpose of determining the sentencing range under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.6" This would have produced a sentence range of 63
to 78 months.3 6 However, the government argued that the crime of money
laundering should be separated out from the other crimes, yielding a higher
range of 78 to 97 months in prison.687 The defendant received a sentence of
84 months. 8
At trial, Glover's lawyers did not aggressively contest the government's
position on this "grouping" issue, nor did they raise the issue on appeal to
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, despite the fact that prior to the deci-
sion in Glover's case, a different panel of that circuit held that under certain
circumstances it was appropriate to group money laundering with other simi-
lar offenses for the purpose of determining the sentencing range.689
After Glover's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal involving
other grounds, Glover filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 chal-
lenging his sentence. He argued that his lawyer's failure to vigorously argue
that all offenses should have been grouped together constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Strickland test.6'
The District Court denied his petition on the theory that even if the al-
leged failure was error, the difference such an error would have made in
Glover's sentence (a 6-21 month differential) would not constitute prejudice
within the meaning of Strickland. The Seventh Circuit affirmed relying on
681. 531 U.S. 198 (2001).
682. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland created a two prong test, requiring a defendant
claiming ineffectiveness of counsel to demonstrate (1) that counsel's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced by coun-
sel's deficient performance. Id. at 669.
683. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
684. Glover, 531 U.S. at 200.
685. Id.
686. See id. at 202.
687. Id. at 200, 201.
688. Id. at 201.
689. Id. See also United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281 (1996).
690. Glover, 531 U.S. at 201-02.
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acting as an agent of the state.' The Texas court also found that Penry's jury
instructions regarding mitigation were in compliance with Penry 1.'
Because Penry filed his federal habeas petition after the enactment of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the
provisions of that law governed the Court's review. Under the restrictions
imposed on federal habeas review by AEDPA, the Supreme Court did not
reach the actual merits of Penry's Fifth Amendment claim because it could
not be said that the Texas court's ruling on that issue was "objectively un-
reasonable." However, six justices found that the State court's determina-
tion that the trial court followed the mandate set out in Penry I was objec-
tively unreasonable.7"
Justice O'Connor, who authored the Court's opinion, explained that the
AEDPA prohibits a federal court from granting an application for a writ of
habeas corpus with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state
court, unless that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.""'
Justice O'Connor observed that the "contrary to" and "unreasonable ap-
plication" clauses of AEDPA have independent meaning under Williams v.
Taylor" and a state court decision will be contrary to clearly established Su-
preme Court precedent if the state court either "applies a rule that contradicts
the governing law set forth in our cases,"' 3 or "confronts a set of facts that
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and neverthe-
less arrives at a result different from our precedent."' A state court decision
will be an "unreasonable application of" clearly established precedent if it
"correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to
the facts of a particular prisoner's case. 7 5
In arguing that the admission of the conclusions from his previous psy-
chiatric evaluation violated the Fifth Amendment, Penry had relied upon
Estelle v. Smith-7" In Estelle, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment pro-
hibited use of statements made at an uncounseled psychiatric interview.
Unlike Penry, however, the defendant in Estelle had not placed his mental
condition at issue.0 7 Moreover, in Estelle, it was the trial court that had
called for the competency evaluation and the State had chosen the examining
697. Id. at 1917. The report concluded that Penry would be dangerous to others if re-
leased. Id.
698. Id
699. Id. at 1919.
700. Id. at 1924.
701. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
702. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
703. Id. at 406.
704. Id.
705. Id. at 407-08.
706. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
707. Id.
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Lockhart v. Fretwell.69 Assuming without deciding that counsel was ineffec-
tive, it was the Seventh Circuit's view that Lockhart precluded relief since
the increase in sentence was not so significant that the outcome was funda-
mentally unfair. Justice Kennedy, writing for the entire Court, reiterated that
Williams v. Taylor6" had established that Lockhart did not change the Strick-
land analysis. Justice Kennedy thus rejected the Seventh Circuit's attempt to
add an additional "significance" requirement, holding that "any amount of
actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance." 69' The Court then re-
manded the case for a determination of whether there was in fact error in
failing to group the offenses and if so whether Glover's counsel had been in-
effective.
V. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A. Penry v. Johnson694
In 1989 the United States Supreme Court held that Johnny Paul Penry's
sentence to death for the brutal rape and murder of Pamela Carpenter was in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, because his jury had not been ade-
quately instructed with respect to mitigating evidence regarding his mental
retardation.6" Penry was retried in 1990, and again a Texas jury found him
guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death.
In this case, the Court considered two issues: (1) whether the jury in-
structions at Penry's resentencing complied with the Court's original man-
date, and (2) whether the admission into evidence, during cross-examination
of a defense expert witness, of conclusions from a psychiatric report based
on an uncounseled interview with Penry, which occurred two years before
the murder of Carpenter, violated the Fifth Amendment.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that no Fifth Amendment
violation had occurred because the interview had been conducted by a psy-
chiatric specialist requested by Penry's defense counsel to determine Penry's
competency to stand trial in an unrelated case.696 Therefore, the use of con-
clusions from his psychiatric evaluation, even though based upon unwarned
and uncounseled statements made by Penry, were not elicited by someone
691. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
692. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). For a discussion of Taylor see Benner et al., Criminal Justice
in the Supreme Court: A Review of United States Supreme Court Criminal and Habeas ('or-
pus Decisions (October 4, 1999-October 1,2000), 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 285-95 (2001).
693. Glover, 531 U.S. at 203.
694. 121 S. Ct. 1910 (2001)
695. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) [hereinafter Penry I].
696. Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1916 (2001).
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psychiatrist."' Here Penry's counsel in the unrelated 1977 case requested the
psychiatric exam. In Estelle, the State had called the psychiatrist to testify as
a part of its affirmative case,1" but it was during the cross-examination of
Penry's own psychological witness that the prosecutor elicited the quotation
from the report. Also, in Estelle, the defendant was charged with a capital
crime at the time of his competency exam, and it was thus clear that his fu-
ture dangerousness would be a specific issue at sentencing; but Penry had
not yet committed murder at the time he was interviewed regarding his com-
petency to stand trial on the unrelated case. Finding it unnecessary to actu-
ally determine Penry's Fifth Amendment claim, the Court concluded, in light
of these differences between Penry's situation and Estelle's, it was not ob-
jectively unreasonable for the Texas court to rule that Estelle did not require
exclusion of the conclusions from the defense originated report on cross ex-
amination by the state.
The instructions to the jury, however, were a different matter. The
Texas death penalty statute requires that at the close of the penalty hearing,
the jury be instructed to answer three statutorily mandated "special issues":
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society;
and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in kill-
ing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any,
by the deceased.71°
The first time the case was tried (in 1980) the jury answered "yes" to
each issue and, as required by statute, the trial court sentenced Penry to
death."' Although Penry had offered extensive evidence that he was men-
tally retarded and had been severely abused as a child, the jury was never in-
structed that it could give mitigating effect to that evidence in imposing sen-
tence."' For that reason, the Supreme Court had reversed and remanded
Penry's case for retrial, mandating that the jury receive instructions that
would permit it to "consider and give effect to" the mitigation evidence pre-
sented by Penry."'
Justice O'Connor, in Penry H, holds that the instructions given in
Penry's retrial did not accomplish this constitutionally mandated goal. Al-
though the trial court did instruct the jury about mitigation, and told them
708. Id at 456-57.
709. Id. at 459.
710. TEx. CODE CR M. PRoc. ANN., art. 37.07 1(b) (Vernon 1981 and Supp.1989)).
711. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1989).
712. ld at 320.
713. Id. at 319.
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they could consider it and give it the weight they felt it deserved, it still in-
structed the jury that it must answer the three questions, and that three "yes"
answers would mandate a death sentence."' Although the defense told the
jury that if they wished, they could simply answer "no" to one of the ques-
tions if they felt the mitigation was such that death was not appropriate. The
Court held that this did not cure the defect identified in Penry I. Characteriz-
ing the supplemental instruction as confusing, the Court acknowledged that
it informed the jurors they could take Penry's mitigating evidence regarding
his retardation into account in answering the three special issue questions.
However, the instructions were still found wanting because the three special
questions themselves did not provide an opportunity for the jury to consider
Penry's mitigating evidence. As Justice O'Connor explained:
[Tihe supplemental instruction placed the jury in no better position than
was the jury in Penry I. As we made clear in Penry I, none of the special
issues is broad enough to provide a vehicle for the jury to give mitigating
effect to the evidence of Penry's mental retardation and childhood
abuse.... Thus, because the supplemental instruction had no practical ef-
fect, the jury instructions at Penry's second sentencing were not meaning-
714. The court instructed the jury:
[Blefore any issue may be answered 'Yes,' all jurors must be convinced by the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to such issue should be
'Yes.' ... [I]f any juror, after considering the evidence and these instructions, has
a reasonable doubt as to whether the answer to a Special Issue should be answered
'Yes,' then such juror should vote 'No' to that Special Issue.... [lIf you return an
affirmative finding on each of the special issues submitted to you, the court shall
sentence the defendant to death. You are further instructed that if you return a
negative finding on any special issue submitted to you, the court shall sentence the
defendant to the Texas Department of Corrections for life. You are therefore in-
structed that your answers to the special issues, which determine the punishment to
be assessed the defendant by the court, should be reflective of your finding as to
the personal culpability of the defendant, JOHNNY PAUL PENRY, in this case.
The trial court also gave a "supplemental instruction" on mitigation:
You are instructed that when you deliberate on the questions posed in the special
issues, you are to consider mitigating circumstances, if any, supported by the evi-
dence presented in both phases of the trial, whether presented by the state or the
defendant. A mitigating circumstance may include, but is not limited to. any aspect
of the defendant's character and record or circumstances of the crime which you
believe could make a death sentence inappropriate in this case. If you find that
there are any mitigating circumstances in this case, you must decide how much
weight they deserve, if any, and therefore, give effect and consideration to them in
assessing the defendant's personal culpability at the time you answer the special
issue. If you determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if any, that a
life sentence, as reflected by a negative finding to the issue under consideration,
rather than a death sentence, is an appropriate response to the personal culpability
of the defendant, a negative finding should be given to one of the special issues.
Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1916-17 (2001) (citing App. 672-75).
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fully different from the ones we found constitutionally inadequate in
Penry L
715
Justice O'Connor also rejected the State's alternative argument that the
supplemental instruction acted as a "nullification instruction" permitting the
jury to disregard the three special issue questions, if it believed death was
not appropriate because of Penry's retardation. This argument, however, ran
counter to the presumption that jurors follow their instructions. Under this
view of the instructions, Justice O'Connor said, the jurors would be forced to
violate their oath to answer the three special questions truthfully. Thus the
jury instructions, taken as a whole, were "internally contradictory and placed
law-abiding jurors in an impossible situation."" 6
Justice O'Connor concluded that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal's
determination that the jury instructions given at Penry's second trial met the
mandate of Penry I was therefore "objectively unreasonable."7 '
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
dissented, arguing that the Texas trial court had given the jury sufficient op-
portunity to consider Penry's mitigating evidence. '
B. Shafer v. South Carolina""
In this case, the Court tells the state of South Carolina, rather emphati-
cally, that it meant what it said in Simmons v. South Carolina.' Simmons
held that where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is placed in issue,
and the only sentencing alternative other than death is life imprisonment
without possibility of parole, due process requires that the jury be informed
of the defendant's parole ineligibility."'
After Simmons, South Carolina modified its capital statute so that the
jury was charged with making two decisions. First the jury decided if eligi-
bility for the death penalty had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by
considering evidence regarding the aggravating factors which made the de-
fendant death-eligible. If death-eligibility were found, then the jury would
make the decision only between life without parole and death.' If the jury
found that defendant was not death-eligible, sentencing would then go to the
judge, who could sentence the defendant either to a term of thirty years to
life, or to life without parole.
715. Id. at 1921.
716. 1&
717. Il at 1924.
718. Id.
719. 121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001).
720. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
721. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 165 (2000).
722. Sections 16-3-20(A), (B), (C).
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In April of 1997, Wesley Aaron Shafer, Jr., shot and killed a conven-
ience store cashier during an attempted robbery. Before trial, the prosecutor
notified the defense they would seek the death penalty, and that the State
would present evidence of Shafer's "prior bad acts," as well as his "propen-
sity for [future] violence and unlawful conduct. 7
Near the end of Shafer's sentencing hearing, the trial judge conducted
an in camera hearing on jury instructions. Shafer's counsel maintained that
due process, and the holding in Simmons v. South Carolina,"' required the
judge to instruct that under South Carolina law a life sentence carries no pos-
sibility of parole. The prosecutor opposed the request stating that 'the State
has not argued at any point... that he would be a danger to anybody in the
future, nor will we argue [that] in our closing argument.... ,,72" Defense
counsel replied that the state had introduced evidence, which tended to show
future dangerousness and the instruction was therefore required. 76 The judge
denied the requested Simmons instruction.
Shafer's counsel then sought permission to read in his closing argument
lines from the controlling statute, Section 16-3-20(A), which stated plainly
that a life sentence in South Carolina carries no possibility of parole. That
motion was also denied.7 7
During the jury's deliberations (after a finding of eligibility), the jury
sent out a note asking about the possibility of parole. 28 Shafer's lawyer
again asked that the relevant statute be read, but the judge refused, instead
responding to the jury's inquiry by telling them not to concern themselves
with parole. The jury sentenced Shafer to death within eighty minutes after
receiving the judge's response. 29
After noting that South Carolina has consistently refused to inform the
jury of a capital defendant's parole eligibility status, Justice Ginsburg re-
jected the South Carolina Supreme Court's view that Simmons was inappli-
cable under the new sentencing scheme, because at the start of jury delibera-
tions the defendant was technically eligible for parole if the jury found he
723. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1267.
724. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
725. Shafer, 121 S. Ct. at 1267-68 (quoting App. at 161) (alteration appearing in text of
the opinion).
726. The defense attorney argued,
The State cannot introduce evidence of future dangerousness, and then say we are
not going to argue it and [thereby avoid] a charge on the law .... They have intro-
duced [evidence of a] post arrest assault, [and] post arrest violations of the rules of
the jail .... If you put a jailer on to say that [Shafer] is charged with assault .. on
[the jailer], that is future dangerousness.
Id. (citation to record omitted).
727. Id.
728. "'1) Is there any remote chance for someone convicted of murder to become
eligli]ble for parole? 2) Under what conditions would someone convicted for murder be
elig[i]ble."' Id. at 1269 (citation to record omitted).
729. Id. at 1270.
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was not death-eligible and he could be given a thirty years to life sentence.'
Dismissing this argument, Justice Ginsburg observed that once the jury has
determined a defendant is death eligible, Simmons does come into play. She
pointed out that at this stage:
South Carolina law provides no third choice, no 30-year mandatory mini-
mum, just death or life without parole.... We therefore hold that when-
ever future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding
under South Carolina's new scheme, due process requires that the jury be
informed that a life sentence carries no possibility of parole."'
The Court also rejected South Carolina's claim that the jury was suffi-
ciently apprised of defendant's parole ineligibility by defense counsel clos-
ing argument, which urged that defendant would "die in prison" if given a
life sentence.73 The Court was similarly unpersuaded by the State's argu-
ment that no parole ineligibility instruction was required under Simmons be-
cause the State never argued Shafer would pose a future danger to society."'
Although Justice Scalia and Thomas dissented, they both acknowledged
that Shafter is a "logical extension of Simmons." '"
VI. PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
A. Michaels v. McGrath"'5
In a surprising opinion, Justice Thomas dissents from the denial of cer-
tiorari in this case. 36 Margaret Michaels, who worked as a teacher's aid in a
nursery school was tried and convicted of the sexual abuse of her charges.
She served five years in prison before a New Jersey appellate court reversed
citing egregious behavior by the police and prosecution. 7 The appellate
court noted that even the respondents apparently realized that their interroga-
tion techniques "'caused certain children to use their imagination and stray
from reality.""'73 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, hold-
ing "'the interviews of the children were highly improper and employed co-
ercive and unduly suggestive methods,"'7 '" and that "'[t]he interrogations
undertaken in the course of this case utilized most, if not all, of the practices
730. Id. at 1270-71.
731. Id. at 1273.
732. Id.
733. See id. at 1274.
734. 1l at 1275 (citations omitted).
735. 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1118 (2001).
736. Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118 (2001).
737. Id. (citing State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489. 510-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993)).
738. Id. (citing State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 511 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)).
739. It (citing State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1380 (N.J. 1994)).
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that are disfavored or condemned by experts, law enforcement authorities
and government agencies."' 7
Michaels then sued for a violation of her civil rights under Rev. Stat.
Section 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the District Court granted summary
judgment,"' and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,42 hold-
ing
[r]ecovery was barred because the coercion of child witnesses was a viola-
tion only of the witnesses' rights, and not of any right held by petitioner.
And although petitioner's due process rights were violated when the testi-
mony was used at trial, the court held that the presentation of testimony
fell squarely within the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity."""
Justice Thomas noted that the Seventh Circuite" agreed with the Third,
but the Second and Tenth Circuits did not." 5 Justice Thomas would grant
certiorari.
In Zahrey v. Coffey,"6 the Second Circuit took the position that a plain-
tiff does state a claim under Section 1983 when he shows that prosecutorial
misconduct in gathering evidence has led to a deprivation of his liberty. The
intervention of a subsequent immunized act by the same officer does not
break the chain of causation necessary for liability. Justice Thomas stated: "I
believe that the Second Circuit's approach is very likely correct, and that the
decision below leaves victims of egregious prosecutorial misconduct without
a remedy."7 '7 In light of Justice Thomas' general antipathy to criminal de-
fendants, this dissent from a denial of certiorari is therefore of particular in-
terest.
VII. DUE PROCESS
A. Rogers v. Tennessee"'
Rogers was convicted of second-degree murder for the stabbing death of
James Bowdre. Bowdre, stabbed with a butcher knife, did not die right away,
but lapsed into a coma after surgery. After fifteen months he developed a
kidney infection and died from "cerebral hypoxia, secondary to a stab wound
to the heart.""7 9 Rogers appealed his conviction, arguing that under Tennes-
740. Id. (citing State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379 (N.J. 1994)).
741. Michaels v. New Jersey, 50 F. Supp. 2d 353, 356 (D.N.J. 1999).
742. Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).
743. Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118 (2001) (citation omitted).
744. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7h Cir. 1994).
745. See Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147 (10" Cir. 1997) and Zahrey v. Coffey, 221
F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000).
746. 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000).
747. Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118 (2001).
748. 121 S. Ct. 1693 (2001).
749. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W. 2d 393, 395 (Tenn. 1999).
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see common law, if the victim does not die within a year and a day the de-
fendant cannot be convicted of murder." The Tennessee Supreme Court,
however, abolished the "year and a day" rule and affirmed Roger's convic-
tion."'
Although the Tennessee Court observed that the rule was part of Ten-
nessee law,"0 it noted that the rule had recently been abolished in the vast
majority of jurisdictions that had considered it.'" It then found that the origi-
nal reasons for recognizing the rule no longer existed, and abolished the
rule.'6 The defendant argued that abolishing the rule in his case would vio-
late due process and the Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the state and federal
constitutions. The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, rejected the due
process argument and held that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied only to leg-
islative acts and did not apply to the Judiciary.'"
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Tennessee Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision." Justice O'Connor was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Souter. Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and in part by Justice Breyer.
It is interesting to note that the lineup is very similar to the lineup last
term in Cannell v. Texas," which also dealt with the issue of the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the federal constitution. In Carmell the defendant was ac-
cused of sexually abusing his teenage stepdaughter in 1991 .'" At the time he
committed these offenses, Texas law allowed the uncorroborated testimony
of anyone under fourteen to be sufficient for conviction, but if the victim
was over fourteen years of age, the victim's testimony would require other
corroboration for conviction. However, in 1993 the Texas legislature
amended the legislation to allow the uncorroborated testimony of any victim
under eighteen to be sufficient for conviction." 9 Under that act, Carmell was
convicted on the testimony of the victim only, and sentenced to life impris-
750. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TIlE LAWS OF ENGLAND 197198
(1769).
751. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W. 2d 393 (Tenn. 1999).
752. See, e.g., Percer v. State, 118 Tenn. 765 (1907).
753. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W. 2d at 397.
754. Id. at 399-401. The rule is generally believed to date back to the 13' century when
medical science was not capable of establishing causation beyond a reasonable doubt when a
great deal of time had elapsed between the injury and the death. Advances in modern medical
science have rendered the reason for the rule obsolete. See Donald E. Walther. Comment.
Taming a Phoenix: The Year-and-a-Day Rule in Federal Prosecutions for Murder, 59 U. Ciii.
L. REv. 1337 (1992) (tracing the history of the rule).
755. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d. at 402.
756. 529 U.S. 1129 (2000).
757. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
758. ld. at 516.
759. See TEx. CODE CRLM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07.
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onment and thirteen concurrent sentences of twenty years each. He appealed,
and the United States Supreme Court reversed.7"
Using both historical arguments and the four pronged test set forth in
Calder v. Bull,"' Justice Stevens found that the action of the Texas legisla-
ture violated the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution, be-
cause Carmell was convicted on less evidence than was required at the time
he allegedly committed the offense.76
However, Rogers involved a change in a common law rule promulgated
by the judiciary. Justice O'Connor observed that the literal text of the Ex
Post Facto Clause, which reads "no state shall pass any ex post facto law," '
makes clear that the Clause is 'a limitation upon the powers of the Legisla-
ture, and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of govern-
ment."'
However, that is not the end of the analysis, because as the Court recog-
nized in Bouie v. City of Columbia,765 there are "limitations on ex post facto
judicial decisionmaking ... inherent" in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.7" Bouie involved the judicial enlargement of South
Carolina's criminal trespass statute, which required notice from the owner or
tenant prohibiting entry in order to apply.767 The South Carolina Supreme
Court construed the state's criminal trespass statute to apply to patrons who
had entered a store with permission, but refused to leave when asked. '68 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the South Carolina
Court's decision constituted a retroactive construction of the statute and thus
violated due process.
In Rogers, Justice O'Connor points out that it is a basic principle of due
process that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct it makes
a crime.769 Therefore, for Justice O'Connor and the majority, Bouie stood for
the proposition that "if a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unex-
pected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed
760. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 552-53.
761. 3 Dal. 386, 390 (1798), The four categories were (I) every law that makes an act
done before the passing of the law, and which was not criminal when done, criminal; (2)
every law that makes a crime greater, i.e., aggravated, than it was when committed; (3) every
law that provides a greater punishment for a crime that when it was committed; and (4) every
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender.
762. See Carmell, 529 U.S. at 530.
763. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
764. Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 1697 (2001) (quoting Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977)).
765. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
766. Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1697.
767. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 349 n. 1.
768. Id. at 357.
769. Id. at 350.
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prior to the conduct in issue, then that construction must not be given retro-
active effect." '
However, Rogers read Boule, to hold that if a state legislature is barred
by the Ex Post Facto Clause from retroactively applying a law, '"it must fol-
low that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from
achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.'"'" Justice
O'Connor rejected the idea that Bouie held the Due Process Clause "incor-
porates the specific prohibitions of the Ex Post Facto Clause as identified in
Calder." rn She declared that language in Bouie to this effect was mere dicta,
because Bouie was decided on "core due process concepts of notice, forsee-
ability, and in particular the right to fair warning."" 3
Noting the differences between the work of the legislature and the work
of the courts, and observing that the Calder categories would "place an un-
workable and unacceptable restraint on judicial decisionmaking,"" Justice
O'Connor formulates the test for retroactive judicial decisionmaking under
the Due Process Clause as follows:
[W]e conclude that a judicial alteration of a common law doctrine of
criminal law violates the principle of fair warning, and hence must not be
given retroactive effect, only where it is "unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in is-
sue."-W
5
Having set up that test, Justice O'Connor finds that the Tennessee
Court's abolition of the year and a day rule was not unexpected and indefen-
sible. The rule was based upon outmoded models of medical science, and
had been abolished in the vast number of jurisdictions that had considered
it."6 In addition, although it was recognized in Tennessee law, it was not part
of the criminal code and had been only mentioned several times in dicta by
the Tennessee courts.m Finally, it had never been enforced in the state."' For
those reasons, Justice O'Connor believed that the action taken by the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court was defensible and not unexpected.
Justice Scalia wrote the chief dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ste-
vens and Thomas, with Justice Breyer joining in part. In a fierce opening
salvo, Justice Scalia begins:
770. Id. at 354.
771. Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1698 (quoting Boule, 378 U.S. at 353-54).
772. Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1698.
773. Id.
774. Id. at 1700.
775. Id. (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354).
776. Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1701.
777. Percer v. State, 118 Tenn. 1765 (1907); Cole v. State, 512 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn. Cnm.
App. 1974); State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
778. Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1702.
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The Court today approves the conviction of a man for murder that was not
murder (but only manslaughter) when the offense was committed. It thus
violates a principle ... which "dates from the ancient Greeks" and has
been described as one of the most 'widely held value-judgments in the en-
tire history of human thought.
779
The thrust of Justice Scalia's first argument is that it makes no sense to
give judges the power to do that which elected representatives cannot do, i.e.
"retroactively make murder what was not murder when the act was commit-
ted."78 Justice Scalia then compares Rogers to Carmell v. Texas,"' which
was decided the previous term. He argues that just as the law could not be
applied retroactively in Carmell to allow the uncorroborated testimony of a
rape victim to convict, when it could not do so at the time of the crime, so
too, the law cannot be changed after the fact to allow a manslaughter to be-
come a murder.782 Indeed, Justice Scalia points out:
if the present condition differs at all from the one involved in Carmtell it is
in the fact that it does not merely pertain to the "quantum of evidence"
necessary to corroborate a charge, . . . but is an actual element of the
crime-a "substantive principle of law,". . . the failure of which "entirely
precludes a murder prosecution. 783
Justice Scalia then disagrees with the majority that the statements con-
tained in Bouie v. City of Columbia,M to the effect that "'if a state legislature
is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must fol-
low that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from
achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction,"'783 are "mere
dicta." '786 Instead, according to Justice Scalia, "the ratio decidendi of Bouie
was that the principle applied to the legislature through the Ex Post Facto
clause was contained in the Due Process Clause insofar as judicial action is
concerned. 787 Justice Scalia thus saw Rogers as falling within Calder's sec-
ond category of ex post facto laws (i.e. "one that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed"). 7 8
Justice Scalia also rejects the majority's interpretation that Bouje only
forbade retroactive judicial changes, which were made without fair warning,
noting that the "fair warning" Bouie referred to was "not 'fair warning that
779. Id. at 1703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting in part, J. [[ALL, GLZNERAL PRINCHI.IS 01;
CRIMNAL LAW 59 (2d ed. 1960)).
780. Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1703.
781. 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
782. Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1703-04.
783. Id. at 1704 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
784. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
785. Id. at 353-54. quoted in Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1704 (Scalia. J.. dissenting).
786. Rogers. 121 S. Ct. at 1704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
787. Id.
788. Id.
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the law might be changed,' but fair warning of what constituted the crime at
the time of the offense."' Justice Scalia observed that if a bill, pending be-
fore a legislature and assured passage, were upon enactment to be retroac-
tively applied, the fact there was fair warning would not save it from invali-
dation."9 Thus, he argued the same result should follow for the courts as
well. 9'
Continuing in his point-by-point refutation of the majority opinion, he
concludes by attacking Justice O'Connor's philosophizing about the need for
judicial flexibility because the common law needs to grow and change with
the times. Justice Scalia acknowledges this, but points out the difference be-
tween applying the law to a new set of circumstances and changing the law
by abolishing a long established common law rule. 7" He then argues that
"retroactive revision" of judicial rules in criminal cases was unheard at the
time of the adoption of the Due Process Clause."3 Quoting from an admiralty
case in 1886, well after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868,
Scalia observed that the Supreme Court had disclaimed such power.
[t]he rights of persons in this particular under the maritime law of this
country are not different from those under the common law, and as it is the
duty of courts to declare the law, not to make it, we cannot change this
rule."M
Justice Scalia maintained that English Judges could not change a law
even if they felt the reason for the law was no longer valid. Rather, it was for
Parliament to change the law, and these views carried over into the colonies.
Justice Scalia then closes his lengthy historical analysis into English com-
mon law, with a quote from James Madison in the Federalist Papers, that "ex
post facto laws... are contrary to the first principle of the social compact,
and to every principle of social legislation."'
Justice Scalia then responds to the majority's notion that due process is
violated only when there is lack of a fair warning of the impending retroac-
tive change. Justice Breyer joins him in this portion of the dissent as well.
Justice Scalia does not agree that the defendant in this case received any
kind of fair warning to prepare him for the retroactive abolition of the year
and a day rule. First, he deals with the majority's assertion that the year and
a day rule had been abolished in the vast number of jurisdictions that had re-
cently considered the issue. How had this given him fair warning? Is a per-
789. Id.
790. Id. at 1705.
791. Id.
792. ld.
793. Id
794. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213-14 (1886). overruled by Morgane v. States Ma-
rine Lines Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
795. Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE F.Erniis No. 44,
at 282 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).
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son expected to keep abreast of the laws of the fifty states? Moreover, why
not consider the number of jurisdictions that had not recently considered the
issue, or those that had considered the issue and dealt with the problem
legislatively instead of by judicial fiat? What about the jurisdictions that had
abolished the rule prospectively, and not retroactively? Justice Scalia there-
fore finds that the defendant did not have fair warning that the year and a day
rule would be retroactively abolished by the judiciary.796
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority of the Court that in applying the
Due Process Clause, the relevant question to ask is whether the judicial rul-
ing was unexpected and indefensible. But he felt that Rogers did not have
fair warning that this rule would be abolished, or if it were, that it would be
abolished retroactively, and not prospectively or by the legislature. There-
fore, he agreed with the dissenters on this issue.797
VIII. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Ohio v. Reiner798
In this per curiam opinion, the Court held that a claim of innocence does
not preclude a witness from asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination, where the witness has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that her answers could be used to incriminate her.Y
This case arose out of a grant of transactional immunity to a state's wit-
ness. Defendant Reiner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after his
two-month-old son died from "shaken baby syndrome. ' ' "° The evidence
showed that the infant had a broken leg and a broken rib at the time he died.
Defendant claimed that the family's babysitter, who had cared for the infant
on the day he died and for two weeks preceding his death was responsible."'
The State called the babysitter at trial and she asserted her Fifth Amendment
privilege. The trial court then granted her transactional immunity from
prosecution as provided for by state law and the jury was informed of this
fact. The babysitter then testified that she had never shaken the deceased in-
fant and was unaware of any injuries.8"
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed Reiner's conviction on the ground
that the babysitter did not have a valid claim of privilege, because she denied
any involvement in the crime and that defendant was prejudiced by the
796. Rogers, 121 S. Ct. at 1710.
797. Id. at 1711 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
798. 121 S. Ct. 1252 (2001).
799. Id. at 1253.
800. Id.
801. Id.
802. Id.
[Vol. 38
94
California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss1/4
2001] U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL AND HABEAS CORPUS DECISIONS 181
wrongful grant of immunity because it communicated to the jury that the
babysitter did not cause the infant's injuries."
Noting that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination protects
the innocent as well as the guilty, the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion
noted that the innocent witness as well as the wrongdoer "might be ensnared
by ambiguous circumstances ... [and] may provide the government with in-
criminating evidence from the speaker's own mouth."'
Given the fact that the defense theory was that the babysitter was re-
sponsible for the abuse, she therefore had "reasonable cause to apprehend
danger""0 5 that her answers to questions might "furnish a link in the chain of
evidence" that could be used to prosecute her for the abuse to the infant un-
der her care.' Because the witness therefore had a valid claim of privilege,
the Supreme Court reversed the state court's judgment and remanded the
case leaving open the question as to whether the grant of immunity under
had been appropriate.
IX. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Cleveland v. United States' 7
This case holds that a state license to operate a gambling machine does
not constitute "property" for the purposes of the federal mail fraud statute
until the license is actually issued."08
The state of Louisiana authorizes gambling through use of video poker
machines. Owners of the machines must obtain a license from the state be-
fore operating the machine for gambling and the license must be renewed
yearly.' Applicants paid a $10,000 fee to the state for processing their ini-
tial application and a $1000 fee with each license renewal application. The
state also taxed the machine $2000 yearly and received 32.5 percent of the
net revenue from the machine.810
Cleveland served as the attorney for a successful applicant for the li-
cense, as well as several renewals of that license."1 ' He was convicted of mail
fraud and racketeering under the Federal mail fraud statute."2 The gist of the
alleged mail fraud was Cleveland's failure to disclose in the initial applica-
tion and subsequent renewal applications that he was a part owner-operator
803. Ild.
804. 1l at 1254.
805. Id. at 1255.
806. 1& at 1254.
807. 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
808. Id. at 15.
809. Id.
810. Id. at 22.
811. ld at 15-16.
812. Id. at 17.
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of the video machines covered by the license."1 3 Cleveland's motion to dis-
miss the indictment on grounds that the license was neither money nor prop-
erty, as defined in the statute, was denied and the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction." ' The United States Supreme Court, however,
in a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Ginsburg, reversed. "
The government argued that the license granting the right to operate the
gambling machine constituted intangible property."6 In support of this posi-
tion, the government pointed out that other intangibles such as confidential
business information and services had been held to constitute property for
the purposes of the mail fraud statute."7 However, the Court concluded that
before the state issues a license, the license is not property."8 The primary
purpose of the license requirement is regulatory."9 The license processing
fees are for expenses incurred by the state in connection with the licensing
process. Subsequent taxes are only received after the license is issued.82
Once issued, the license may become property, but until the license was is-
sued, it was not property.82' The renewal of the license also did not deal with
property, because once the license expired, and until it was actually renewed,
it did not represent any interest. 22 Also, to the extent that there may be some
ambiguity to the term "property" in the mail fraud statute, the Court held that
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the defendant as a matter of leni-
ency." 3 Accordingly, the false statement in the applications did not violate
the Federal Mail Fraud statute.824
X. PRISONER RIGHTS
A. Shaw v. Murphy"25
In Shaw, a unanimous Court held that an inmate of a state penitentiary
had no special right under the First Amendment to provide legal advice to
another inmate, although he served in the penitentiary as an inmate law
clerk.26 The Court held that a penitentiary may regulate who is to receive the
813. Id. at 16-17.
814. Id. at 17-18.
815. Id. at27.
816. Id. at 21-22.
817. Id. at 23-24.
818. Id. at 15.
819. Id. at 23.
820. Id. at 22.
821. Id. at 15, 25.
822. See id. at 15.
823. Id. at 25 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
824. Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 27.
825. 121 S. Ct. 1475 (2001).
826. Id. at 1477.
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law clerk's legal advice, so long as the regulation is reasonably connected to
a legitimate objective of the penitentiary. "7
Murphy, a maximum-security inmate in a Montana penitentiary was a
law clerk allowed to provide legal information to other inmates." However,
penitentiary policy would not permit him to provide legal assistance to an-
other maximum-security inmate because, in the prison's view, such commu-
nications could threaten prison security. ' Pat Tracy, a fellow maximum-
security prisoner, was criminally charged with assaulting a correction officer
employed at the penitentiary. Tracy was represented by an attorney in the
case, but Tracy also asked for Murphy to assist him in his defense."'
Prison officials barred Murphy from giving advice to Tracy because
they were both maximum-security inmates.'" The prison offered Tracy the
help of another prison law clerk.' Nevertheless, Murphy sent Tracy a letter
containing information and legal advice about the case."s' The letter was in-
tercepted by prison officials and Murphy was disciplined for violating prison
rules. 5
Murphy brought this action for an injunction, claiming, among other
things, infringement on his First Amendment rights." The district court
dismissed the suit. 3' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court, holding that prison 'inmates have a... right to assist other inmates
with their legal claims."' 38 A unanimous Supreme Court in an opinion by
Justice Thomas, reversed the Ninth Circuit.1 39
Justice Thomas' opinion first noted that in Turner v. Safley, the Court
held that prison regulations may lawfully infringe upon constitutional rights
of prisoners if the regulation is 'reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests."'' Indeed, Turner was a First Amendment case. Murphy argued
here, however, that a First Amendment right required greater protection
when the exercise of that right involved giving legal advice to another pris-
oner facing a criminal charge. The Court declined to elevate legal advice
827. Id. at 1481.
828. Id. at 1477.
829. Id. at 1478.
830. Id. at 1477.
831. Id. at 1477, 1477 n.I.
832- Id. at 1477 n.1.
833. Id.
834. Id. at 1477.
835. Id at 1477-78.
836. Id. at 1478.
837. Id.
838. Id (quoting Murphy v. Shaw, 195 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9" Cir. 1999)).
839. Murphy, 121 S. Ct. at 1477.
840. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
841. Murphy, 121 S. Ct. at 1479 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
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from one prisoner to another prisoner in this situation to a higher status than
other communications between prisoners." 2
Justice Ginsburg concurred in a separate opinion noting that Murphy
also claimed that the prison rules under which he was disciplined (which
prohibited insolence and interference with due process hearings) were vague
and overbroad as applied to him."3 She observed that since the court below
did not resolve those issues, this decision does not prevent Murphy from
pursuing those claims on remand.8"
XI. CONCLUSION
The criminal justice decisions of the Supreme Court's 2000 Term reflect
the cautious, tentative approach of a deeply divided Court. In many of the
most significant cases the defendant's fate was decided by a single vote. A
majority of these five to four decisions rejected the defendant's claims. Nev-
ertheless, in several of these close cases, the Court upheld important consti-
tutional protections, although this was accomplished either by a narrow in-
terpretation of the right or through statutory construction that avoided
treading upon the constitutional right at issue. Thus, in Kyllo v. United States
the Court struck down high-tech surveillance of a home, but based its deci-
sion upon reasoning that arguably may have little application outside the
home itself. Similarly in INS v. St. Cyr and Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court pre-
served access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus guaranteed in Article I of the
Constitution, but did so by avoiding the constitutional issue, finding no clear
Congressional intent to restrict this method of judicial review in immigration
cases.
Despite their narrow scope, the opinions in these cases resonate with a
healthy respect for the importance of the Constitutional rights at stake. St.
Cyr and Zadvydas, moreover, have presciently laid the groundwork for
firmly establishing the right to use the Writ of Habeas Corpus to challenge
the exercise of executive power. Zadvydas also illuminates the fact that due
process protections do not disappear just because the government orders de-
tentions in contexts outside the normal criminal or mental health spheres. It
is fortunate that these decisions occurred before the terrorist attacks on Sep-
tember 11, 2001. They provide a base line for rational discourse unaffected
by the emotional trauma that has anguished us all in the aftermath of those
tragic events. Challenges to the detention provisions of the USA Patriot
Act ' and President Bush's Military Order46 authorizing trials of suspected
842. Murphy, 121 S. Ct. at 1479-80.
843. Id. at 1481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
844. Id.
845. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, PL 107-56 (FIR 3162) (Oct
26, 2001) (amending, inter alia, the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 et
seq.) to provide detention of suspected terrorists for periods of up to six months.
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non-citizen terrorists by military tribunals, for example, may soon reach the
Court via the very avenue of habeas corpus relief it secured in St. Cyr and
Zadvydas.
To be sure, as the Court in Zadvydas expressly noted, in the context of
national security, an argument might be made for judicial deference to the
judgments of the political branches. Under what circumstances the Court's
deference will extend to sacrificing the strong procedural protections it rec-
ognized in Zadvydas, however, remains to be seen. The lessons of history
teach that blind deference in the past has proven unwise and has tarnished
the Court's integrity.' The Court might well find courage from the example
set in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,' a war related case, which refused to
permit the government to dispense with the right to a jury trial and other ba-
sic due process protections, declaring that even Congress' power to conduct
war and foreign relations was still subject to the Constitution:
The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due
process under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout our con-
stitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis,
that there is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit governmental actions.
'The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
846. Military Order, Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, November 13, 2001, 2001 WL 1435652 (Pres.). Section 7(b) of the Mili-
tary Order declares that:
(b) with respect to any person subject to this order-
(1) military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by
the individual; and
(2) the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any pro-
ceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on
the individual's behalf, in
(i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof,
(ii) any court of any foreign nation, or
(iii) any international tribunal.
Such a blanket attempt, by executive order, to deprive individuals of all judicial
review concerning even whether they are in fact properly considered a "person
subject to this order," would appear to be subject to challenge under Zadvydas.
847. See Korematsu v. United States, 23 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment of citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry during World War I).
848. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Mendoza-Martinez was a person of dual nationality who fled
to Mexico in 1942 to evade U.S. military service. He later voluntarily re-entered, was con-
victed of draft evasion in 1947 and served his sentence of a year and a day. Five years later
deportation proceedings were brought against him. Following a hearing before a special in-
quiry officer appointed by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the government determined
Mendoza-Martinez had forfeited his U.S. citizenship and was thus now a deportable alien. Id.
at 147-48. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture of citizenship by executive decision,
even though Congressionally authorized, was nevertheless unconstitutional because it denied
Mendoza-Martinez the due process safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments. Id. at 166.
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classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.' . . . In no other
way can we transmit to posterity unimpaired the blessings of liberty.... '"
It may be feared that because Zadvydas was decided on non-
constitutional grounds and by the slimmest of margins, it may easily be dis-
tinguished and ignored. That may be prove to be true, but it does not neces-
sarily follow. In many ways Zadvydas is thus emblematic of the 2000 Term.
It reveals a Court cautiously keeping its options open, while not readily toss-
ing away constitutional protections that have historically been deemed fun-
damental to American justice.
Whatever the outcome of future litigation in this area, it is likely that
Justice O'Connor will play a critical role in its determination. She cast the
decisive vote to form the majority which upheld the constitutional protec-
tions at issue in Zadvydas. Indeed the 2000 Term perhaps bears the stamp of
Justice O'Connor's signature more clearly than that of any other justice; she
wrote seven majority opinions during the term and cast the decisive vote in
over half of the closely decided cases.
In two other split decisions, Penry v. Johnson (Penry I) and Shafer v.
South Carolina, which were decided by larger margins, the Court struck
down death sentences because of faulty jury instructions. In the wake of
revelations by DNA technology that our criminal justice system has repeat-
edly convicted the innocent and on numerous occasions even sentenced them
to death,8  a majority of the Justices have shown an increased sensitivity to
capital punishment issues. Only the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas dissented in Penry II, which held, following remand by the Court in
Penry I, that the state had again failed to give adequate jury instructions re-
garding the mitigating effect of Penry's mental retardation. The failure of ei-
ther the state legislature or the courts in Texas to adequately address the Su-
preme Court's mandate in Penry I may have prompted its decision to hear a
direct challenge to the constitutionality of executing the mentally retarded
during the 2001 Term. 85'
The Court, by a six to three margin, also attempted to hold the line and
prevent further erosion of the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, refusing to dispense with the traditional Fourth Amendment
requirement of individualized justification in both Ferguson v. City of
849. Id. at 164-65 (quoting Ex parte Milligan 4 Wall 2, 120-21 (1866)). But cf Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Quirin involved the trial of Nazi saboteurs, during a declared war.
before a military tribunal authorized by Congressional legislation, for war crimes which "by
the law of war may be triable by such military commissions." Id. at 29. Quirin expressly
noted that it did not address whether the executive branch had constitutional power to create
military tribunals in the absence of Congressional legislation. Id.
850. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AIFrER TRIAL. (1996)
(finding that the majority of defendants exonerated by DNA evidence had been victims of
mistaken eye-witness identification). See also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Mis-
carriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 57 (Table 6) (1987).
851. Atkins v. Virginia, No. 00-8452 (Sup. Ct. argued Feb. 20. 2001).
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Charleston and City of Indianapolis v. Edmond. However, the elusive "prin-
cipal purpose" test employed there to strike down drug checkpoints and law-
enforcement-initiated drug testing of pregnant mothers, is hardly a bright
line rule. We may find that Ferguson and Edinond were just lines drawn in
the sand, easily washed away by the waves of fear and frustration enveloping
us in this new era of terrorism. The traditional structure of Fourth Amend-
ment protection could then conveniently be replaced by the simple concept
of "reasonableness," which has become the touchstone of the Court's "spe-
cial needs" doctrine. Yet, the malleable concept of "reasonableness" once
unleashed from its textual moorings, found in the Amendment's probable
cause and warrant requirements, can all too quickly and unnecessarily di-
minish the compass of liberty and privacy. What is "reasonable," after all, is
subject to the fears and prejudices of the day. " The Fourth Amendment,
however, was intended to shelter liberty and privacy against the storm of
such passions, not become their barometer. The Court's failure to establish a
solid foundation for Fourth Amendment protections during the 2000 Term
will make it difficult to resist the pressures that lay ahead.
The 2000 Term was also filled with some curious contrasts. In Bush v.
Gore, for example, the Court required standards to control the discretion of
vote counters in determining the intent of the voter with respect to punch
card ballots which were not machine readable. In Anvater v. City of Lago
Vista, however, the Court upheld the wholly unbridled discretion of police
officers to make full custodial arrests, subjecting traffic offenders to the in-
dignity of being taken to jail for minor, non-jailable infractions. The Court's
indifference to the additional intrusions this decision will impose upon mi-
norities (who, recent racial profiling studies indicate, will bear the brunt of
such arrests and accompanying searches) remains another of the major dis-
appointments of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Another disappointing contrast is seen in the fact that while the Court
recognized in Ohio v. Reiner that the Fifth Amendment exists to protect the
innocent as well as the guilty, it did not seem to recognize in Texas v. Cobb
that this same principle also applies in the context of the Sixth Amendment's
fight to counsel. In Cobb, which delivered a severe blow to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at interrogation, the Court seems to see counsel
as an obstacle to gaining incriminating admissions from guilty defendants.
But in assuming the defendant's guilt, the Court is trampling upon the pre-
sumption of innocence that must exist if our system of criminal justice is to
provide fundamental fairness and actually do justice. While the Court recog-
nized in Reiner that an innocent person could unwittingly make an incrimi-
nating admission in the courtroom, its confession jurisprudence does not
seem to recognize the even greater danger that this could happen in the con-
852. It should not be forgotten that the Court once upheld restricting an individual's use
of certain transportation facilities because of their race on the ground this was a "reasonable
regulation." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
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fines of the police station interrogation room. The right to counsel at interro-
gation serves not as a roadblock to the conviction of the guilty, but as a safe-
guard against the conviction of the innocent. The Court once recognized that
a system of criminal justice that comes "to depend on the 'confession' will,
in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system
which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation.""8 3 Sadly, the Court seems willing to ignore that lesson of his-
tory.
A final contrast appears in the Court's treatment of retroactivity. This
theme was present in Tyler v. Cain and Rogers v. Tennessee as well as INS v.
St. Cyr and Zadvydas v. Davis. The Court's pronouncement in Rogers that a
court can retroactively apply changes in judicial rulemaking to the detriment
of defendants, so long as such changes are not unexpected or indefensible in
light of prior law, of course, contrasts sharply with the much different ex
post facto prohibition imposed on legislatures. The Rogers rule, however,
stands in even starker contrast to the AEDPA rules, which, after Tyler v.
Cain, severely restrict the ability of defendants, via habeas review, to gain
the retroactive benefit of new judicial interpretations regarding constitutional
protections. One can only hope that Rogers is not the harbinger of an ill
wind portending future restrictions, through judicial interpretation, of basic
constitutional rights.
853. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
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